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THE
IDEAL THEORY OP BERKELEY,
REAL WOELD.
FREE THOUGHTS ON BEEKELEY, IDEALISM, AND
METAPHYSICS.
BY
THOMAS HUGHES.
PREFACE.
About one-fourth of this volume was published
some months since, in a small spirited Irish
periodical. It is now given to the public not only-
enlarged in matter, but also altered in form. I
am not so contracted in view, and vain in expecta-
tion, as to think that it will settle the vexed
question between the realist and the idealist. If
it will in any way advance knowledge, and cast a
ray of light on any dark spot on the canvass of
human vision, it will satisfy mj expectation and
wish.
The book is not intended for the advanced and
the erudite; but for those who aspire after
advancement and knowledge, and receive with
gratitude any light and assistance, from whatever
quarter they may come. The intent is, to give
within a narrow compass, some acquaintance with
Berkeley's theory, to those who have not studied
his works for themselves : it aims also to help and
encourage the student of metaphysical science, in
his lonely and persevering efforts.
There is one ambitional thought running
IV PREFACE.
through the volume, — the universal unity of
all truth and knowledge. Though the book is on
metaphysics, metaphysical phrases and formularies
are avoided ; it is intended for the unsophisticated
and unmetaphysical reader, as well as to assist
those humble students who wish to travel forward
in the path of truth and science. The notes are
added to give more variety and interest to the
ordinary reader.
As people value things by their character and
inherent qualities, and not by their appearance
and what may be said of them, so books, by the
discreet and intelligent, will be thus estimated,
and not by what may be said of them in their
prefaces; and a different verdict I cannot reason-
ably wish for this volume. A book becomes a
member of a large family, the moment it is given to
the public, and an object of blame or praise, as its
character is, or as the views and taste of its critics
may be ; and, in some degree or other, without a
doubt, this unpretending volume will share the
same common lot. And, in common with all
natural feeling, I cannot but wish well to my
own : yet, if it happens to have praise, it will not
elate ; but, if otherwise, it will not distress.
T. H.
February Sth, 1865.
CONTENTS.
iarf |.
PAGE.
LIFE 1
fart Sg,
BERKELEY'S PHILOSOPHY ... 33
i^rt |J|.
METAPHYSICS.
CHAPTER I.
Mistaken Views concerning Meta-
physics 92
CHAPTER II.
The Advantages op Metaphysical Study 116
CHAPTER III.
The Necessity of Metaphysics 130
VI CONTENTS.
CHAPTER IV.
PAGE.
Metaphysics and tue Bible 140
CHAPTER Y.
The Relation of Metaphysics to other
Forms of Knowledge 147
CHAPTER YI.
Metaphysical Dangers 167
CHAPTER VII.
The Encouragements and Discourage-
ments which meet the Student of
Metaphysics 178
PAET I.
LIFE.
SECTION I.
The hand of Supreme Providence is impartial
in the distribution of its rich and suitable bene-
fits. The chief blessings of that liberal and wel-
come hand are given unto all people and countries
alike. All countries have their beautiful spots
and splendid sceneries, elevated hills and magnifi-
cent mountains, rich fields and charming valleys,
transparent rills and gigantic rivers. They have
their Fauna and Flora, their bright summers and
fruitful harvests ; they have their sun, moon,
stars, and comets. There are, hovrever, spots
where its blessings appear to have been lavished
more copiously than they are in other parts ; yet,
when all things are considered and compared,
there are found palpable evidences of suitability^
impartiality, and equality in the whole. What
appears to be deficient in one place to compete
with another in beauty, value, and grandeur, is
made up of other elements equally important, and
B
2 PART I.
much more suitable and needful to answer the
wise end of both place and circumstances.
The physical arrangement of things, presents a
presumptive proof of tlie impartial intention and
blessings of God in the moral and spiritual. The
natural is both an emblem and a proof of the
Divine purpose in the spiritual. As the blessings
of the natural world are distributed with an ap-
proximate equality and unfailing suitability over
all the face of the material, so is the inteution of
God relative to the moral and the spiritual. There
is this difference. The moral views man on a higher
ground than the natural does; he is viewed on
this higher ground of his relation as a rational
and accountable being, capable of refusing, re-
ceiving, using, or mis-using, the blessings given.
Moral blessings are equally contingent and con-
ditional in their character to the natural. Ac-
cording to the exact degree these contingencies
and conditions are observed or neglected, moral
blessings increase or diminish in their value and
usefulness to us. In the spread and distribution
of moral blessings there are two parties to be con-
sulted ; the agent, as the parent, the minister, or
the tutor, and the child, the disciple, and the
scholar. If one of theise miscarry in the discharge
of his duties, the conditions arc violated, and the
results will most assuredly follow.
LIFE.
SECTION II.
History informs us that hitherto most nations
and peoples have had their epochs and cycles in
intellectual and moral excellencies. Nations, no
more than the physical world, have not flourished all
at once. When the light and glory of one country
grew dim, the other country rose from obscurity
to a higher and a nobler elevation ; as if by some
mysterious power, the glories of oue were trans-
mitted to the other. This we attribute in part to
the Avrong and temporizing policies of nations, and
not to any fate or necessity. Whilst Greece"^
* The ancient Grrecia, a maritime country in the south-east of
Europe. It is in the shape of a triangle, with its base extending
from the top of the Adriatic to the mouths of the river Danube, and
having its two sides washed by the sea. It is bounded ou thj north
by European Turkey, west by the Ionian Sea and islands, south by
the Mediterranean, and east by the ^Egean Sea. In extent it is
210 miles long, by 160 broad; aud contains an area of 15,()0U
square miles, inclusive of its islands. It was called by its inhabit-
ants Hellas, aud the people were called Hellenes. The name Greece
comes to us through the Romans ; though why the Konians gave it
this name, is not known. It is a familiar fact, that foreigners often
call people by a diflerent appellation to what they call themselves.
Thus, lor instance, the nation called Germans by us, bear the appel-
lation of Deutscheu among themselves : and the people whom the
Eomans called Etruscans, or Tuscans, were known in their own
tongue by that of llasena. Greece, as a small portion of earth, has
a history without a parallel, except the hilly land of Judea ; and,
except the Jews, no people ever have made for themselves such a pro-
minent and illustrious place in the everlasting pages of history ;
whilst in philosophy and science they arc far superior to the Jews.
Schlegel calls them the second people of the world, chosen of
B 2
^ PART I.
floitrished in artSj science, and philosophy, other
^arts of Europe* were uncivilized and dark. Now
the land of science and philosophy is deserted, and
notliing left but sacred and splendid monuments;
as mementoes to testify to the passer-by of her
past greatness and glory ; other parts of Europe
flourish in science and philosophy. Whilst the
hills and lakes of Judea t were favoured with the
God to he the medium of fiirtlier difTnsion of revelation in the cause
of the develo))ment of humanity.
* That part of the globe which is now considered as one of the
fis'e divisions of the earth, and in material size the least of them.
It is bounded by the sea in all directions except the east, where it
is separated from Asia by a botuidary-line, formed by the river
Kava, the Ural mountains and river, and the Caspian Sea. It has
the Baltic on the north, the Mediterranean, the Sea of Marmora,
and the Black Sea, on the south, and a large e:?lent of coast, bor-
dered on the west by the Atlantic. Its extent is about 3,'400 miles
long:, by about 2,300 broad ; population, 265,000,000. Keli?;ioasly,
the popnlatiou is divided between the Catholics, the Protestants, the
Greek Church, a sn)all portion of Jews, and a smaller portion still of
Mohammedans. The appellation Europe, ap])lied to this j)art of the
f^lobe, has a little uncertainty about it, Bochart supposes this word
to be composed of N3t* lin, /lur ap//a, "white face," the land of
white peo))lc, as distinguished from the Ethiopians, black-laced people,
or tawny inhabitants of Asia imd Africa.
t Judea lies between Phoenicia on tlie north, and Idnmea on the
south, separated from each by a cliaiu of lotty mountains. On the
east it was bounded by the Dead Sea, the river Jordan, and the
Sea of Galilee , on the west, it extended to the Mediterranean. Its
length, from north to south, was about one hundred and eighty
miles ; and from east to west, measuring from Jordan, about lifty
miles. The most extraordinary country in the woi-lJ, both as to
its religious and political history, no wonder that nothirig can efl'aee
an afi'ection for it from tiie memory of its original inhabitants. At
first it wub inhabited by idolatrous peoples ; it was then conquered by
LIFE. ' 5
saving philosophy * of God in the teaching of the
Divine Saviour^f and the noble band of Apostles, J
other parts of the world were feeding upon vanity,
and enveloped in deep darkness. Now, whilst
Judea with her sacred associations has nothing to
boast of except her beautiful sceneries, the graves
and dust of Prophets and Apostles, and the spots
where the Sou of God wept,§ prayed,]] and
the Israelites, and divided by them by lot amoug the twelve tribes.
After the death of Solomon, it was divided into two kingdoms ; and
finally iuto small provinces, by its several conquerors. It was con-
quered and governed in turn by the Persians, the Egyptians, the
Macedonians, the Romans, the Saracens, the Christians, the Turks ;
and now is governed by the Mohammedan rule.
* *iA.6£B, " to love," and crocpia, " wisdom," " the love of wisdom."
As a system, religion is the revelation of Divine things in love : and,
as an element of government in the human will and feeling, it is a
love and a desire after Divine wisdom.
t John iii. 16; Heb. vii. 25.
J AnoareWcif, "to send away;" airo and trreWcj, "to send."
An apostle is a person deputed to execute some importaut busi-
ness ; but, appropriately, a disciple of Christ, commissioned to preach
the Gospel. Twelve persons were selected by Christ for this end ;
and Judas, one of the number, proving himself an apostate, his place
was supplied by Matthias. The title Apostle is applied to Chz'ist
Himself. (Heb. iii. 1.) In the primitive ages of the church, other
ministers were called Apostles, as were also persons sent to carry alms
from one church to another. (Rom. xvi. 7 ; Phil. li. 25.) This
title was given also to those who first planted the Christian faith .
thus Dionysius of Corinth is called the Apostle of France; hence the
Jesuit Missionaries are called Apostles. Among the Jews, the ap-
pellation was given to officers who were sent into distant provinces,
to see the laws observed. Apostle, in the Greek Liturgy, is a book
containing the Epistles of St. Paul, printed in the order in which
they ai"e to be read in churches through the year.
§ John xi. 35.
II Luke xxii. 41, 42 ; John ivii.
6 PART I.
tauglitj"^ and wrought His numerous miraeles,t
other parts of the globe possess, enjoy, and flourish
under the influence of the religion established
there.
SECTION III.
Every country and people have some monu-
mental relics, either in fossils, architecture, tra-
ditions, books, or illustrious names and characters,
which make the past sacred and immortal in their
remembrance. On this ground all people, in some
way and degree or other, cleave to the past with
sacred reverence and great tenacity. This is a natural
and right affection in its place and prudential use.
It is a conservative power, to preserve from sudden
innovations and frequent revolutions in bodies,
politic and religious. When this affection settles
down in narrow superstition, and opposes every
improvement and progress because they difl'er from
the past, then it is abused, and becomes injurious
to the interest of universal man. In common
with all countries, Ireland J has her relics and
• Matt. V. 2 ; John iii. 2.
f Miracnium, from viiror, " to wonder ; " literally, a wonderfal
ocenrrciice. Theologically, an act al)ove the ordinary laws and order
of things, yet subject to the law of Infinite Wisdom, as to its sonrce
;ind end. "We have a record, in the Gospels, of thiity-three miracles
being wrought by Christ.
J An island in the Atlantic Ocean, separated from Great Britain
by the Irish Sea, or St. George'sf'hannel, varying in breadth from
12 to 130 miles. It is fertile, and capable of great and various de-
LIFE. 7
monuments, which make the past dear and great
to her feeling and conception ; and, most assuredly,
velopment. It varies iu length from 235 to 290 miles, and ia
breadtk from 110 to 182 miles. The whole comprises aa area of
32,513 square miles.
The Irisli, doubtless, are of Celtic ori5;in. This is seen in the names
of their rivers, towns, momitaiiis, and other objects of common and
historical interest. This is proved, equally clearly and indelibly, in the
remaining i-elics of antiquity, the tumuli, the cairus, the cromlechs,
and the draidical circles. The name of the island confirms the same
thing. Eri, or Erin, its most ancient appellation, to which the na-
tives still cling with the fondness of veneration, is derived from the
Celtic lor, or Eir, whicli signifies " western." jM%st of its more recent
names may be traced to this source. By the Grecians it was called
lerue, being honoured by them as the third island of the ocean ;
yielding precedence only to Taprobane and Britain. It is named
by Ptolemy, louerna; by Juvenal and Mela, Juveraa. Diodorus
Siculus calls it Iris. By the Britons it was called Iverdon ; and the
Saxons, attaching to the original name an epithet from their own
language, called it lerland, or Ireland. Its later name, Hibernia,
has caused much diversity of opinion, but possibly may be traced to
the same original source. Some derive it from an adjective of climate,
hibernal, on account of its wintry temperature; others from Iberus,
a Spaniard, or a river in Spain. Another writer goes still further.
PosteUus, in his strictures on Mela, deduces it from the Hebrew,
Irin quasi Jitrin, " the land of the Hebrews," who, believing that
the empire of the world would be established in a strong place in the
north-west, made themselves masters, as soon as possible, of those
parts, and of Ireland. Bochart traces it again to the Phenician :
Hibernia, according to him, or lerne, being nothing more than
Ibernse, or the furthest habitation ; because, beyond Ireland, west-
ward, all was ocean, according to the ancients.
All this may have a dim trace in it, that the Celtic Irish and the
Phenician proceed originally from the same common eastern stem.
Other appellations, of later date, as Scotia, and Ogygia, mean, ac-
cording to their several adopters, different things. It was not con-
sidered by the Greeks and Romans as the country inhabited by any
one nation ; on the contrary, its coasts sire described by Ptolemy as
8 PART I.
tlie liistory of Ireland is rich with great events
and most illustrious and worthy characters. Ac-
cording to tliC magnitude of her area, and the
political advantages she has had, perhaps no
country is richer in events, traditions, and illus-
trious names and characters, which will ever ren-
der her past history, to her own children, very
dear and saercd. If much of her history is stained
with cruelty, injustice, and oppression, these make
the impression all the more deep and lasting.
Whether the history of Ireland be viewed religi-
ously, politically, philosophically, or scliolastically,
it is very attractive and instructive, and mixed
with melancholy and pleasurable interest. In all
these classes, Ireland has given birth to some of
the most memorable and illustrious men and
things that chronicles can record. Even in this
day she is behind none in proportion to her means,
advantages, and magnitude. In abstract and in-
tellectual science she is behind none.* Her sons
inhabited by a ruiniber of tribes, of varions names. In common with
all people dtlijchtiiig in the antiquity of their land and race, the
hards and historians of Ireland trace the origin of its popnlatioo to
the family of Noah. Much of its history, iu comMion with all his-
tories of the long past, is buried in the tanjjltd mystery of years and
romai.ce.
* Tl;e scicncfs of pnre thought are those of metaphysics, pure
iiiathemalies, ontology, and that of mind generally. 1. It is an
abstraction from sense and objective nature ; or a kind of an effort to
separate from them in thought and consciousness. 2. An abstract
science is so named, because it is the hi-i.hcst and purest exercise of
LIFE. 9
are found useful and illustrious in every depart-
ment of intellect and religion, and that in every
part of the globe.
SECTION IV.
The famous George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne,"^
was born on the soil of Ireland. I shall only give
an epitome of his life within a small compass. My
business chiefly at present is to examine and, so
far as I can, within a limited compass, give an
impartial view of his ideal philosophy. The editor
of his Works f gives us only a short sketch of his
life, just extending it over some fi^'teen pages.
Whether this arose from want of materials, or the
monotony and dearth of his life, in those incidents
and circumstances which make a memoir palatable
to the many, or that Berkeley failed to form a
numerous and influential school, either in theology,
politics, or philosophy, and for these reasons his
life was not written more extensively, we cannot
tell. It is possible that an analytical biography of
his life, containing the developments of his mind
in connexion with his difierent philosophical theo-
thought, a science of pure thought. 3. As coutrasted with and
ditl'erent from the complex. 4. It aims at the knowledge of beings
and things in their Zeal nature, condition, and relations.
* Cloyue is a town of Ireland, in the county of Cork, twelve
miles from Cork. Its populatiou is under 2,00u.
t Berkeley's Life and Works, by the Bev. G. N. Wright, M. A.,
in two volumes.
10 PART I.
ries, TTOuld have been both interesting and in-
structive. But it has been the portion of only few
good and great men, to leave behind them faithful
and able biographers. An Agrieola* had an
efficient and lucid biographer in his son-in-law,
Tacitus.f Not many Newtons J leave behind
* Cneius Julius Agricola was a Roman commander, whose father,
Julius Grfecinus, was an orator, and put to death by Caligula, for
refusing to plead against Silanus. He was carefully brought up by
his mother, Julia Procilla, and sent to Massilia, (Marseilles,) the
chief seat of learning in Gaul, to pursue his studies. He was sent to
Britain, where he was at the time of the insurrection of Boadicea, in
A.D. 61. After holding various positions, and performing many great
and active services in ]5ritain, Gaul, Asia, and Kome, it is asserted
that he fell a sacrifice by poison to the cruel jealousy of Doniitian.
He was born at Forum Julii, now called Frejus, in Provence, a.d.
37, and died at Rome, a.d. 93.
t Caius Cornelius Tacitus, a celebrated Roman historian, of whose
family and early life hardly anything is known. Piiny the Younger
declares him to be the first orator of his day. He is known chiefly
by posterity through his histories, many of which are lost. His
Annals were thr most important of his works ; but of these we have
lost a part. His Treatise on the Manners of the Germans, and his
Life of Agricola, his father-in-law, are both pure in style, and lofty
in sentiment ; but his History of the Reign of Tiberius is considered
as his master-piece. It is supposed that this great and noble cha-
racter was born about a.d. 54, and died about a.d. 130.
' X Sir Isaae Newton, one of the greatest mathematical geniuses
and natural philosophers that ever existed. No name so familiar and
more respected in all civilized lands than his. He was born at
^Voo]sthor[)e, near Grantham, in Lincolnshire, 1642, and died at
Kensington, 1727. On the mantelpiece in the room where
Newton was born at Woolslhorpe, is placed 'a marble tablet, com-
memorative of the past, beneath which are the well-known lines of
Pope : —
" Nature, and nature's laws, lay hid in night ;
God baid, ' Let Newtou be ! ' and all was light."
LIFE. 11
them a Brewster,* able and faithful, and full of
sympathy with his great subject; and so giving
unto us a philosophical detail of the inward and
outward life of the great philosopher. No one but
Johnson f left behind him a Boswell,J to write
* A living experimental philosopher, and the author of Sir Isaac
Newton's Life, with several other works on material scien(:e. His
discoveries relative to the properties of light have led to great im-
provements in the illumination of lighthouses. In 1815, he received
the Copley medal for his paper on the polarization of light by re-
flection ; and in the following year, for his discoveries in physics,
received from the Institute of France 1,500 francs, which was tlie
half of the prize. In 1816, he invented the kaleidoscope ; in 1818,
received the Rumford medal of the Royal Society; and, in 1830,
was presented with the medal of the Royal Society, for his further
researches on the properties of light. In the same year, with Davy,
Herschel, and Babbage, he originated the British Association, the
first meeting of which was held at York, in 1831. He was knighted
by "William I\'., and decorated with the Hanoverian Guelphic Order.
In 1841, he became Principal of St. Leonard's College, at St. An-
drews. In 1849, he was elected President of the British Association ;
and, the same year, had the honour of being chosen in the place of
Berzelius one of the eight foreign associates of the French Academy
of Sciences. For twenty-two years he edited the Edinburgh Ency-
clopajdia : he was also one of the editors of the Edinburgh Philo-
sophical J ournal, as well as of the Edinburgh Journal of Science.
He was born at Jedburgh, Scotland, in 1781.
t Johnson has left a fame in criticism, lexicography, and miscella- '
neous writing, that few cau hope to acquire ; which will last as long
as the literature of the English language. He was born at Lichfield,
1709, and died in London, 1784.
J James Boswell, the author of the Life of Dr. Johnson, has
secured himself immortality, in connexion with his great subject.
Though not possessing vigorous intellectual powers, he has written
one of the most attractive and instructive memoirs in English or any
other language Macaulay says of it, as to its accurate detail: —
" His coat, his wig, his figure, his face, his scrolula, his St. Vitus'
13 PART I.
adoringly the life of his friend and master ;
coming to his work after many years of perpetu-
ally studying his unwieldy subject in all his capa-
ble bearings, and diligently collecting materials for
it from all resources about the living man, both
wliilst his subject was awake, and whilst he was
asleep. Few theologians, if any at all, have, or
ever will leave behind a Hanna,"^ to hand faith-
fully down their lives to generations to come, as
was the fortune of Chalmers.t The loss is that of
future humanity, and not to themselves ; for the
dauce, his rolling walk, his blinking eye, the outward signs which too
clearly marked the approbation of his dinner ; his insatiable appetite
for fish-sauce and veal-pie, with plums; his inextinguishable thirst
for tea; his trick of touching the posts as he walked ; his mysterious
practice of treasm-ing up scraps of orange-peel ; his morning slum-
bers ; his midnight disputations ; his contortions ; his mutterings ;
his gruntings ; his puffings ; his vigorous, acute, and ready eloquence ;
his sarcastic wit; his vehemence; his insolence; liis fits of tempes-
tuous rage; his queer inmates, old Mr. Levett and blind Mrs.
Williams, the cat Hodge, and the Negro Frank, all are as familiar to
us as the objects by which we have been surrounded from childhood."
During more than twenty years of friendship and familiar intercourse
between Boswell and Johnson, they did not spend more than two
hundred and seventy-six days together. He was born at Edinburgh,
1740, and died, 1790.
* Hanna is a living minister of tlie Free Presbyterian Church, an
able preacher, a discriminative theologian, and an elegant writer.
He is a son-in-law of the late Dr. Chalmers, and has been for many
years a colleague, in pastoral charge, with Dr. Guthrie. He has
written a most able but somewhat too voluminous memoir of Dr.
Chalmers, with some other theological works.
t Dr. Chalmers was one of the most ])owerful ])reachcrs and
writers that Scotland, or any other laud, ever produced. He has
done more towards the unity and harmony of theology and science.
LIFE. 13
life of the great and good is written above ; it has
done its service below, and is in an indestructible
keeping, and on imperishable records.
The 12th of March, 1684, at Killcarn, near
Thomastown,* were the time and place that wit-
nessed and recorded the birth of a little child,
afterwards called the " philosophical Doctor Berke-
ley," and the " metaphysical Bishop." He re-
ceived the first rudiments of his education at Kil-
kenny School,t under Dr. Hinton, and was re-
ceived a pensioner of Trinity College, Dublin, at
the age of fifteen, under the instruction of Dr.
Hall ; but was received a fellow of that college in
the year 1707.
SECTION V.
In 1713 he came to London, and, at the close
of the same year, went, in the capacity of a chap-
lain, in the train of the Earl of Peterborough into
than any other theologian. lie was born at Anstruther, Fifeshire,
17S0, and died at Edinburgh, 1847.
* Thomastown is a borough town of Ireland, in the county of
Kilkenny, ou the river Nore ; with population about 2,200. It
was formerly enclosed with walls.
t Kilkenny is the capital of the cuunty called under that name.
It contains many elegant buildings, and its streets are paved with
black marble. The venerable ruins of its clinrches, monasteries, and
abbeys, still remain to prove its former importance. Its college, or
free school, is still one of its celebrated buildings and establishments.
Its population is about 20,000.
14 PART I.
Italy.* The editor relates a verj' ludicrous iuci-
deiit that transpired at Leghorn ; t we shall
transcribe it for the reader, in the words of the
learned editor. " It may not be amiss," says the
biographer, " to record a little incident tliat befel
Mr. Berkeley in this city, with the relation of
which he used sometimes to make himself merry
among his friends. Basil Kennett, the author of
the * Roman Antiquities,^ was the chaplain to
the English factory at Leghorn, the only place in
Italy where the English Service is tolerated by
the Government; which favour had been lately
obtained from the Grand Duke, at the particular
instance of Queen Anne. J This gentleman rc-
* Charles Mordaiint, Earl of Pcterborotigli, a great Eu'ilisb
general who entered the navy, and distinguished hinisell" at Tangiers,
when it was besieged by the Moors. He was created the Earl of
Monmouth ; and, on the death of his unele, succeeded to the
title — the Earl of Peterborough. Some of his letters are printed in
the works of I'ope, with whom he was iutimate. It was said of liim,
that he had seen more Kings and more postilions than any man in
Europe. He was born in 1658, and died 1733.
t Leghorn is a celebrated seaport-town of Italy, the Italian
I,ivorno. In the sixteenth century, it was made a free port by Cosmo
de Medici ; and to this its advancement and prosperity may be
greatly attributed. Among other tilings, its lighthouse is noted.
Its population is about 85,000.
^ Queen Anne was the second daughter of James II., by Lady
Anne Hyde, daughter of the great Earl of Clarendon. In 1668, she
married Prince George of Denmark, by whom she had several chil-
dren, but all of whom died young. In 1702, on tiie death of Wil-
liam III., she succeeded to the crown. One of the greatest events
of this rcigu was tiie union of Scotland with England. Ou account
LIFE. 15
quested Mr. Berkeley to preach for him one Sun-
day. The day following, as Berkeley was sitting
in his chamber, a procession of priests, in surplices,
and with all other formalities, entered the room ;
and, without taking the least notice of the wonder-
ing inhabitant, marched quite round, muttering
certain prayers. His fears immediately suggested
to him that this could be no other than a visit
from the Inquisition, who had heard of his offici-
ating before heretics without licence the day before.
As soon as they were gone, he ventured, with
much caution, to inquire into the cause of this ex-
traordinary appearance ; and was happy to be in-
formed, that this was the season appointed by the
Bomish Calendar for solemnly blessing the houses
of all good Catholics, from rats and other vermin ;
a piece of intelligence which changed his terror
into mirth."
In August, 1714, he returned fi'om the Conti-
nent. The fall of Queen Anne's ministry having
put an end to his hope of preferment, he accepted
an offer from Dr. Ashe, the Bishop of Clogher,*
to accompany his son on a tour through Europe.
of the number of eminent literary characters who flourished in her
reign, it has beea called the Augustan age of Britain. Though too
much the dupe of her ministers and favourites, she will ever be re-
spected for the general excellency of her private character. She was
horn, 1664, and died, 1714.
* Clogher is an ancient, small, episcopal city of Ireland, 82 miles
from Dublin.
16 PART I.
He travelled, in addition, to places move coDraon,
over Apulia, Calabria, and the Island of Sicily.
He was on the Continent in this tour about four
years. When at Paris he paid a visit to Pere
Malebranche,* the author of an ingenious system
of philosophical idealism, M'hich teaches that we
perceive all ideas in God, which is known under
the name of occasional causes. This theory has
points of resemblance and sympathy with that of
Berkeley; yet they are widely different in their
* Pere Xicliolas Jlalebrariche was the ablest disciple of the philoso-
phy of Descartes. lie has been derided by the superficial, and neglected
almost by all Protestant thinkers: partly ou account of his ideal
theory, and partly from the notion that he was a Jesnit. It is true that
his theory is considered as exploded among almost all thinkers, yet
the thinker himself is worthy of the highest regard both as to hi3
character and as a profound thinker. It is a mistake to think him
a Jesuit ; he was a priest of the Oratory. Sir ^V. Hamilton, in
speaking of him, says: — "As a thinker he is, perhaps, the most
profound that France has ever produced ; and as a \vri;cr on philo-
sophical subjects, there is not another European author who can be
placed before him. His style is a model at once of dignity and
of natural ease ; and no metaphysician has been able to express him-
self so clearly and precisely without resorting to doctrinal and scho-
lastic terms. That he was the author of a celebrated but exploded
hypothesis, is, perhaps, the reason why he is far less studied than he
otherwise deserves. His works are of principal value for the admi-
rable observations ou human nature which they embody ; and were
everything to be expunged from them connected with the vision of
nil things in f/ia Deiti/, and even with the (Cartesian hypotheses in
general, they would still remain an iucstinmble treasury of the ablest
analysis, expressed in the most appropriate and, therefore, the most
admirable eloquence. In the last respect, he is only a|iproacbed,
certainly not surjiassed, by Hume and Mendelssohn." He was born
at Paris in 1C38, and died at Paris in 1715.
LIFE. 17
teacliing and conclusion. Berkeley found this phi-
losophical father in his cell, preparing a medicine
in a pipkin for a disorder he was suffering under,
— an inflammation on the lungs. The conversa-
tion was naturally led to their peculiar philoso-
phical sympathies and theories. It grew so
earnest and warm that the ingenious father raised
his voice so high, and became subject at the
time to so intense and deep emotions, that his
disorder increased and carried him off in a few
days. So great and grave a reality the idealism
of Berkeley proved to poor jNIalebranche. What-
ever edification and interest this visit gave to the
visitor, according to report, it proved a dear and a
mortal one to the visited.
SECTION VI.
In July, 1717, he was elected a Senior Fellow
of his college ; and on the 14th of November,
1721, he took degrees of Bachelor and Doctor in
Divinity. The year following increased his for-
tune considerably ; a lady that was no relation left
the sum of £8,000 between himself and another
gentleman. In the year 1724, he was presented,
by the Duke of Grafton, to the deanery of
Derry,"^ worth £1,100 per annum. At this time
* Derry, a city and a county of Ireland, now called liOndon-
derry, because given to twelve London companies by James I.,
C
18 PART I.
he conceived a scheme for the conversion of the
aborigines of America to Christianity^ and the
building of a college in the Somers Islands ; *
and in 1725 published his purpose, and offered to
resign his opalent preferment, and dedicate him-
self the remainder of his days to this noble and
Christian enterprise, for the paltry sum of ,£100
per annum. In August, 1728, the enterprising
philosopher entered the marriage condition ; and
in the following month of the same year, after
much delay and trouble, he set sail, for his very
sanguine mission, to America. He took up his
residence at Newport, and laboured indefatigably
in the discharge of the duties of his clerical func-
tions. After being there two years, he returned
home, grieved and disappointed that his sanguine
wishes and confident expectations were not met
and fulfilled by the Government and men in
power. He trusted too much in political schemes
and Avorldly men ; so his darling project fell
unrealized. In this scheme Berkeley's confidence
was on a wrong basis, as were his motives not the
after the rebellion of its chiefs ; and now almost the whole comity
is owned by their successors.
* Somers Islands, or the Bermudas, a cluster of small islands
belonging to Great Britain, in the Atlantic Ocean, in number about
three hundred. These Islands were discovered in 1522 by Juan
Bermudas, a Spaniard; and in 1609, George Somers, an English-
man, was wrecked there, and soon after the English formed a settle-
ment there.
LIFE. 19
loftiest and diviaest. He trusted in the efficiency
and faithfulness of worldly patronage and enact-
ments, instead of confiding his cause to the sym-
pathy and feeling of the good and the religious,
and the immutable power of truth. This ground
failed him, as he might well have expected. His
motive, in a great measure, was to make religion
subservient to the State. We cannot but look on
this as one of the great failures of his life. We
are ready to believe that this was the natural
result of a system that depends upon worldly
patronage for preferments, rather than of want
of principle and high view in the amiable
philosopher.
SECTION VII,
Queen Caroline* was peculiarly fond of philo-
sophical conversation between learned and ingeni-
ous men, and had one day in the week set apart
for that purpose whilst she was the Princess of
Wales. Among those who attended, and took an
active part in the conversation in this illustrious
and select company, were Drs. Sherlock,t Hoad-
* Princess Caroline, tke wife of George II., and daughter of
Braudenburgh-Anspach, who died in 1737-
t Sherlock, Thomas, an eminent prelate of the Anglican Church,
and a son of Richard Sherlock, an able divine and a chaplain of the
army of Charles I. ; he was born in Loudon, 1678, and died near
London, 1761.
n O.
20 PART I.
lev,* Clarke,! and Berkeley. Drs. Clarke and
Berkeley were the two leading antagonists ;
Hoadley sided with Clarke, and Sherlock with
Berkeley. In this select intelligent company,
Berkeley's idealism, and other philosophical the-
ories, were made the chief subjects of conversa-
tion. In Dr. Clarke it met a gigantic opponent,
and, Ave should think, in point of mental strength
and severe logic, superior to Berkeley : but
Berkeley, in expertness of movements, clever and
skilful handling of his tools, and amiable temper,
was equal to him. We should think that Berke-
ley's idealism tottered, and was blown down to
the ground, before the heavy calibre and gigantic
reasoning of the author of the a p7'wri evidence.
But Berkeley, doubtless, was so enamoured with
his darling theory, and at the same time so expert
in building up his fortification after it fell, that
he was blind and indifferent to his own condi-
tion. It is said that Addison J made it his
* Iloacllcy, Benjamin, a bishoj) of the Anglican Church. His
controversy witli Atterbury is familiar to most readers ; and by
reason of his doctrine of non-resistance, he was noticed by the
House of Commons, who pressed the Queen te confer preferment
upon him. He was born at Westcrham, Kent, 1G76 ; died, 1761.
t Clarke, Dr. Samuel, was one of the profoundest men that the
Anglican (.'hurch or any other Church ever produced, lie was at
once a scholar, a mathematician, a metaphysician, and a theologian.
He was born in Norwich, 1C75 ; died in London, 1729.
j Josnjjh Addison was the sou of the Rev. Lancelot Addison, a
divine and an author of some eminence. Joseph Addison was the
LIFE. 21
purpose and work to have the two philosophers
together; and that Berkeley complained of the
unfairness of Clarke. We should think that
Clarke's artillery would be awfully heavy upon his
antagonist ; and his opponent would feel that he
met with a giant^ however matters would ulti-
mately end. But, so far as we know, neither of
the parties were convinced, which is mostly the
result. A man must be met sideways generally
to be convinced. If he is conscious that he meets
an antagonist, he prepares his instruments, for-
tifies his ground, searches for arguments, and so
confirms and roots himself in his own views more
and more-
After the return of Berkeley from Pohode
Island, the Queen often commanded his attend-
ance to communicate unto her what he witnessed
on the other side of the water. Apart from all
he saw in America, his conversation must have
been exquisitely instructive and interesting. In
most elegant writer of his age ; so much so, as to secui-e the admira-
tion aud imitatioa of iSIacaulay. Johnson speaks of his style, —
" Whoever wishes to attain an English style, familiar but not coarse
and elegant but unostentatious, must give his days and nights to
Addison." It may be said, however, that his style is wanting in
masculine energy, and forceful expression. When he found r.nat the
hand of death was upon hini, he sent for Lord Warwick, aud, affec-
tionately pressing his hands, whispered, " See in what peace a
Christian can die." He was born at Milston, Wilts, 107:^ i and
died at Holland House, 1719.
22 PART I.
him met all the qualifications to charm and
instruct : — his classical taste ; his knowledge of
the modern languages and manners of Europe ;
his philosophical insight, analysis, and quick
apprehension; and his rich variety of mental
treasures ; — for his range of study covered theo-
logy, politics, and philosophy, in their widest
acceptation. His sweet temperament, polished
manners, and his religious views and feelings,
mellowed and sweetened the whole. It is the
portion of but few, to be adorned with so nume-
rous mental and moral qualifications, and that in
so high a proportion, as met in the Bishop of
Cloyne. Religion and philosophy, refined and
adorned, by their combined teaching and influence,
the soil that was naturally rich and fertile.
After the deanery of Down became vacant. Dr.
Berkeley, at the request of Queen Caroline, was
named to it ; and the letter of the King went over
to Ireland to that effect. But through the neglect
of Lord Burlington to notify the royal intention
to the Duke of Dorset, who was then Lord Lieu-
tenant of Ireland, his excellency was offended that
the richest deanery in Ireland was thus disposed
of without his concurrence, and the matter was
not pressed further ; so Berkeley lost the rich
deanery of Down. Her INIajcsty now declared,
that since they would not allow Berkeley to be
LIFE. 23
Dean in Ireland, he should be a Bishop ; so in this
case, as in thousands more, one misfortune leads
to a higher honour and advantage. According to
the determination of the Queen, he was, on the
]9th of May, consecrated the Bishop of Cloyne,
in the splendid edifice of St. Paul, Dublin. Fond
of study and retirement, susceptible to the beau-
ties and charms of nature and romantic sceneries,
this secluded spot would be most agreeable to his
taste. He formed such an attachment to it, that
when Lord Chesterfield* offered him the vacant
bishopric of Clogher, the value of which was
double that of Cloyne, he modestly refused it.
SECTION VIIT.
It was his habit to rise between three and four
in the morning during the whole of the time he
was at Cloyne. In 1752 he removed to Oxford,
in order to superintend the education of his son.
Being convinced of the evil of non-residence, he
tried to exchange his high preferment for some
* Chesterfield, Philip Dormer Stauhope, the fourth Earl of, was
considered the greatest wit and most accomplished in manners
of his day. He associated much with literary men ; and partly
from that, and partly from some productions of his own, he enjoys
still a degree of literary reputation. In 1742, he received the
appointment of Lord Lieutenant of Ireland: in this capacity he
greatly distinguished himself by reducing the country into a state of
tranquillity, such as it did not enjoy before. He was born in
London, 1694; and died, 1773.
24 I'AllT I.
canonry or headsliip at Oxford. Failing in this,
he wrote to the Secretary of State, to request that
he might have permission to resign his bishopric,
worth at the time j8 1,400 per annum. Such an
uncommon petition excited His Majesty's curi-
osity to inquire who was the extraordinary man
that sent it : being informed that he was his old
friend Dr. Berkeley, the King declared that he
should die a Bishop in spite of himself, but gave
liira liberty to live where he pleased. On Sunday
evening, 14th of January'', 1753, as he was sitting
surrounded with his family, listening to a sermon
of Dr. Sherlock's read by his lady, he was seized
with palsy in the heart ; and so instantaneously
expired, that his body was quite stiff and cold
before his death was discovered.
SECTION IX.
I differ greatly from Berkeley in theology,
politics, and philosophy ; yet I wish to do him full
justice. My difference from him does not hide
from ray view his high qualities and excellencies,
and my admiration of his character and powers.
No one, therefore, it is to be hoped, can accuse
me of partiality on the one hand, or ignorant pre-
judice on the other. His character was made up
of varied, rich, and high qualities. He was an
accomplished scholar, all his days a devested stu-
LIFE. 25
dent; his powers of philosophical analysis were
very acute ; his powers of conversation were
graphic and various ; and his rich store of know-
ledge, both ancient and modern, was almost
boundless. His moral character was very rich in
clusters of the highest excellencies ; his charity
to others who differed from him in religious views,
was witnessed and testified of by the many
Roman Catholics who lived around him ; his
beneficence was experienced by the poor, not only
in the tar-water''^ system, but in his care for them
and gifts unto them. His zeal for the spread of
Christianity was seen in his sanguine and self-
denying mission to Bermuda ; and his disinterest-
* Berkeley published a large treatise, called Siris, on the efficacy
of Tar water. He thus speaks of it himself : " Every step that I
advanced in discovering the virtues of tar water, my own wonder
and surprise increased as much as theirs to whom I mentioned
them : nor could I, without great variety and evidence of facts, ever
have been induced to suspect, that, in all sorts of ailments whatso-
ever, it might relieve or cure, which at first sight- may seem incredi-
ble and unaccountable ; but, on maturer thought, will perhaps appear
to agree with, and follow from, the nature of things. For it is to be
noted that the general notion of a disease seems to consist in this,
that what is taken in, is not duly assimilated by the force of the
animal economy ; therefore, it should seem, whatever assists the
vis vita may be of general use in all diseases, enabling Nature either
to assimilate or discharge all unsubdued humours and particles what-
soever. But the light or ether detained on the volatile oil which
impregnates tar water being of the same nature with the animal
spirit, is an accession of so much strength to the constitution, which
it assists to assimilate or expel whatever is alien or noxious."
—Works, vol. ii., p. 432. Edit., 1843.
26 PART I.
edness was evinced repeatedly, as in the giving up
of the deanery of Derry, refusing the bishopric of
Clogher, and his wish to resign his preferment
when he removed to Oxford. After allowing
much to the friendship and warmth of Pope,
there is enough still in his poetical praise
of Berkeley to sustain him on the ground of
virtue : —
" To Ikrlxcley every virtae under heaven."
We do not take and recommend him as an
absolute pattern in all things, because no finite
dependent nature can be an absolute model in
all matters ; and in common with the best in
this life, he had some things which it would
have been better to be without, and other things
which it would have been better to have possessed.
SECTION X.
The life of Berkeley will be estimated differ-
ently by different minds. By a small class in the
different departments of science he will be always
honoured and estimated to his full worth, but the
larger class by far will refuse him the meed of
honour and praise he is worthy of. His sympa-
thies and application of his powers were universal.
He viewed man in all the capability and suscepti-
bility of his nature ; he viewed him as having
LIFE. 27
raind and heart ; as susceptible to misery and
happiness ; as a creature of time and eternity : so he
directed his skill and energy to these varied forms
of his relations and wants. By some he will be
treated as an enthusiastic ignoramus in physics^ by
others as a dangerous empiric in politics ; by many,
as a delusive, soft-brained philosopher, and not a
few will consider him an unsafe and an unsound
theologian. The wider the ramification any man
takes, and in proportion to his genius and origin-
ality, the more he comes in collision with other
theories and views ; and in proportion to these
things will be the diversity of views concerning
him ; and for a time, at least, the number of his
opponents. Whilst the tame and the common-
place man passes through this life in quietude and
happiness without almost any opposing forces; the
superior man who tries to benefit his fellows has
difficulties and opposing powers without number.
Such is the reward of genius and greatness in this
life.
SECTION XI.
One accusation against Berkeley is, that he
went so much beyond the boundary of his own
profession. In the premiss itself there is much
truth, but we cannot grant the conclusion which
is drawn from it. We cannot allow all this to be
28 PART I.
wrong. "We see no reason that a man should
never give advice and exert his influence in other
matters besides what directly belongs to his pro-
fession. This would be tantamount to a prohibi-
tion not to think of other things ; for to know is
of little use, if it is never put in practice when
that is convenient and needful. According to this
narrow theory, ignorance in all matters except the
direct profession of a man is an advantage. Ac-
cording to this, no one but a svirgeon must try to
save life ; no one but an attorney must give any
advice in legal matters ; no one but a statesman
must talk about the state of the country; and
no one but the theologian must say anything
of the Bible.
SECTION XII.
There is nothing in the economy of Christian-
ity which prohibits a minister of religion from
doing all the good he can in all ways, and exert-
ing his influence and powers in every direction,
against every form of evil and error. He cannot
do all his work in the pulpit and by the sick bed ;
for all wrong, misery, and darkness are not
around them; moreover, wisdom and discretion
would teach not to bring all there. Christianity
leaves all the legitimate relations, duties, and
liberties of man intact in this respect, only it
LIFE. 29
enforces upon Lim motives and conditions.
Every body, every day of his life, goes beyond the
direct sphere of his calling. There is not an indi-
vidual to be found who never thinks, speaks, or
acts about anything but what belongs to his
actual sphere of action. It cannot be ; for it
would be contrary to the intuition of man's
nature, and at war in numberless instances with
the best and noblest feelings of his being. It
would at once erase from existence genius, and
every superior talent and profundity. A man of
high genius must not be confined to a common-
place route, or his nature will be degraded, his
spirit imprisoned, his heart broken, and the world
robbed. Whilst the narrow common-place path
will satisfy and be wide enough to the common-
place spirit, not so with one of the superior class of
spirits. He must have his meandering turns in
all directions, and have full liberty of turning in
and out, according to the eccentricities of his
nature ; to observe and reflect ; to make new dis-
coveries and experiments ; and, perhaps, he will
find a new, nearer, and better path ; at least the
world will be benefitted in having new facts and
experiments.
SECTION Xlll.
Let us not be misinterpreted. We do not
recommend a neglect of one's profession, to
30 PART I.
attend to other matters wliicli do not belong
immediately to one's chosen sphere of action.
On the contrary, we think that the duties which
belong directly to every one's call, should have the
preponderate weight and influence Avith all. No
one should neglect the functions of his own pro-
fession to attend to others of less importance.
All should aim at raising their own profession in
eflFectiveness and usefulness, by aiming to excel
themselves in it. Every man, on moral and
rational ground, is responsible to do this. What
we maintain is, that there is no righteous reason
to prohibit from man of any profession to do all
he can to benefit man in all ways, provided he
does it on enlightened ground and sincere motive,
according to the conditions of truth. We cannot,
therefore, condemn Berkeley in the abstract, for
his varied ramifications into the different paths of
science, in politics, in mathematics. At one time
he writes about the laws of nature ; at another
time, about the theory of vision ; now on mental
philosophy, and not the least in political and philo-
sophical theology. In all this he benefitted man;
and, so far as human reason can see, he violated
no law of religion or reason. But viewing
things relatively, it is possible, nevertheless, that
many of his friends may say that the bishop was
not entirely faultless so far as his labours and
LIFE. 31
works are known. It must be confessed that the
taste for science, philosophy, and politics, appa-
rently, preponderated in influence over the direct
important duties of his profession. It must be
confessed, also, that the purely theological por-
tion of his works, compared with other depart-
ments, is both meagre and small. The absence of
theological literature we do not commend and
admire; but this is not an argument against his
other writings.^ It may be that he had sufficient
reasons in his own mind, not to write more exten-
sively in theology. We should not like to say to
a bishop or a minister, " Now you must not study
science and philosophy; neither politics nor
classics must be thought of by you ; and surely
you must write nothing upon any of these
things." This we should rebel against ; but on
* All the works of Berkeley, if not what is called directly reli-
gious, were written for the good of men, and from religious
sympathy and motive. If he did not always treat of the human
heart and conscience and the first great duties of religion, he fed the
minds and tried to cure the bodies and ameliorate the conditions of
men ; and unless these are done, religion itself cannot be enjoyed,
practised, nor be developed. He who does these things from a reli-
gious motive, is a Divine messenger to men, and a great benefactor
to his race. He went further than the strait theologian and nervous
religionist, but was as religious in aim and conviction as any of
them ; and far grander in conception and feeling of human want and
duty, consecrating himself and all his powers to the honoui' of his
God, the advancement of His truth and goodness, and the happiness
of mankind.
32 PART I.
the other hand, it may be said, for a bishop to
write more on every thing than on the subject-
matter of his own profession, is, perhaps, both
unwise and out of place. It must be mentioned
as a palHation of Berkeley's case, that he wrote
most of his philosophical works during the time
that he had no responsible ministerial charge;
and neither after, nor before he was made a
bishop, has it ever been brought to his charge
that he neglected any of the duties of his high
vocation.
33
PAET II.
BERKELEY'S PHILOSOPHY:
SECTION XIV.
Bishop Berkeley is best kriowii by the system
of idealism developed by liim. This theory is
unfolded in two works, called ''The Principles of
Human Knowledge,""^ and " Three Dialogues be-
tween Hylas and Philonous/'f If it were not
for this system, the name and works of Berkeley,
like many more good and great men, would have
fallen into a state of entire obscurity. But so
long as the various systems of mental science will
be studied, the name of Berkeley will be men-
tioned and his works studied. As yet his theory
of idealism, and works in general, have not been
so generally read and digested, as they have been
* The book called. The Principles of Human Knowledcje, was
published in 1710, by Aaron Ilhonies, for Jeremy Pepyat, bookseller
in Skinner Row, Dublin ; and was the only edition published in Dr.
Berkeley's life.
t His Three Dialogues letween Hi/las and Philonous was pub-
lished in London in 1713. It shows much acuteness, grer.t pre-
cision and elegance of expression, bat considerable repetition, and
often appears as one turning in a circle.
D
34 PART II.
ignorantly referred to and flippantly. treated with
a smile. The demonstration of the great lexi-
cographer, Dr. Johnson, against the idealism of
Berkeley, kicking a stone, is as faithfully and
generally copied as it is familiarly known.^ His
system of idealism is considered, generally, so
absurd, and contrary to common sense and
universal experience, that the best answer it is
worthy of is to treat it lightly and indifferently, as
the production of one whose brain was not sound .
at the time in all its organs and powers.f On this
ground the philosopher has just reason to com-
plain, and appeal against his critics and judges.
We think that the views and sincere convictions
of all men should be treated respectfully and cha-
* " After we came out of the church," says Boswcll, " we stood
talking for some time together of Bishop Berkeley's ingeuious
sophistry to prove the non-existeuce of matter, and that everything
in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are
satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I
never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered,
striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone till he
rebounded from it, — '/ refute it thus.'" — Boswell's Life of
Johnson, vol. i., pp. 303, 304.
t There is another instance in the Life of Johnson by Boswell,
where the fi;rcat critic treats Berkeley's idealism liglitly. Being ia
company with a gentleman who thought tit to maintain Dr. Berke-
ley's ingenious philosophy, — that nothing exists but as perceived by
some mind ; when the gentleman was going away, Johnson said to
him, " Pray, Sir, don't leave us ; for we may, perhaps, forget to
think of you, and then you will cease to exist ! " — Boswell's Life of
Johison, vol. iv., p. 20.
Berkeley's philosophy. 35
ritably, and that however novel and peculiar they
may be, provided tliey are believed and stated
uprightly and fairly. And this is peculiarly
rational and righteous on the ground of philo-
sophy. This concession should be made to
Berkeley ; and we are prepared to give him a full,
fair, and just hearing. This we state, not from
any partiality to the idealism of Berkeley, but on
the ground of rational, impartial justice.
SECTION XV.
On every side it is confessed that he has pro-
pounded his system without a method, and often
is very ambiguous ; so much so sometimes, that
his views and theory are so obscure, that both the
Healist and the Idealist may refer to it for support
and proof."^ He appears as one under a sudden
* The Realists and the Idealists are the two great common classes
of believers aud unbelievers in material substance, which may be snb-
divided according to the various grades of their belief. The Realists
are called sometimes the Substantialists : they are commonly divided
into natural Realists, and hypothetical Rfcalists. They are again
divided into Dualists, and Unitarians or Monists, according as they
view the testimony of coasciousness as to subject and object to our
ultimate perception. The Idealists are classed into two great
and common classes ; the cosmotketic and the absolute Idealists.
The Ck)smothetic are divided into two : those who view the ideal or
representative object to be a tertium quid different from the percipi-
ent mind as from the represented object ; aud others who regard the
ethereal world as only a modification of the mind itself. And the
former of these views, again, is divided into various subdivisions ; —
as theories may differ as to the nature and origin of the vicarious
D 2
36
PART ir.
impnlse of discovery and conviction ; he runs
hastily to make his philosophical panacea known
to the world, and that without studying method
or perspicuity. He opened his bag, and threw his
varied materials down at the foot of men, without
any form or classification. He appears frequently
as one anxious to make some concession, especi-
ally to the "vulgar," as if he were afraid of
launching too far, or being thought of doing so at
least, or that he might gain for his theory more
disciples and favour. He walks as one without a
track. He had only two points before him, — the
starting ground and the concluding spot; but he
had no straight line between these extrem.e points,
— he must make that himself. His starting-point
object, as. Is it material or immaterial? Does it come from without,
or rise from within ? Does it emanate from external reality, or from
a higher source? Is it produced by God, or by some higher intelli-
gence, or a representation in the Deity Himself ? Is it innate, or
produced by the mind on the occasion of the presence of matter?
Such are some of tliese subtle aud puzzling theories. Absolute
Idealism is again divided into two principal species; — the theistic,
and the egoistic. The first supposes that the Deity represents to
the mind what we mistake for an external world ; the second sup-
poses that these appearances are manifested to consciousness, in con-
formity with some unknown laws, by the mind itself. The Theistic
is again subdivided into three theories : according as God is sup-
posed to exhibit the phenomena in question in His own nature, or
to infuse into the percipient mind representative entities different
from its own modification, or to determine the effo itself to an allu-
sive representation of the non-ego. See Sir \V. Hamilton's Dis-
courses on Philosophy and Literature, pp. 54-00, l'J3-200. Also
his Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. i., pp. 2'J 1-297.
Berkeley's philosophy. 37
was a conviction of the non-existence of matter
â– without the perceiving being ; his ultimate object
was the making of this theory known unto others,
and convincing them of its truth and advantage.
In both he was earnest and sincere. All his skill,
learning, and acuteness, are summoned simulta-
neously to prepare their varied logical arrows
against a material world, and completely annihi-
late it from existence, or to prove that it never
did exist, which, to the common sense of short-
sighted mortals, would be the same thing.
Everything exists in the mind that perceives it ;
and apart from the perceiving mind nothing
exists. The real place and form of existence is in
the idea. The desk I write upon, the paper I feel
— they exist in my ideas, and nowhere else ; and
they may exist in the ideas of all others, if they
only saw and felt them, at the same time. If the
perceiving ego did not exist, the desk and the
paper before me could not have existed. Ideas
are objects of perception, and their existence is in
the fact that they are perceived. Ideas are difter-
ent from the mind, and yet they exist in the
mind. He tells us that all the material things
around us, and all the objects of our senses, are
nothing more than ideas ; and all these exist in
the mind, and nowhere else. Hence, using the
thought of Dr. Brown, this system rather materi-
38 PART II.
alizes mind, than spiritualizes matter.* Though
it denies the material outside, yet it creates some-
thing that is not purely mental inside ; it denies
the old world, that has been always intuitively
believed in, yet it calls into being another world
of ideas. This may be small or large, just as it is
perceived ; if it is not perceived by anybody, it
dees not exist ; for its real existence is in the fact
that it is perceived by some intelligent mind. It
may exist to one without existing to the other;
for one may perceive it whilst the other does not
perceive it. A thing existing and not existing at
the same time, according to the logic of common
reasoning, is a contradiction. f
* Dt. Thomas Brovru, an elegant philosopher. Never any works
on metaphysics have been so popular and captivating as his Leetures
were, when they were fust published. It may be said, however,
notwithstanding liis great philosophical genins, that it is very doubt-
ful Avhether bis style is not too flowery to suit serious and deep
metaphysical thought. The philosopher was born at Kirkmabreck,
Kirkcudbrightshire, in 1778 ; and, after an illustrious career as a
medical practitioner, lecturer on metaphysics, and an author, died at
Eromptou, Loudon, whither he had gone for his health, m 1826.
t The logical "law of identity or contradiction" is the general
expression and criterion of all necessary truth. The law is that a
thing must be what it is. A is A. This law vindicates itself; and
shows at least one necessary truth or law of reason. In itself it is
of little value ; but as an abbreviated expression for the criterion of
truth, it is of high importance and of great value. The primary laws
of thought, or the conditions of the thinkable, are four : — 1. The law
of identity. 2. The law of contradiction. 3. The law of exclusion;
or excluded middle. 4. The law of sufficient reason.
Berkeley's philosophy. 39
section xvi.
ISow, according to this idealism, ideas are not
part of the thinking ego, neither are they material
substance; therefore, they must be something
different from both, or possess the qualities of
both. According to this, this theory calls into
existence a new class of entities, or ideas must be
either spiritual or material. If ideas are material,
Berkeley will be no further on his way, than he
was before the thought of his theory ; the name
is the only difference, — matter still exists under
the name idea. If ideas are spiritual, this would
be directly against his theory. If ideas were
made up of mind and matter, this would be
against him ; for then matter and mind would be
the synthesis. If different from both, this would
not help him ; but involve him and all in greater
perplexity. We cannot see how Berkeley can
avoid the dilemma of the preceding conclusions,
without giving up his theory of idealism. Let
the ingenious philosopher be heard in his own
words : " This perceiving, active being is what I
call mind, spirit, soul, or myself: by which words
I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing
entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist,
or, which is the same thing, whereby they are
perceived ; for the existence of an idea consists in
40 PAllT II.
being perceived/^* He unfolds Lis views further
in the following words : " The table I write on, I
say exists, that is, I see and feel it ; and if I were
out of my study I should say it existed, meaning
thereby that if I was in my study I might per-
ceive it, or that some other spirit actually does
perceive it. There was an odour, that is, it was
smelled ; there was a sound, that is to say, it was
heard ; a colour or figure, and it was perceived by
sight or touch. This is all I can understand by
these and the like expressions ; for as to what is
said of the absolute existence of unthinking things
•>vithout any relation to their being perceived, that
seems perfectly unintelligible. Their es»e is per-
cipi, nor is it possible they should have any
existence out of the minds or thinking things
which perceive them." " The vulgar opinion
involves a contradiction. It is, indeed, an opinion
strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses,
mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible
objects, have an existence natural or real distinct
from their being perceived by the understanding.
But with how great an assurance and acquiescence
souver this principle may be entertained in the
world, yet whoever shall find it in his heart to call
it in question, may, if I mistake not, perceive it
to involve a manifest contradiction ; for what are
* Prlnciijh's of II inn an KnuwIeJye, j). 87, sect. ii.
Berkeley's philosophy. 41
the foreraentioned objects but the things we per-
ceive by sense ? and is it not plainly repugnant
that* any one of them, or any combination of
them, exist unperceived ? "
To make it more clear and explicit, we shall
quote once more : " From what has been said/'
says the author, " it follows there is not any other
substance than spirit, or that which perceives.
But for the fuller proof of this point, let it be con-
sidered the sensible qualities are colour, figure,
motion, smell, taste, and such like ; that is, the
ideas perceived by sense. Now, for any idea to
exist in an unperceiving thing, is a manifest con-
tradiction ; for, to have an idea is all one as to
perceive ; that, therefore, wherein colour, figure,
and the like qualities exist, must perceive them ;
hence it is clear there can be no unthinking
substance or substratum of those ideas." *
SECTION XVII.
It is clear, from the quotations made, that
Berkeley denies, virtually and actually, the exist-
ence of the external world. The external world
is nothing but subjective ideas. Whatever his
disciples and apologizers ingeniously say to screen
or modify his theory, his language is clear, and
his meaning cannot be mistaken. In fact, he is
* Principles of Human Kitowledi/e, pp. 88, 89, sects. 3, 4, 7.
42 PART 11.
clearer, and not so disingenuous, as his apolo-
gizers and expounders. It makes no difference
as to the way he proceeds, and the ingenuity he
displays; the end aimed at is, the total denial of
matter. This is the only interpretation which the
letter and spirit of his philosophy will furnish us
with. To put another construction upon his phi-
losophy would be to do injustice to the author,
and violation to his system. The material uni-
verse, in its ten thousand classes of beings, and
numberless tangible objects, is reduced to ideas or
sensations. If such a theory could be proved
true, we should think it a most marvellous thing,
that universal humanity has been deceived so
long. It would have been the most amazing dis-
covery that human reason ever made ; and the
genius which made it would be the most extraor-
dinary. The external world, according to this
amazing discovery, has no true existence but in
the compass of man's ideas. Not only the cata-
logue of material objects are ideal in conception,
but the real things themselves ; he carries them
all with him in his ideas. The sun he sees is not
above him, but in his idea ; the moon he beholds
by night is not many miles distant, but in his
sensatiou ; the ten thousand stars he sees
through his magnifying telescope, are not actually
in the different constellations of heaven, but in
Berkeley's philosophy. 43
hinij in his ideas ; for the real existence of things
is in perceiving them ; the mind perceives
nothing but ideas, and ideas exist in the mind.
He maintains that the rivers, the trees, the fields,
the houses, beasts, and men, have no real exist-
ence, but in the mere sensations of man. And,
sure enough, if they existed within man, they
could not be real ; for no finite space and power
could find place for them all.
SECTION XVIII.
It is true, that he does not deny external phe-
nomena, as presenting themselves to the senses.
Mr. Lewes tells us, in his " Biographical History
of Philosophy," ^ that this is an unfortunate affair
for his critics. Berkeley could not deny the
cognizance of certain objects by the senses, with-
out being considered a maniac ; yet, he denies
the external reality of all material substance, inde-
* " Uufortunately for the critics," writes ]Mr. Lewes, " Berkeley
did not contradict the evidence of the senses ; did not propound a
theory at variance in this point with the ordinary belief of mankind.
His peculiarity is, that he confined himself exclusively to the evi-
dence of the senses. What the senses informed him of, that, and
t/iat onlij, would he accept. He held fast to the facts of conscious-
ness ; he placed himself resolutely in the centre of the instinctive
belief of mankind ; there he took up his stand, leaving to philoso-
phers the region of supposition, inference, and of occult substances."
— Leioess Bioffrajihical History of Pkilosophi/, vol. iv., p. 9.
Knight's Edition.
44 PART T.I.
pendent of the perceiving being ; and this leads to
the same conclusion as the denial of the pheno-
mena of matter, and less consistent. He denies
the final and simple credence to the testimony of
his senses. His senses informed him of certain
material objects, external and independent of
himself; but he comes forward and corrects their
testimony, and says, " O dear ! you misinform
me; all those things which you inform me to
be without me, material in nature and independ-
ent of me in existence and relation, are within
me ; they are as essential parts of me as my
ideas; they are as spiritual as my ideas; they
are nothing but my ideas or sensations."
SECTION XIX.
I see an external object, a tree, a field, or
some other material thing, and in these as quali-
ties there are extension and figure. My sense
would intuitively inform me that these objects
are external and different from myself; but Berke-
ley says. No; they are in my mind; they are
nothing but inward sensations. There is bread on
the table; I feel, see, and taste it. Here we have
the testimony of three senses that this bread is
something external and independent of the eyes
that see it, the mouths that eat it, and the hands
Berkeley's philosophy. 45
which handle it : it is clear that it has extension,
figure, coloui% weight, and certain taste. But
according to this ideal philosophy, this bread is
nothing but an idea in the mind. Pity that such
ideas cannot be produced in the mind of many
hungry ones ; it would be a convenient and cheap
way to supply their wants. I carry a heavy bur-
den ; mj^ feelings inform me of the time I took it
up and put it down ; but here, as well as in other
matters of which the senses inform us, the good
bishop steps forward and stoutly maintains that
feeling is inherent in the mind, and that all is
nothing but an inward sensation. We believe
that in such circumstances very few would believe
the good Doctor. This is the plain logic of his
philosophy. It is amazing if ever he himself was
a satisfied convert to its reasoning and conclusion.
SECTION XX.
My senses inform me of something tangible;
they inform me also that this tangible thing is
without me and quite independent of me. They
inform me, moreover, that this tangible thing,
external and independent of me, has certain quali-
ties, as length and breadth, colour, and caloric.
But this philosophy will not accept of such evi-
dence, but at once refuses it wholesale, and says^
46 PART II.
all is a mistake ; all these are nothing but per-
ceptions of the mind, and the mind perceives
nothing but ideas, and these ideas are in the mind.
This idealism accuses the senses of deceiving us;
it disbelieves and denies their primordial and final
testimony. The very root of the theory must be
traced to the want of confidence in the simple
testimony of the senses. It vrould have been,
therefore, more candid and unambiguous, as well
as better for the theory itself, to have declared an
open war against the testimony of the senses.
That Berkeley thus accepts in the first instance
the testimony of the senses, and yet denies them
final credence, we think it an unfortunate thing
for him and his philosophy; and not, as Mr.
Lewes thinks, for his critics. If the testimony of
the senses is to be accepted as to the phenomenon
of matter, what consistency is there in denying
their testimony that matter is what it appears to
be, a real external substance independent of ideas ?
If this evidence is to be accepted in one, why
refuse it in the other? This is accepting and
refusing the testimony of the same witness, and
that relative to the same thing. It appears to us
that this involves both inconsistency and contra-
diction.
BERKELEY S PHILOSOPHY. 47
SECTION XXI.
And yet this philosophy claims a sympathy
and coincidence with the view of the vulgar. Mr.
LeweSj in the work we have already mentioned,
says, " He thought with the vulgar that matter
was that of whjch his senses informed him, not an
occult something of which he could have no
information," In our humble opinion Mr. Lewes
did not rightly inform himself of the view of the
vulgar, or has mistaken Berkeley, or was not sin-
cere in this assertion. We are ready to ask in
reference to him, as he did in reference to Reid's^
and Beattie's,t " Where was ]\Ir. Lewes^ usual
acuteness?" If we were to ask Mr. Lewes in a
straightforward manner. Did Dr. Berkeley deny
the external existence of matter, as it is conceived
and believed in by the generality of men, or did he
not? we must have a straightforward answer to
* Dr. Thomas Reid was a divine, and one of the greatest philo-
sophers that Scotland ever produced. His chief works are, "An
Inquiry into the Human i\Iind," and "Essays on the Intellectual and
Active Powers of Man." He was born at Strachan, Kincardineshire,
in the year 1710 ; and died in 1790.
t Dr. James Beattie was both a poet and a philosopher. He was
the author of many works of considerable popularity in his day; but
his " Minstrel," and " Essay on Truth," are tlie works by which he
is most generally and lastingly known. He was the Professor of
Moral Philosophy for many years in the Marischal College of Aber-
deen, an office which he retained till nearly the close of life. He
was born at Lawreucekirk, Scotland, in 1735 ; and died, 1803.
48 PART II.
this simple and plain question. We shall accept
of no metaphysical quibbling. Mr. Lewes wiU
not object to this, being such a faithful disciple
and advocate of Comte's positive philosophy.*
* Aua;uste Comte, a late French pliilosoplicr. He commenced
hi? public life as a follower of Saint Simon, and, in 1820, prepared
a work explanatory of (he sy-Ntem of that extraordinary man. He
subsequently became a Mathematical Professor at the Polytechnic
School ; but on the accession of l;0uis Napoleon to the Empire, he
was deprived of that position. Between 1830 and 1842, he jmb-
lished, in six large volumes, his " Course of Positive Philosophy,"
the purpose of which is (o prove that the human mind passes
through three different stages in its meditations upon all subjects.
The lirst is the theological ; the second, the metaphysical ; and the
third, the positive ; in which, it is supposed, the mind has acquired
a positive knowledge of things, according to their comprehension,
relation, and harmony with the laws of the universe, lu 1843, he
published a mathematical work ; and, in the following year, a " Dis-
course " intended to enforce and make clearer his larger work. His
theories attracted a large number of ardcut disciples and admirers;
especially among the disciples of Saiut Simon and Fourier. Not only
he found many followers in France, but in England and Europe he has
many disciples and admirers: and Mr. Lewes appears to be one
of them. At Paris, an Institution was established, of which
Comte himself was a kind of high priest ; and all its members used
all means and the greatest activity to promulgate the views of their
admired and great master. There are several causes which have
greatly enhanced the influence and popularity of his system. The
'' Course of Positive Philosophy " is undeniably a very great work ; and
no one but the very first intellect and genius could have produced it ;
and every great work by a master spirit is sure to make many dis-
ciples. But there are other reasons, wliich are to be found in the
state of men's views and sympathies, which helped greatly its
popularity.
The author had a high name and position ; the work has an
luazing amount of science in it; there is a tendency in the European
mind to materialism, especially in the English mind ; and, above all,
Berkeley's philosophy. • 49
We think that Mr. Lewes must answer in the
positive. Let us quote a few sentences from
Berkeley himself. " It will be urged/' says the
author^ " that this much at least is true ; to wit,
that we take away all corporeal substances. To
this my answer is, that if the word substance be
taken in the vulgar sense for a conviction of
sensible qualities, such as extension, solidity,
weight, and the like; this we cannot be advised
of taking away. But if it be taken in a philo-
sophical sense for the support of accidents or
qualities without the mind, then indeed I acknow-
ledge that we take it away, if one may be said to
take away that which never had any existence, not
even in the imagination/' * This passage might
mislead any one who is not familiar with his sys-
tem. He does not deny " sensible qualities, as
in the matter-of-fact students of material science. There is a com-
mon dislike among many formal scientific men to metaphysics ;
and, above all, it is very acceptable to the wish and feeling of men,
to believe themselves in possession of positive and infallible know-
ledge about all objects of anxious inquiry. It is the dogma of
infallibility introduced into philosophy ; and the lofty questions of
metaphysics reduced to the limit of human mechanism, and positive
knowledge. It limits human thought, and paralyses intellectual
energy ; and no doubt its tendency is material and sceptical. Comte's
" Positive Philosophy " has been translated into English by Miss
Martineau. He was born at Montpelier, 1795, and, after an illus-
trious, active, and earnest life, died in Paris, in the year 1857, loved
and regretted by a large nimiber in Prance, Europe, and America.
* Prindijles of Human Knowledge, p. IGO.
E
50 PART 11.
extension, solidity," and so on. But what does he
mean by these qualities? Notliing more than
qualities in the form of ideas existing in the mind.
Let this be known once more in the words of
Berkeley himself, on the same page as the above :
— " The hardness or softness, the colour, taste,
warmth, frjure, or such like qualities, which, com-
bined together, constitute the several sorts of vic-
tuals and apparel, have been known to exist only
in the mind that perceives them; and this is all
that is meant by calling them ideas, which word,
if it was ordinarily used as thing, would sound no
harsher nor more ridiculous than it. I am not
for disputing about the propriety, but the truth
of the expression." If the reader will compare
these quotations with those we have made in
former pages from Berkeley, it will show that we
interpret him fairly.
SECTION XXII.
But this theory does not coincide with the view
of the vulgar, relative to material substance.
Berkeley appears to contradict himself on this
ground. In one of the quotations we have given,
he asserts that the vulgar view of matter is wrong;
in another place he states that he coincided with
the vulgar. "We cannot account for this as well as
Berkeley's riiiT.osoniY. 51
for other things in his idealism; except the autlior
was in a dilemma, and knew not how to extricate
himself. Prima facie, it might be thonght that
Berkeley coincides with the vulgar ; but a short
consideration and few interrogations will soon
convince that he docs not. His material subjifa7ict',
&c., resolves itself into ideas ; these ideas are iu
the mind, and in the perception of them consists
their existence. This is all Berkeley understands
to be matter. Berkeley and the vulgar would go
only a short distance together. They would agree
as to the phenomena which present themselves to
the senses; but the moment he would say, " These
material objects which present themselves to our
senses, are nothing but ideas perceived b^'^ the
mind," they would part company Avith him imme-
diately. The vulgar would ask him, " Do you see
that splendid field covered with beautiful daisies,
fine horses, sheep, and cattle? We think them to
be real things without us, independent of us, and
if we never saw them, they would exist just the
same; what do you mean by this?" lie would
answer, " They are ideas in my mind." Ideas of
daisies, horses, sheep, and cattle ! Tiiis view is
diametrically opposed to the common sense of the
vulgar. Such is our confidence in this, that avc
should willingly venture it upon the examination
of the view of the vulvar. Such idealism never
53 PART II.
entered the view of ordinary men. They take
material substance to be what it presents itself to
the senses, intuition, and consciousness ; and never
dream of solving it to a mere inward idealism.
It never has been^ nor can it be, the conclusion of
common sense; and the vulgar are governed by
common sense and intuition. It is the theory of
aben'ant genius, tired with the common route, and
anxious for a more novel path, more congenial with
their predisposed feelings, desires, and purposes.
Only a few restless spirits have landed on this
naked shore of ideal philosophy. The intuition
and consciousness of men have preserved them
from it, and ever will.
SECTION XXIII.
Neither is there that difference between the
vulgar and philosophers, as to the nature and laws
of matter. Philosophers, and the vulgar, believe
cordially that matter has certain properties ; as,
'extension, impenetrability, divisibility, porosity,
compressibility, elasticity, mobility, and inertia.
They both believe in other properties, which are
not found invariably in universal matter ; as hard-
ness, softness, heavy, light, rough, smooth, bitter,
sweet, red, brown, green, large, small, and many
more of such kinds. They both believe that
Berkeley's philosophy. 53
matter is found in different forms, as solid, liquid,
or gaseous. They both believe that matter is a
tangible substance, apprehended by its contact
with the senses. Their belief in all the properties
and laws of matter, in the main, is the samej
only the vulgar are not capable of going so far,
and of defining so accurately, its laws and quali-
ties, scholastically and precisely, as philosophers.
The vulgar did believe that the sun, moon, and all
the solar planets, turned around this globe ; but
now they believe with philosophers. The vulgar
at length follow and adopt the tested views of
philosophers ; as one advances, the other follows.
In many points of natural science, the vulgar are
now higher than philosophers were in times past.
SECTION XXIV.
If it were granted to the idealist, that the vul-
gar have no conception of a substratum in which
the qualities of matter inhere, it would not follow
that they disbelieve in the existence of an external
world on that account. Whether the first is
rightly understood or not, the latter will be always
believed in, because it is a matter of conscious in-
tuition. Neither does it follow, as a necessary
conclusion, if such a thing as a substratum, as a
metaphenomenal underlying matter, cannot be
54 PART II.
clearly defined and proved, that the non-existence
of matter is demonstrable, and to believe in its
reality inconsistent. The denial of universal
material substances would be a very rash and un-
vrarrantable conclusion to arrive at, because such
a thing as a substratum of matter cannot be de-
fined and proved. The want of proof and denial
of one, can never destroy the other. In this we
think Bei'keley very inaccurate in his reasoning
and conclusion. He denies the existence of mat-
ter, which presents itself as an indubitable pheno-
menon to his senses, because the substratum of it
cannot be clearly defined and proved. He sacri-
fices a thing that has clear evidence, because
another thing cannot be clearly pointed out ; and
the proof of the existence of matter does not de-
pend upon and require the proof of that thing.
He is guilty of drawing a positive conclusion from
an uncertain premiss, and from a postulate that
the conclusion does not necessarily depend upon.
SECTION XXV.
The idealist is not able to prove that a sub-
stratum does not exist, and yet draws a conclusion
of affirmation, that matter cannot be what it ap-
pears to be to all the minds of men. Would it be
safe and right to use this logic in all departments
BERKELEY'S PHILOSOPHY. 55
of knowledge ? Is it needful to be able to define
all things about the objects of our credence, before
we believe in their existence ? Does it not
happen frequently, that there is something per-
taining to the most simple objects of faith, beyond
our definition ? Do not the idealists themselves
believe in innumerable things that they cannot
explain all about ? This is a highway to uni-
versal scepticism : man is conscious of a spi-
ritual influence, and yet, according to this, he
must not believe in it, because he cannot define
the course and the agent of it. There are evi-
dences of intelligence in men, and yet, because
mind cannot infallibly be defined, we must not
believe in it. Many think that they have evi-
dence of the Divinity of the Messiah ; yet, because
the hypostatic union cannot be defined, we must
deny His Divinity ! If this is the rule of certi-
tude and credence, we have not sufficient evi-
dence to believe anything; stubborn unbelief
must universally reign ; and, the more ignorant
man is, the more rational his unbelief. These
conclusions would have been deprecated by Berke-
ley, yet we think that they follow naturally from
his position.
SECTION XXVI.
Though we may not be able to define a sub-
stratum, or material substance, in which inhere
56 PART II.
sensible qualities, yet one involves the other.
Material substance must have some qualities ; so
cognizable sensible qualities must inhere in the
same substance. A clear proof, therefore, against
the existence of one, would end in the negation of
the other. If Berkeley could have proved the
non-existence of material substance, or of the sub-
stratum of matter, which is the same thing, then,
as a matter of simple sequence, nothing would
remain but airy and empty ideas ; but, as he could
not prove either of these, his reasoning, in our
opinion, is illogical and most inconclusive. It
follows that whoever has a perception of one,
must have a belief in the other, for one is a corre-
lative of the other; and the mind, by natural
logical order, and intuitive conviction, leads us
from one to the other.
SECTION XXVII.
That it cannot ibe defined, is not the least evi-
dence against its existence, must be clear, from
the fact that an exact knowledge of things is
never in this world of imperfection to be either
the test of truth, the evidence of conviction, the
ground of belief, the rule of action, or the final
test of things. If this is conclusive, the vulgar,
as well as the philosopher, believes in the sub-
BERKELEY S PHILOSOPHY. 5/
stratum of matter. Would any one believe in
colour, figure, weight, extension, caloric, sweet,
bitter, and all other sensible qualities, without a
substance in which they inhere ? Can a motion
exist without some moving body? One is the
accident or the property of the other. It could
not have existed without. We could not, orderly
and logically, conceive of one without the other.
Here is a book. This book has figure, extension,
weight, and colour. These qualities are not the
book, and yet we cannot conceive of a book with-
out them. The book is not figure, nor is it exten-
sion, nor weight, neither is it colour, nor all these
put together ; it is something that has all these as
its properties, yet in itself it is none of them.
SECTION XXVIII.
The legitimate force of this is applicable to the
mind as well as matter. Mind is a unity ; so
matter is a unity ; yet both have their powers or
properties. If the substratum of one is denied, is
it consistent to believe in that of the other ? We
cannot think it is. If it will be said that we are
conscious of one, so are we of the other. Per-
ception, conception, reflection, remembrance, ab-
straction, and calculation; love, hate, fear, grief, joy,
confidence, and hope, and many more, are powers
58 PART II.
and acts of the mind. Though the mind cannot
be what it is without thcse^ yet the mind itself is
not one or several of these ; it is something in
which these exist, and are the expressive powers of
it. On the same ground, as this ideal philosophy-
denies the substratum of matter, it does away
with that of the mind, too. In this, also, we
consider the theory inconsistent and self-contra-
dictory.
SECTION XXIX.
The immediate question at issue is, — Are the
things which come in contact with our senses,
material qualities? This is the gist of the whole
question. If this were settled, as a matter of sure
consequence, the whole matter would rest. If
they are material properties, matter must exist,
and they inhere in that material reality ; but, if
they are not material properties, so far as we know,
matter does not exist. This is the goal where
both sides must unite or separate ; in this place
must the first premiss of negation or affirmation
be proclaimed ; without this understanding all
will be fighting without arms and order, and com-
pletely in the dark. In this, we think that Berke-
ley and the idealists appear as if they wished to
evade the question. Instead of declaring at once
that extension, hardness, softness, and other pro-
Berkeley's philosophy. 59
perties presenting tlieraselves to the senses, are
nothing but ideality, they say, — " We believe our
senses, that all these are really what they appear
to be." Yet, according to the system of Berke-
ley, they are nothing but ideas in the brain. This
appears like quibbling and evading, rather than
fairly defining and reasoning. Truth fares always
best when it is stated fairly and fully; and, if
idealism is true, it needs fear nothing as to its
aim and consequences. The misfortune of truth
is, that it is concealed, misunderstood, and denied ;
whilst it is the fortune of error to be misconstrued,
and clothed and mixed Avith truth.
SECTION XXX.
Berkeley rests his idealism upon the ground of
consciousness, and Mr. Lewes says that he is in-
controvertibly safe here. On this ground Hume
used to say of his philosophy, that it is uncontro-
verted, but convinces nobody.^ The original
datum, and primordial truth and testimony of
consciousness, are the same everywhere, and in
everybody. It cannot be a predicate of the nega-
tive and of the affirmative, relative to the same
thing, and in the same sense ; therefore, it cannot
* Hume, David, a historian, and a philosopher of great power
and acuteness. Bora at Edinburgh, I7II; died in the same city,
1776.
60 PART II.
deny and affirm the existence of matter. The
testimony of consciousness is not contradictory
and changeable. It is the same in every age and
breast. The only difficulty is to solve and under-
stand it rightly. Both the realist and the idealist
appeal for proof to the ground of consciousness.
The two it cannot support^ or its evidence is con-
tradictory ; if so, its worth and veracity are gone.
The veracity and the efficiency of the fact of con-
sciousness must be preserved in their integrity. If
the veracity and uniformity of its evidence are not
accepted, it cannot be the court of final appeal ;
but this must always be the final and absolute
court relative to all that belong to the individual
€ffO, because it is the only power of test in the
possession of all. It is an instinct in the nature
of man to fall back upon his own consciousness ;
and whatever contradicts its testimony is not be-
lieved. Here, where landed Descartes,"^ after all
his doubts and anxieties, Cogito, ergo sum, was his
resting-place; and here where all philosophers
finally seek a safe landing. "Whatever is not im-
* Descartes, a celebrated French mathematiciau and i)liilosopher.
He was tlie first to reduce the science of optics to the command of
mathematics. He was an extensive author. The following are
some of the principal works which perpetuate the philosophical
power of the eminent philosopher : — Principia Philosophia ; Bisser-
tatio deMethodoredereyendaPaiioms ; I)iojptrica ; Meditationes;
Geometry ; Letters. He was born at La Haye, in Touraine, 1596,
and died at Stockholm, 1650.
Berkeley's philosophy. 61
mediately the fact of consciousness, must be a
matter of revelation or testimony ; but the cogni-
tion of the senses, the emotions, and the state and
acts of the mind, are directly under the jurispru-
dence of consciousness, which Berkeley falls back
upon as a testing-ground of his theory.
SECTION XXXI.
To a certain point the idealist and the realist
agree, and walk together in unity. The two ac-
knowledge the testimony of consciousness, para-
mount as to the ego, or the mind itself; so far
goes the idealism of Fichte,"^ which resolves all
the external objectives into pure thought ; so far
goes the idealism of Berkeley, which resolves all
into ideas ; and so far goes the belief in the ex-
ternal world together. At this point Berkeley,
and his friend the realist, (not Hylas,) differ, and
finally separate company. Berkeley asserts the
fact of consciousness further than this : he says
that he is conscious of certain ideas as objects of
perception, but these were not external and inde-
* Johann Gottlieb Kchte, a subtle metaphysician, and a lofty
pure character. One of the ablest expounders of Kaut's philosophy ;
and father of J. Hermann Fichte, who has caught the metaphysical
tendency, views, and ability of his father. The story of his life and
death is most touching ; and, whether his system of philosophy is
received or not, all will admire the felicitous purity of his life.
He was bom at Eammenon, in Upper Lusatia, 1762 ; and died, 1814.
62 PAUT IT.
pendent objects. Ficlite asserted that he was
conscious of nothing but of his own thoughts;
Berkeley says that he was conscious of his own
perception, or the perceiving being, and also the
idea perceived, but this idea is nothing. The
idealism of Fichte is more simple and consistent
than that of Berkeley."^ The realist differs
from the two as to the cognition of the non
ego, and its real identical existence, apart from
the perceiving ego. This philosophy is both
more simple and more consistent than that of
idealism.
SECTION XXXII.
The fact of consciousness in its present view
and relation, resolves itself into different inquiries.
First, how far does consciousness take cognizance
of things? Does it include something external
with the perceiving ego ? This we answer in the
* Fichte's was a more spiritual and pure idealism than Berke-
ley's ; though they possess much in common, yet they have
their features of diifereuce. Berkeley claims identity of belief with
the vulgar ; Fichte boldly declares that the vulgar are deluded.
Berkeley says that he perceives ideas and nothing else ; Fichte
knows nothing beyond his immediate and absolute consciousness.
Berkeley would say, " The world is as if it were real to me, it presents
itself to my senses ; " Fichte would say, " I know nothing about it, I
know of nothing but of my own consciousness." Berkeley quibbles
more than Fichte ; but both end in the same conclusion, — a complete
negation of our external world.
Berkeley's philosophy. 63
affirmative. It takes cognition of the subjective
and of the objective; consciousness testifies to the
ego and the non ego, as a natural and necessary
synthesis. It is impossible to think of self, with-
out thinking of something that is not self. The
ego is conscious of the perceiving being ; it is also
at the same time conscious of the external reality
perceived ; and, in the concept, these are con-
trasted and separated from each other. This
almost all philosophers believe to be the incon-
testable deliverance of consciousness. Many of
the ancient philosophers believed in certain images
or representations made to the mind. Eeid was
the first, in this country at least, to exalt con-
sciousness to its proper place and function ; and
yet Eeid is not very explicit and comprehensive in
all his statements ; but Sir William Hamilton,
with consummate learning, and lavish criticism,
and most acute and exact definitions and analysis,
has established the fact beyond the power at pre-
sent of an attack, or perhaps improvement.*
* Sir William Hamilton was one of the greatest philosopliers, if not
the very greatest, of his age ; and the first even Scotland ever pro-
duced. He was educated at Balliol College, Oxford, and was brought
up to the bar ; but, his philosophical tendency being too strong, he
never courted much practice. In 1836, he became the Professor of
Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh, which he
retained till his death. He greatly advanced the literature of philo-
sophy, logic, and metaphysics. His powers, both of generalization
and analysis, were extraordinarily great. There have been as great
64 PART II.
That the non ego is different and external to the
ego that perceives it, is, and has been, the con-
thinkers, and perhaps greater than he ; hut few, if any, ever united
such extensive and various learning, wondrous reading, and wonder-
ful intellectual resources, with great thinking, as the late Sir W.
Hamilton. ]\I. Cousin calls him, " le plus grand critique de notre
Steele;" and M. Braudis, " le grand maitre du Peripatctisme."
His chief works are, his "Discussion on Philosophy," &c., fii'st
chieily published in the " Edinburgh Review," afterwards collected
into a large volume ; his edition of Reid's Works, with many notes,
and long supplementary dissertations ; and he was engaged upon the
Works of Dugald Stewart, when the message of death came. His
Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, which he delivered to his Uni-
versity class, have been published in four volumes, edited, and givea
to the public, and at once are worthy of the illustrious Professor, and
of the distinguished editors, so that his most tenacious disciple can-
not wish anything more.
Without a doubt. Sir W. Hamilton was a disciple of Kant, and
the fundamental principles of his philosophy are of the Kantian
school; and his acceptance and defence of the common-sense philo-
sophy accorded fully with these principles. It has been said of
him, that he was destructive and not constructive. Philosophy in
its very nature is controversial, testing, and destructive ; its business
and aim is, to correct the inadvertencies of thought, belief, and life.
Before a philosopher can become constructive, he must destroy the
systems of dogmas, and mouutaius of opinions and prejudices, which
stand in his way. After this is done, and a clear way opened, the
work of construction begins ; and he who can destroy right well, has
also the power to construct right well. Sir W. Hamilton was not
only a powerful destructive critic, he was also a discoverer both in
logic and metajihysics ; though he has done more than any one man
for a long period, it is possible, but for the lamentable stroke of
death, that he would have done more, in constructing a system of
philosophy, which he was not permitted to do. He devoted
all his powers and resources to teach, elucidate, and establish
the fundamental principles in the common-sense philosophy of
Keid ; and has put it on a ground not easily attacked. These
just and high eulogiums do not necessitate our acceptance
Berkeley's philosophy. 65
sciousuess of universal man. This cannot be
doubted, Arithout coming into collision with the
universal conduct and actions of men. 1. The
emotions of the mind are different to these enti-
ties : love, hatred, hope, joy, with others of the
same nature. These emotions have thinr real
subjectives and objectives, and all are conscious of
their different modifications towards their different
objects. 2. The actual habits and actions of all
men show this universal consciousness ; all men
avoid falling into the water, going into the fire,
precipitating over a rock, taking poison ; all men
fear the lion, the mad dog, fire instruments, the
terrific thunderbolt, and numberless things beside.
The fact of consciousness alone accounts for these
universal conducts. Berkeley himself, in per-
petual and numberless instances, obeyed this law
of his nature, whilst he tried to reason it away in
his theory of idealism. This is not the production
of all in his views; for thei-e are some matters as to wliich we
cannot as:ree all in all witli Sir W. Hamilton.
In purging and establishing the philosophy of common sense, he
lays down the following canons as his touch-stone, which regulated
all his philosophical inquiries: — "1. That we admit nothing, not
either au original datum of consciousness, or the legitimate con-
sequence of such a datum. 2. That we embrace all the original
data of consciousness, and all their legitimate consequences : and, 3.
That we exhibit each of these in its individual integrity, neither dis-
torted nor mutilated, aud in its relative place, -whether of pre-
eminence or subordination." — Hamilton's Eeid, Note A., p. 747.
Sir \\. Hamilton was born at Glasgow, 1788 : and, after a laborious,
illustrious, and glorious life, died at Edinburgh, 1856.
F
66 PART II.
of a mere plicuoraenal phantom, but of the real
consciousness of the mind, of an external reality.
This is seen in children in every class and condi-
tion, and that without distinction of time and
place, which shows it to be original and uniform.
SECTION XXXIII.
The veracity of consciousness cannot be doubted.
If tills were doubted, and called in question on
one ground, it must be doubted on every ground,
and in every form. This would be suicidal
and destructive, for the same consciousness
testifies everywhere. And if its testimony is not
believed relative to the external, what ground have
we to believe its evidence relative to the existence
of the ego himself? If the veracity of the testi-
mony ot consciousness were denied, universal
scepticism, as a matter of necessity, would follow.
The/acr of consciousness cannot be doubted, with-
out doubting doubt itself; which would be a con-
tradiction and annihilation. Every man must be
conscious of his own doubt ; and yet, if the fact of
consciousness is denied, it is a simple impossi-
bility. The fact of consciousness must ever stand
as firm as the existence of man.
SECTION XXXIT.
Secondly, Dees consciousness become familiar
with external reality mediately, or immediately ?
BERKELEY S PHILOSOPHY. C7
These two theories have been held, and yet are
held, by many. They xvho hold that the mind
becomes familiar with the external world, through
the medium of an ideal medium, are called repre-
sentationists ; and the believers in the theory that
the mind becomes familiar with the external
reality, without any teriium quid, or immediately,
are called presentationists. Ancient philosophers,
down to Locke,"^ and, indeed, Locke himself, be-
* John Lucke is a familiar name to the veriest tyro in mental
science, and excites feelings of love and admiration in the profound-
est thinkers of every land, nationality, and age. He is cue of the
first that taught me to think, and lead my boyish sympathies and re-
flections into the lofty and delightful regions of higher thought. I
revere him as a master ; I respect him as an independent and un-
affected thinker ; and never will cease to admire his lofty, upright,
and noljle demeanour as a man; and I love him as a father of the
noblest heritage, which a man can leave to his race. It would be
one of the most gloomy and distressing thoughts and feelings of my
soul, if such characters were gone for ever, without a hope to meet
and hold commuuion wilh them iu a happier and brighter world.
Hence, it is a part of the brightest thoughts, and happiest hopes and
feelings my mind is capable of, that such lights are not extinguished
from tlie universe of God ; and that it will be in my power and
privilege to liold intercourse and associate with them in another life.
Thinkers difier as to the quality of his philosophy, but all agree
in acknowledging both his greatness and power. No one has
wielded, since the time of Aristotle, such great and universal sway
over the thinking portion of Europe, as John Locke. He produced
an epoch in the intellectualism of England and Europe. Never a
more unaffected and natural thinker; never a more homely and
familiar thinker; but never a more honest and earnest thinker.
It is the portion of a great man often to be opposed and persecuted,
becpuse he removes venerable and fashionable landmarks in thought
and habits, and settles the future destiny of men and nations. No
P 2
68 PART II.
licved tliat the mind perceived the external medi-
citehj:-^ They bcheved that the mind was too
mail was more persc(!utcd iu his time and persoOj than John Locke;
and no one has been more opposed, and more severely handled and
tested in his philosophy, than he. But it is the portion of the
great and good, to ba greatly loved and admired as men. No one
has had a larger meed of jiraise and admiration than John Locke ;
and at this very time he has readers and admirers throughout
Europe and America, and all parts of the globe where philosophy is
loved and studied. He was born at Wrington, Somersetshire, on the
29th of August, 1632, and died in the arms of his friend, Lady
Masham, on the 28th of October, 1704.
* This is a matter of great debate and disagreement among the
critics of Locke. Reid brought upon himself the severe criticism of
Dr. Priestley, Dr. Brown, and others, for his criticism upon Locke,
that he held ideas as media between the external world and the per-
ceiving mind. Sir W. Hamilton decides in favour of Dr. Reid, and
severely handles the opponents of Reid. See Hamilton's " Dis-
cussions," p. 77, &c. ; "Lectures," vol. ii., p. 53, &c. ; Dr. Brown's
" Lectures," p. 170, &c.; " Dr. Reid," by Hamilton, p. 256, &c.
From the want of greater preciscncss and unity in diction, and his
extensive, familiar, and lively pictorial figures, there is a diliiculty to
get at the real view of Locke on this controversial point. Yet, any
one in studying the works of Locke unprejudiced, without the know-
ledge of the comments and criticism of his admirers and deprecators,
will arrive like myself at the conclusion, that he holds ideas as repre-
sentations to the mind, of external objects. The mind, according to
him, perceives ideas ; the external meets the mind iu its ideas ; ideas
are the place of meeting and imity between the mind and all its per-
ceiving objects. " To ask, at what time a man has first any ideas ? "
says Locke, "is to ask when he begins to perceive? having ideas,
and perceptions, being the same thing. 1 know it is an opinion that
the soul always thinks, and that it has the actual perception of ideas
in itself constantly, as long as it exists; and that actual thinking is
as inseparable from the soul, as actual extension is from the body ;
which, if true, to inquire after the beginning of man's ideas is the
same, ns to incpiire after tiie beginning of his soul. For, by this
account, soul and its iJi as, as body and its extension, will begin to
Berkeley's philosophy. G9
refined to come immediately into contact with
matter. According to this theory of representa-
tion, the material reality was something beyond
the thing perceived ; and so, nothing but a matter
of inference. This view throws the material
reality, from the ground of absolute certainty, to
the ground of logical probability. On this ground
material and external substance cannot be proved,
directly by the fact and veracity of consciousness ;
for the simple reason, that the mind is not con-
scious of anything directly but the ego, and the
representation made to it. It would be a hard
matter, on this ground, to prove external reality.
But the common -sense philosophy of Scotland
has delivered the fact of consciousness in this
exist both at tlie same time." — Human Understanding, Tegg's Edi-
tion, sect. 9, p. 53. la another place he says : — " Fire may bui'n
our bodies with no other effect than it does a billet, unless the mo-
tion be continued to the brain ; and then the sense of heat, or idea
of pain, be produced in the mind, wherein consists actual perception."
— Ibid., sect, iii., p. 81.
I shall quote once more: — "Idea is the object of thinking.
Every man being conscious to himself that he thinks, and that which
his mind is applied about whilst thinking, being the ideas that are
there, it is past doubt that men have in their minds several ideas,
such as are tliose expressed by the words, whiteness, hardness, sweet-
ness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkenness, and
others : it is in the first place then to be inquired, how he conies by
them ? " — Ibid., sect, i., p. 50.
These quotations might be easily increased to a great extent; from
these and others it appears, that Locke considered a knowledge of
external objects possible through the medium of ideas.
70 PART II.
respect. This philosophy of rcpresentationisrn
was the iijnis fat mis that first misled, and at last
confirmed, Berkeley in his ideal materialism.
Idealism is a direct and natural conclusion of the
representation philosophy.
SECTION XXXV.
The wonder is not that any have fallen into
idealism, but that any who have believed in this
tertium quid, have been preserved from it. If it
were not that the iutviitive conviction of men is
stronger than the teaching and tendency of this
theory and its deductions, all would have landed
in idealism that believed the representative philo-
sophy. It required only a simple conclusion, and a
bold spirit to have made it, and this representation
would land in idealism. This step Berkeley was
bold enough to make. Reality is converted into
representation ; he is conscious of this, and of
nothing beyond this. If all this were true, the
simple conclusion would be, so far as conscious-
ness goes, nothing but a mere representation
exists. This Berkeley called ideas; and he main-
tained he was conscious of this, and nothing more.
This conclusion was natural and right, but his
premiss was a wrong assumption. His radical
error was that the mind ])erccives mediately, and
beukeley's philosophy. 71
not immediately. If lie could have established the
tertium quid of the representation made to the
mind, then, so far as consciousness goes, his ground
would have been invulnerable. But this he never
could ; in fact he never tried, for the reason, it
could not be done. Indeed, Berkeley appears as
if the thought never struck him, that the mind
was capable of conversing with the external reality
without a medium.
SECTION XXXVI.
This is the only ground upon which dualism
and idealism must fight out their quarrel about
the reality or non-reality of an external world.
The victory must be gained here. If the mind
perceives immediately external reality, then we are
conscious of it, consequently must believe that
materiality exists. Once this is allowed, the exter-
nal world cannot be denied more than the fact of
consciousness. On the other hand, if the miiid
perceives, through images or representations, the
material world cannot be proved from conscious-
ness to exist, it is thrown to the ground of infe-
rential conclusion. Berkeley thought he answered
this triumphantly when he said, " An idea can be
like nothing but an idea.^^ This is to say, — blue
cannot be green, red cannot be scarlet, white can-
t'i PART II.
not be blacky round cannot be square, small cannot
be large, extension caunot be like solidity, moun-
tains cannot be like rivers, trees are not like
flowers, horses are not like cattle and sheep. In
this every tyro will agree with the philosopher.
The idea of an effect is like nothing but
effect. Is there no likeness of the cause in the
effect ? Is the idea not like its archetype ? Is
the idea self-created ? Is there no preceding
cause to it, and that according to the representa-
tionists themselves ? For aught this contains, it
is an argument on the side of the reality of matter,
and the immediate perception of it by the mind,
as much as it serves the idealist. J\Iy hand which
I hold before my eyes is like nothing but my
hand ; the book upon the table before me is like
nothing but a book. These objects, I am con-
scious, are external to the perceiving being, and
at the same time am not conscious of any mediate
representation between me and the non ego. The
mind sees things as they are immediately, and, in
appearance and reality, they are not like other
things. It would be impossible to persuade and
convince the consciousness of men contrary to the
way things are perceived ; for man is not conscious
of any teriium quid that might deceive him. No
power could persuade the mind that red is blue, or
a flower is a stone ; and the same with all other
Berkeley's philosophy. 73
objects, because the mind is infallibly confident
and conscious of the immediate objects of its
perception.
SECTION XXXVII.
We think, therefore, that the ground of con-
sciousness not only fails Berkeley, but, so far as
its evidence can be canvassed, is completely against
his position. Any one can test it if he will but
fall back upon his own consciousness, and examine
its simple and decided testimony. I have a stone
in my hand ; I am conscious that this stone is cold,
round, of certain weight, and of a brownish colour.
Some of these deductions are facts of intuitive con-
sciousness relative to this stone. As to its mineral
qualities, they are as yet, perhaps, not determined
to my understanding, consequently my belief is
suspended relative to them ; therefore they are not
within the reach of the fact of consciousness.
Now, am I conscious of any representation made
to my mind of this stone? is it by something be-
tween it and my mind I know it? is it an image
of a stone, or is it the stone itself, my mind per-
ceives ? My own consciousness informs me that
I perceive the stone immediately, and nothing
else. Another question rises, — Is it possible for my
consciousness to inform me of other qualities be-
longing to this stone besides those I actually per-
74 PART II.
ceive, and so deceive me in the matter? Is it
possible for me to be conscious of a square whilst I
perceive a round object? and so with all the rest.
If this were possible, it would make the testimony
of consciousness a medley of contradictions. This
would be the same as to be conscious and not to
be conscious at the same time, relative to the same
thing; the same as to be and not to be, which
would be self-destructive : consciousness, there-
fore, informs me of the immediate percei^dng of
the object, and indubitably testifies of the thing
as it is perceived.
SECTION XXXVIII.
The editor of the present edition of Berkeley's
^Yorks says, in his prefatory remarks, " It will not,
however, be misplaced to observe that Dr. Rcid,
the only adversary who has assailed ' The Prin-
ciples of Human Knowledge' with any degree of
plausibility, has not gone deep enough in the
investigation. He imagined that when he should
have overthrown the philosophic scheme of ideas,
Berkeley's theory would necessarily become in-
volved in the general ruin. But Berkeley's theory
does not depend on the truth or falsehood of that
ancient hypothesis, but ou this fact, that ' there is
no necessaiy connexion in reason and language
Berkeley's philosophy. 75
between our perceptions and the existence of ex-
ternal objects, since we know it not unfrequently
happens that objects appear to be present to the
senses when disordered, altliough we know they
are not present.' Reid has not refuted Berkeley,"
continues the editor, "not even struck at the
leading root of his system. No other antagonist
has assailed his doctrines with equal ability or
success. Berkeley, therefore, remains unanswered."
SECTION XXXIX.
We think that there is an absolute relation
between external objects and perception. As for
things appearing to disordered senses, this is beg-
ging the question. The things which so appear to
the imagination of such persons are faint recollec-
tions or deductions from something in the memory
or in their former knowledge. It is possible to
imagine of things that have no real existence ; but
even that has a reference to something in exist-
ence Avhich we saw, heard of, or are familiar with
in some way or other. All our imaginations are
relative, not to the mind only, but to something
without it. All dreams, spectres, and imagina-
tions are nothing but modifications or reproduc-
tions in a meaner or in a nobler form of the
things which have been made known unto us,
76 PART II.
either tlirougli our senses^ reflections^ or revela-
tion. According to tins hypothesis the mind could
perceive things as they are, if they never existed,
nor were heard of, nor made known in any way. So
the objects themselves are of no use ; equally useless
are the senses, for one is made for the other. Thus
it is possible to perceive in cold that wc get warm
without fire, quench our thirst without liquid,
satisfy our hunger without bread, clothe our naked-
ness without garments : our common experience,
and that of all men, show most incontestably the
utter impossibility of perceiving things without
their existence.
SECTION XL.
We have shown that the mind perceives material
objects immediately and not mediately. This view
of the case is an absolute destruction to the ideal-
ism of Berkeley. If Dr. Keid lost it anywhere, it
was here. His attack upon the hypothesis of ideas
was the opening of the gate to this route and con-
clusion. He should have established his battery
of attack firmly on this ground, that the mind per-
ceives thiugs immediately. This ground shuts
idealism up ; it is left without power and argu-
ment. The preceding quotations of the editor and
Berkeley assume the ground, that the mind per-
ceives things mediately : destroy this assumption —
BERKELEY S PHILOSOPHY. 77
they are left groundless ; or it must be shown tliat
our position is wrong, which cannot be done upon
the ground of consciousness ; and this is the only
direct witness in the matter.
SECTION XLI.
If external objects are not necessary to the per-
ception of thera^ how are ideas produced ? what
produces them ? If ideas are representations^ the
real things must exist. Thus reasoned the repre-
sentationists and dualists. But Berkeley says
these representations are the real things them-
selves. If it will be answered, " The mind pro-
duces or creates them," we are none the more
enlightened. The mind cannot create ideas out of
nothing. The mind creates nothing; it only
perceives things as they are, and moulds them into
classification and order. This appears to us as
effect without a cause— a something without any-
thing. The mind, according to this, creates and
destroys all, and that without any real elements
without itself. There is a phenomenon to the
sense, but it is nothing but an idea perceived by
the miud."^
* We are roLbcd of the material universe witliout a compensation.
Our faith is disturbed without another element of satisfactioa. We
are unsettled without a reason and a promise. It is hard to choose
between this hypothesis and that of Pere ilalebrancbe. The hypo-
78 PART II.
SECTION XLir.
This idealism is only a natural and maturer
development of other systems which preceded it.
Berkeley made only one step of advance-
ment. Everything has its natural tendency, and
reaches its ultimatum sooner or later. Berkeley
thesis of Malebranche holds that we see all in Rod. It is called the
philosophy of occasional causes. Both Berkeley and ilalebranche
treat the testimony of the senses as false : the two declare the expe-
rience and testimony of mankind as false : the two end in the same
conclusion, namely, the denial of the material world; both arc sup-
ported by pious motives, and expected their systems to result greatly
to the advantage of religion. The authors had much in common, as
to their superior religious character and motives. Their philoso-
phical character, cleverness, and style, have a likeness. The chief
difTcrences in their hypotheses are more of accideuts and circum-
stances, than real and fundamental. Most likely, if ilalebranche
were a Protestant, his idealism would be that of Berkeley ; and if
Berkeley were a Catholic, his .=ystem would be like that of Male-
branche. The system of Malebranche needed but to be purged of its
Catholic external excrescences, to become an absolute idealism ; and
almost all the reasons for such a system are found in his " Inquiry
after Truth." "Whether B( rkeley availed himself of this system and
the reasons used by Malebranche in its support, or not, this is cer-
tain, — he had everything for his idealism made ready to his hand.
The conversation which they had before Malebranche's death, makes it
probable that Berkeley was indebted to him for his system. The
system of Malebranche, in its peculiar features, was a triumph of
Catliolic dogma to philosophy, in accounting how disembodied saints can
beacquaiiited with luuiian invocation, and the affairs of earth generally.
They 'perceivr, they say, all thinr/s in God ; and Malebranche trans-
ferred this Catholic theology, relative to saints in heaven, to men in
the ilesh on earth ; and Berkeley stripped it of its Catholic features,
and gave it a Protestant colour, and thus gained for himself the
fame of being the author of a profound original system.
I
BERKELEY S PIIirOSOPIIY. 79
accepted certain premises, and drew certain natural
conclusions from them ; and he was landed on the
quicksands of idealism. The first thing he accepted
was, that ideas were representations of things.
On this ground one of these conclusions was left
hira^ — either there are three kinds of real entities,
the mind, ideas, and external objects ; or the mind
perceives things immediately, or all external phe-
nomena are ideas. He chose the last. He made
all things ideas; these are the absolute objects of
perception ; and after persuading himself of this,
it was easy to throw himself back upon the ground
of consciousness for a kind of defence and shelter.
We have shown that this was a delusive premiss.
The second thing he accepted was the primary and
secondary qualities, and that the secondary quali-
ties of things are sensibilities in the mind rather
than real qualities in the objects themselves. This
he accepted from the hand of Locke, though he was
not the first to advance this creed."^ When once
* " These I call original or primary qualities of body," says Locke ;
"which, I think, we may observe to produce simple ideas in us;
namely, solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number."
Speaking again of secondary qualities, — " Secondly, such qualities,
which, in truth, are nothing in the objects themselves, bat powers to
produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, i. e., by
the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of Iheir ihsensible parts, as
colours, sounds, tastes, &c., — these I call secondary qualities." —
"Human Understanding," book ii., eliap. viii., p. 7o. The classifi-
cation was in Descartes' philosophy and others before Locke; but the
nomenclature into primary and secondary qualities belongs to Locke.
80 PART II.
he believed that colour, heat, and other seeondary
qualities, were nothing but sensations in the mind ;
it was only a small step further to conelude that
the primary qualities were only sensations too.
This was a direct natural and easy deduction.
Upon these two pillars Berkeley built his hypo-
thesis of idealism. If the foundation were right,
there would be a chance for the upper structure.
He should have examined the premises well before
drawing his conclusions, and not accepted them as
safe postulata.
SECTION XLIII.
Berkeley considered the theory of abstraction
detrimental to his hypothesis of idealism ; so he
directed all his energy against it. Locke main-
tained that abstraction was the chief difl'erence
between man and the inferior brute creation ; also,
to this source he attributed general ideas, and most
of our present knowledge. Hume took up the
side of Berkeley, and applauded him highly, and
made good use of this theory to support his uni-
versal scepticism. We think that the doctrine of
abstraction has been overstated, as to its import-
ance and utility, by both the dualists and the
idealists. Our limits will not allow us to state
our analysis and view of this theory of abstraction ;
and this we think the less needful, 1. Because wc
Berkeley's philosophy. 81
cannot see that it determines the existence or non-
existence of matter at all. If Berkeley could have
established his position, he would have been none
the neai'er to prove the non-existence of matter.
If he could not abstract motion from a bodj^ mov-
ing, — a square body from a round one, — this was
no reason that matter did not possess an independ-
ent reality, and these qualities inhered in it. 2.
Berkeley confesses himself almost all that is want-
ing to establish the doctrine of abstraction. He
brings all his powers to bear against the doctrine,
and yet it appears to us that he abstracted himself
all along. " I own myself able to abstract in one
sense," says he, " as when I consider some par-
ticular parts or qualities separated from others,
with which, though they are united in some
object, yet it is possible they may really exist
Aviihout them.'^ We shall give in his own words
an instance more : "And here it must be acknow-
ledged that a man may consider a figure merely as
triangular, without attending to the particular
qualicies of the angles, or relations of the sides.
So far he may abstract ; but this wiil never [)rove
that he can frame an abstract general inconsistent
idea of a triangle.'" If any one will take the
trouble to analyse the quotations just made, it will
be seen that Berkeley has granted the possibility
of abstraction. (Yol. i., pp. 77, 81.)
G
82 PART ir.
SECTION XLW.
Berkeley, like other kind, indulgent parents,
loved and thought highly of this child of idealism,
which he had begotten. He thought that it was
a kind of universal panacea to purify philosophy
and theology from all possible error and unbelief.
It would put an end to Deism, Atheism, Material-
ism, and finally settle the immortality of the soul,
and put an end to all doubtful theories about
matter for ever, for it is taken out of the Avay.^
So near a relation as a parent is not always the
best and most impartial judge relative to his own
child. Sometimes, also, a parent is much disap-
pointed in the future history and results of his
own darling child. We think that something like
this was the condition of Berkeley. After so much
promise and anticipation, he was much disap-
pointed that his philosophy was so much neglected
and despised, and brought so little of that fruit
which he so abundantly promised to himself and
his disciples.
SECTION XLV.
Yet, Berkeley was a great genius, and a no ble
character. He has made an impression of his
* " "What I here make public has, after a long and scrupulous
iri([uiry, seemed to me evidently true, and not unuseful to be known,
j)articularly to those who are tainted with scepticism, or want a
demonstration of the existence and immateriality of God, or the
natural innuurL.ility of the soul." — Prclace to the "Principles of
Ifumun Kuowledge."
Berkeley's philosophy. 83
name, in the uuiversal field of pliilosophy, tlirougli-
out tlie world of enlightened letters. Since his
system made its appearance, he has been thought
of, spoken of, written of; and, in his turn, praised,
scolded, and puzzled many a smatterer in mental
science. Such a character must have been, in
power and genius, above the ordinary class of
his fellows. But even tliis is no argument for the
truth of his theory. Truth and genius are not
always synonymous things : they are not conver-
tible terms. Many wrong theories often have
much genius and greatness, as to their authors
aud defenders; and truth may frequently have
only feeble and dull advocates. This is not the
ground for testing either truth or falsehood. This
ideal philo .' phy has failed to establish its claims
on our credence for any good results for mankind :
a desideratum so much wished and wanted. It
has failed, not for Avant of genius and power in the
propounder of it, but from its own radical incon-
gruity with the fundamental laws of man's nature.
The mass of human beings who follow the intuitive
and primordial laws of their nature, will for ever
refuse allegiance to this ideal philosophy. Its
chief place will be on the shelves, and in the select
society of philosophers. It will be used by the
clever and the sceptic, more to puzzle and confuse,
than to convince and edify.
G 2
84 PART II.
SECTION' XLVl.
Berkeley anticipated and answered many of tlie
most common objections which would be made to
his system. Most of these answers are not equal
to his other departments in thought, power, or
genius. ]Most of them are meagre and unsatis-
factory. We think also, that to test any contro-
versial thing in a conversational way, as he did in
his " Ilylas and Philonous,^' is not the best and
fairest way. In this mode there are several ad-
vantages, v.liich are generally greatly abused. It
puts the opponent in a very insignificant light ;
whilst the writer himself is in a v.-rcng position,
for he himself is the opponent. — It is radically a
false representation. The author puts the objections
of his antagonist in the form he pleases, in order to
shoot him dead, and then smile at his own clever-
ness : no one can play the two sides fairly. Every
one should establish his own views as well as he
can, but should leave the test of tliem to others ;
and not make their bullets and direct their hands to
shoot as they please. We think that Berkeley was
as fair and candid as anybody would be; but we
cannot think the mode unobjectionable. This is
a Platonic and Ciceronian mode, and Berkeley
excelled much in it. This mode of treatment is so
BERKELEY S PHILOSOPHY. 85
susceptible of abuse, that it is a difficult matter to
avoid it, and hardly any body who adopts that
style runs clear of it.
SECTION XLVII.
Now,"we must say a few words categorically upon
those points, in our view, in which Berkeley's sys-
tem fails. We have shown that it is a development
of an antecedent philosophy. It is not independent
and complete in itself; it is a part of another
philosophy, which preceded it. It is a natural
conclusion, from premises which he accepted from
the hands of others. We view this system as too
short to solve the problem of human nature ; it
goes too far in other directions, — in its attack upon
innocent matter ; so it is not true and suitable in
either.
I. It fails to account for the correspondence
with, and application of, the powers of the human
mind. There is an exact correspondence between
the objective and the subjective throughout the
universe. Both are the workmanship of infi-
nite and infallible Wisdom ; and all in the work of
infinite Wisdom are equal. The one is made for
the other. The philosophy that does not corre-
spond with this, cannot be true and faithful. This
is the chief end of all philosophy. JMatter itself is
not the ultimate point, — it is the human mind.
8G PART II.
The material world is a pheuomeuoii to test, de-
velope, and explain tlie problems of the human
raind. We consider this ideal system of Berke-
ley to have failed completely on this ground. In-
stead of giving full play to the human mind, it
contracts it ; instead of extricating from diffi-
culties, it creates more ; instead of clearing and
simplifying the problems of the mind, it mystifies
the whole.
SECTION XLVIII.
II. It is contrary to the general conviction of
mankind. Human depravity has nothing to do
with the question. It is a question of sense and
consciousness. It is within the jurisdiction of all
men ; yet, the common verdict is against Berkeley.
It cannot be that falsehood is the root of our na-
ture. It cannot be that our senses and conscious-
ness are unfit to judge in matters of common and
direct cognition ; it cannot be that our Creator has
a design to deceive us, by playing some mysterious
sleight-of-hand with us. There must be some
primordial principles of truth in the nature of man
somewhere. The Author of our nature has not
left us without some criteria of truth. It matters
not whether this is called " intuition," " natural
reason," " common sense," or " pure reason," —
this does exist. Sir William Hamilton, with his
Berkeley's philosophy. 87
usual learning and penetration, has shown, in one
hundred and six examples from every age and
country, that all acknowledge this principle of
common sense, and ultimately fall back upon it for
proof and refuge. Such is the case now in Ger-
many ; after a wide and long tossing by the
billows of speculation, they return to this rock, —
the primordial conviction of humanity. These
principles must not be violated ; they must be the
basis of all true philosophy. No philosophy which
violates these things at its very base can be ac-
cepted, without falsifying this general condition.
And this, we believe, is another of the deficiencies
of Berkeley's philosophy.
SECTION XLIX.
III. Berkeley's philosophy is sceptical in its
tendency. It begins on the ground of discredit-
ing the testimony of sense, mankind, and con-
sciousness. Hume, with his usual subtlety and
aptness, took hold on this hypothesis, and made
good use of it to support his consummate system
of scepticism, and wound his antagonists. If con-
sciousness is discredited on one side, what reason
have we for trusting it on the other? Men must
be as conscious of material substance without
themselves, as they are of the thinking being in
88 PART II.
themselves. If one is believed, the other must he
accepted too ; if one is rejected, the other is discre-
dited. If a man could be persuaded that objects
of sense are not external and real, as they appear
to be, he might believe that his body is not what
he is conscious of it to be what it is ; and when
once a man reaches this ground, he discredits con-
sciousness, and will ultimately refuse its testimony
altogether. This would be universal scepticism.
Men generally think they have clearer evidences
of the reality of things material and external, than
of things mental and spiritual ; and, if they were
persuaded to discredit the reality of these, would
they believe the reality of any thing that would be
to them less clear "^ If they believed that fields,
trees, rivers, and all beasts, clouds, stars, though
apparently so many real objects, yet are nothing
but ideas in the mind ; tliey would easily believe
that the first cause, and themselves, are ideas too.
In this, Berkeley sacrificed certainty, to establish
an uncertain hypothesis. There was but a small
step from the primary and secondary qualities of
Locke to idealism : this idealism has the same rela-
tion to universal scepticism. It is only a step
further to discredit the whole evidence of consci-
ousness, and that very easily made. It will be
seen that this idealism is responsible for opening
the door to much scepticism.
Berkeley's philosophy. 89
SECTION L.
IV. Auotlier deficiency in this ideal pliilosophy
is, it fails to correspond with the evidence of con-
sciousness. 'This philosophy does not rightly can-
vass the natural and the simple testimony of
consciousness. It is violated, and made to utter
a language that is not natural. Whilst the lan-
guage of my natural consciousness would assure
nie that the tiling I feel and see is tangible, mate-
rial, and outside me ; this idealism says. No, they
are nothing but ideas perceived by the mind, and
you are conscious of nothing but of ideas. The
natural consciousness of man, in the first place,
does not say they are ideas ; the philosopher must
come forward with his theory of idealism, to
change things into ideas, before consciousness
recognises them as ideas : so the evidence of con-
sciousness is bribed or deceived into the matter.
It is not the unadulterated language of conscious-
ness : the ground of consciousness is the same ;
but the objects are converted from real things into
ideal things. It is a deception, and a violation of
consciousness. In this, it violates the first trutli
in philosophy ; for if the fact and evidence of con-
sciousness are violated, there remaineth no longer
a test and a foundation for philosophy.
90 PAllT II.
SECTION LI.
V. It violates universal language, both natural
and conventional. According to this philosophy,
the words matter, external substance, body, tan-
gible, and many similar terms, which are found in
every language known, must be expunged. Terms
for matter and mind are found in every language,
and more for the first than for the last. These
are not mere conventional words, but most of
them natural. It shows that the belief in matter
is as natural as it is universal. Idealism obliter-
ates all these words ; it has no meaning for them ;
it cannot receive them to her vocabulary ; they
are in her way. It comes in collision, also, with
the terms and facts of the Scriptures. The fact
of creation, the deluge, the fire of the plains, and
the conversion of Lot's wife into a pillar of salt, —
creation of ideas, — deluge of ideas, — ideal burning
of Sodom and Gomorrah, — and ideal pillar of salt.
Harmless things enough ! The miraculous gene-
ration of Christ^s human nature, and His body,
were ideas in the mind. This is the ground, the
Bishop thought, of annihilating Socinianism. We
think it would be also a mortal blow to Christian-
ity. Gnosticism itself would be grateful for this
idealism.* If this philosophy could be proved to
* Gnosticism was that system of pliilosopliy taught by the Gnostics ;
yvoxTTiKos, from yivuiaKw, " to know." The Gnostics were a sect of
Berkeley's philosophy. 91
be true, it would be a good argument against
Transubstantiation. Does it not equally deny us
the fact and possibility of the resurrection of the
material body? If body is matter, and matter a
mere idea in the mind, a resurrection is impossible
in the sense in which it is scripturally understood.
There is nothing left but ideas; it cannot be a
resurrection of ideas. Such, very briefly, is our
examination of the result of this idealism.
philosophers which arose a short time before the Christian era, and
in the first ages of Cliristianity accepted some of the truths of Chris-
tianity, explained them by the spirit and light of their philosophy,
and made them subservient to the support and aid of their system.
Their system of theology was agreeable to the Pythagorean and the
Platonic philosophy, to which they accommodated very much the
interpretation of Scripture. They held that all nature, intelligible, in-
tellectual, and material, is derived by successive emanations from
the infinite fountain of Deity. These emanations they called seons,
auDves. Tliey held matter to be intrinsically evil, of which the
Supreme God could not be the Author. Hence arose their funda-
mental tenet, that the Creator of the world, or the Demiurgus, was
not the same with the Supreme God, the Soiu'cc and Author of all
good, and the Father of Clirist. It was a kind of an eclectic system
of absolute mystery, whose purpose and aim was to purify mankind
from the corruption and death of the evil of matter.
92
PAET III.
METAPHYSICS.
CHAPTER I.
MISTAKF,N VIEWS CONCERNING METAPHYSICS.
Different minds view the same things widely
at variance from one another. They stand on
different stand-points of spectation, they view
things through different mediums, they bring with
them different sympathies, predilections, motives,
and desires : — with all these things, it would be a
marvel if all thought the same. The different
states and relations of the mind to the objects pre-
sented to it, change their colour, form, and value.
Thus, often the true is made false, and the false
true, in human opinion and practice ; the inferior
is put in the place of the superior, and the supe-
rior reduced to the worthless and the mean.
The common fortune of other objects of thought,
is that of metaphysics; only, perhaps it is judged
more hardly and unfairly than most things. JNIeta-
physics are further from the common thoughts
of men, than most objects of thought ; hence, men
judge of them in ignorance, which, upon the
METAPHYSICS. 93
â– whole, is falsCj and can never be fair, safe, and
virtuous. To judge of things ignorantly, is unsafe
and beraeaning to the judge himself, and wrong
and capricious relative to the object of judgment.
And yet this is the case whh. those who judge and
condemn metaphysics general I3' ; they speak in
the dark, they have never made them their study ;
they follow the common custom, or some acquired
and superficial feelings and views in their minds.
The student of metaphysics, the more he studies
them, the more interested he becomes in them ;
and scarcely, if ever, is there found am.oug her
disciples a recre^int. The science has a bewitch-
ing tendency; it draws to itself, it strengtliens
and aspires the soul of her disciples to follow after
her deep and lofty objects, with increasing avidity
and pleasure. Hence, in most cases, it is the
stranger, the superficial, and the would-be-infalli-
ble, that speak disparagingly of her; and not her
disciple, the profound and the earnest inquirer.
Metaphysics are misconceived and judged of
wrongly and harshly, by certain classes and tem-
peraments of mind. It is easj- to tell, from the
common pursuit, sympathies, and associations of
men, whether they are favourable or unfavourable
to metaphysics. It is too broad and liberal in its
inquiries for the narrow and illiberal; it is too
profound in its spirit and problems for the light
94 PART III.
and superficial ; it is too careful in its analysis,
and uncertain in its conclusions, for the matter-of-
fact men ; it is too free, catholic, and antagonistic
to simple human opinion, for the narrow dog-
matist ; it is too elastic and universal in its
reasonings and aims, for the stiff and the formal.
A science that refuses to be governed and tested
by common opinion, and opposes the common
views and feelings of mankind, will be always mis-
judged and opposed.
For obvious reasons, the science of metaphysics
will always be misrepresented by different tastes
and classes of mind. Some will affect to despise
it, because they have no courage and perseverance
to understand it, or no powers and means to do
so. Others misunderstand and misinterpret it,
because their habits of thought, and sympathies,
are in different directions ; hence, they have con-
tracted a deep antipathy to its teaching, and even
to its high aim and object matter. The spiritual-
ity of its sympathies and objects, makes it unpala-
table to the materialist ; because its results are in
the spiritual and the mental, it is misunderstood
and condemned by the physicist and the worldling
as useless, and considered even pretentious and
dangerous. It demands the greatest efforts and
perseverance of the human mind, and the super-
ficial and those who expect to have all in the old
METAPHYSICS. 95
and easy common-beaten path, dislike it and turn
aside from it. So varied and different are the
reasons and feelings against metaphysics, that it is
not easy to find and mention them all. There are
many who object to and oppose metaphysics, yet
never put their opposition in tangible forms, be-
cause the real cause of it is beyond their under-
standing ; and the reason is as much a matter of
indifference to them, as it is beyond their concep-
tion. It is not unfrequently the case, many think,
that by opposing a superior thing, they become
clever and great ; and that, however ignorant the
opposition, and blind the cause. Whilst it is easy
to find faults and oppose, it is not always so easy
to find reasons to justify an opposition, and defend
the same before the bar of truth, and enlightened
witnesses.
Even misconception and wrong accusation have
the effect of leading to a higher court of justice, and
more tested examination ; and often the wrongly-
condemned comes out brighter and more
attractive. As gold comes out of every furnace of
test brighter, so truth comes out of every court
of impartial justice with advantage and triumph.
This is a kind of balance compensation, for the
treatment which truth and right have frequently
at the hands of men in this v.orld. The true car-
ries an incomparable advantage over the false in
96 PART III.
the superiority of its natux'e ; find the Divine order
» is such, that it always sides with and defends the
true, that it has always a fair chance, even in a
world of wrong, to get the true verdict, and prove
victorious, if rightly presented and defended.
The study of metaphysics is viewed by some as
labour lost, because it cannot count upon any real
results. Perhaps nothing is less understood, than
the relation between causes and results ; and about
which so much of ignorant talk and cant is heard,
and especially relative to metaphysics and religion.
Nothing is more common than the misapprehen-
sion of the character and degree of results. Many
expect to have difierent results from the character
of the causes, and different in degree from the
forces or powers which cause them.
It is an universal lav/, running through the
whole constitution of the universe, that results
bear au exact proportion in quality and degree to
the causes which produce them. It is a contradic-
tion to the universal order of nature, to say that
things have no results : and if metaphysics bore
no results, they would be an anomaly in the uni-
verse. Metaphysics, in common with other things,
bear results, and that in proportion with the power
they exert, and the same in quality with their
nature.
Nothing is less understood by the mass of
METAPHYSICS. 97
uninetapliysical minds, than the results of meta-
physics. The mechanist, the artist, and the
labourer in the field of science, have the pleasure
of beholding the results of their toil, presented to
their outward senses. But he who labours in the
field of mind must labour on by faith, encouraged
by the importance and superiority of his work,
and confiding in the faithfulness and immutable-
ness of law and order. And he is as sure of
results as those who labour on the other side of
the field, and far superior in need and importance.
The results of metaphysics are subtle and deep
in their platform and influence ; they are slow and
unobtrusive in their appearance. The results are
felt on the minds of those who become true
students, rnd, through them, on society in its
ramified forms and features. The results are
various and important, which might be shown at
a far greater length than I can do here. INIeta-
physics impart vigour to the mind, superior to any
other educational influence; they give point and
acuteness peculiar to themselves ; they revive the
sympathies, by raising them from the material to
the mental, and lead them from the sensational
to the spiritual. They liberalize the thoughts and
views, by raising the sympathies of the soul above
the limited to the illimitable; and open infinite
resources before the mind in every direction.
H
98 PART III.
There is not a department in the economy of
knoTileclge but what is under obligation to meta-
physics. Ethics, politics, painting, poetry, sculp-
tiu'e, and theology, are under peculiar obligation
to mental science ,• and no one can be a master in
these without being educated in the school of
metaphysics. If those who affect to despise and
cry down metaphysics, were required to point out
theologians or politicians who greatly excelled,
who were not brought up under their dialectics,
they would find it a hard task to fill their list with
illustrious names. Often the metaphysical sways
much power, when denied in word, and frowned at
in external expression. Its fruits are seen often
when no confessions are made ; and its results
are palpable where condemned and prohibited.
Metaphysics are viewed by many as made up of
useless theories, and inimical to the practical in
life. It is difficult to know the precise meaning
of the word " practical,^' as used in the common
parley of the present generation. It is a favourite
word with orators in the pulpit, on the platform,
and on the rostrum ; with commercial men in all
transactions of business; with utilitarians in all
their talk of useful doings, and beneficial results ;
and with all pursuers of material science in all the
ramification of their walks, and boasted emptiness
of their advancement and discoveries. It is one
METAPHYSICS. 99
of those unfortunate vrords wliicb almost every-
body uses ; and on that account is in danger of
being despised by the thoughtful, and in the long
run worn out by its too frequent use, even with
those who carry on with it such an extensive
business. It is one of those delusive words which
everybody who uses it thinks he understands the
meaning of; yet, when it comes to the test, it is
seen that with those who use it most frequently it
has no meaning beyond a vague delusive fancy.
It is a cant word, carrying with it to the minds of
those who use it an infallible evidence, of the
wrong of the thing which is supposed to be
impracticable, and the absolute right of the thing
which is thought to be practicable. Its meaning
is never examined ; its truth is never suspected.
It is an old favourite word, and taken for granted
to be understood, and infallible in its truth and
test.
The term practical is almost always partial and
one-sided in meaning and application. The thing
that is practicable to the one, is impracticable to
the other. Walking, running, climbing, leaping,
swimming, are practicable to many, but not to all.
Speaking, reading, ciphering, writing, painting,
are easy things with a large portion of mankind,
but there are many who know nothing about them.
To make poetry is practicable to the poet, but quite
H 2
100 PART III.
impracticable to the dull prose soul. The musician
can plaVj or sing ; but to a large number both
these exercises are impracticable. One can read
the classics^ and delight himself in the wealth of
the poet. One can solve difficult mathematical
problems; to the other it is a dark mystery. The
arts of life, science in its various developments,
philosophy in its deep truths and lessons, are
practical both in themselves, and to many minds,
yet not to all. It is practicable for the rich to live
in mansions, buy estates, enjoy the luxuries of life,
ride in first-class carriages, and do many other
things which the poor cannot. Are things to be
despised, because all cannot do, possess, or enjoy
them ? Are things wrong, or to be blamed,
because I cannot do them? There may be a
thousand things good and practical in themselves,
which are not known nor appreciated by the one
nor the many. It may often be for want of
powers, or perseverance, they are not practicable.
It would be a common loss and calamity to society
if they were neglected, and allowed to go into dis-
use. When men speak of the practical and the
impractical, relative to superior forms of reasoning
and knowledge, these expressions are used from mis-
taken notions, or often as excuses for weakness,
slothfulness, and want of taste and perseverance.
Doubtless, there are some things not practicable
METAPHYSICS. 101
for all men alike : there are also things not prac-
ticable for any human beings. The luxuries of
life are only practicable for the affluent ; but it is
impracticable for all alike to live without eating
and drinking those things which are essential for
the sustenance of life. The idiot cannot reason
consecutively, the child cannot analyse and
generalize extensively, whilst the strong-minded
philosopher can do both : but to fly is equally
impracticable for the philosopher^ as it is for the
idiot and the child. The tall may do some things
which the short in stature cannot ; the strong can
accomplish many feats which are impracticable for
the weak; the wealthy, the learned, the success-
ful, the happy, and the true, can do things which
the poor, the ignorant, the unsuccessful, the
miserable, and the false, cannot do : but it is
equally impracticable to all alike to transcend
their powers and resources, and successfully
oppose and destroy the laws of their being.
If it is objected to the science of abstruse rea-
soning, on the ground that certain grades of intellect
cannot master and understand it; the same objec-
tion may be raised against poetry, painting,
sculpture, politics, and many of the arts of
common life. What is impracticable to one, is
quite easy to the other ; what is not possible to
one condition, is natural to others. Every thing
102 PART III.
possible to one finite being, is possible to another
finite being, though not in the same degree of
facility and perfection, because men differ greatly
in power, means, conditions, and perseverance.
Everybody of intelligence, with perseverance, could
make some kind of poetry, though only few, of the
highest powers and other conditional qualities, can
carry it to the greatest possible excellency. So in
philosophy and other branches of lofty acquisition,
all may philosophize to the degree of their powers
and means, though only few of the first spirits can
rise and live in the highest regions of thought as
their natural and true element.
There are two classes of things impracticable for
finite beings as men. 1. Those things which are
in themselves beyond the limits of finite capa-
cities, which all alike cannot do or know. 2.
Those things which in themselves are within the
reach of human knowledge, but, for certain known
or unknown reasons, only some can accomplish or
know. The first of these is absolute, the other is
conditional ; the first is impossible from the law
and nature of things, the other from some condi-
tions and circumstances in the relations and influ-
•ences of human life, as it is in its accidental or
circumstantial relations.
Every product of intelligence must have a plan
or a theory in thought, at least j and thought
METAPHYSICS. 103
expressed is a theory revealed to the notice and
thinking of others. Hence, all thoughts in them-
selves and first expression are kinds of theories.
When thought is found to be possible in action,
then it loses its theoretical class and character,
and becomes a practical reality. Every true
theory is practical ; it is nothing but a correct
conception of things in plan as they are, or ought
to be. It may indeed be that the thought as well as
the practice is above the power of the mass : but, if
true, practicable withal. As the thought of a thing
is possible and true, the practice cannot be other-
wise than possible within its legitimate laws and
conditions. If our right thoughts were impracti-
cable, we should always be deceived even by our
true thoughts, which would be a contradiction.
Our true thoughts would be the means to delude
and mislead us : our true conceptions would lead
us astray in conception. All true things are
equal; and if any plan or theory in thought is
impracticable in action, there is something wrong
or unequal in it to the laws and conditions of
things. Truth is consistent in all its steps ; what
is true in action is first true in thought ; aud what
is true in thought, is practical in action.
To admit that there are metaphysical false
theories, is only saying that man is liable to err in
this field of pursuit as well as in others. There is
104 PART III.
no defence made of the false theories in meta-
physics, but of the true ; and to separate the primal
principles and ends from those of human errors
and mistakes. The false and the fanciful in meta-
physics are impracticable as well as everywhere else ;
but all true in thought are practicable in action
there as well as elsewhere.
I defend not the fanciful theories of many
metaphysical writers, though many of these are
innocent and even of advantage to the human
mind. My aim is higher and on a safer founda-
tion : it is to defend metaphysics in their natural
and primal purpose, and shield them from the
charge of foolish and useless theories ; and to show
that they accord with the law of thought, of reason,
and of practice. Metaphysical science is not
responsible for the wild theories of some of her
disciples, more than many good parents are to be
blamed for the prodigality of their children. The
argument of abuse is no legitimate argument at
all against right use ; but rather supposes some
practical good use, before there could be any
abuse. In order to judge correctly of any thing,
its true principles and character must be judged of
apart from the opinions and the use men make of
it ; the same common law of judgment is claimed
for metaphysics.
The end and aim of metaphysics, as I under-
METAPHYSICS. 105
stand them, may be stated in few sentences.
1, It is to trace things to the nature and laws of
their final causes. 2. To inquire into the laws,
conditions, and relations of mind. 3. To test the
limit of the human thought. 4. The strengthen-
ing and cultivation of the mental powers to their
highest capability. 5. The removal of every
human, fanciful, and prejudicial obstruction from
the way of human advancement. 6. The restora-
tion of thought, hence of human life, into inde-
pendent, solid, and true condition. 7. Philosophy
aims also at the correction of the inadvertencies of
ordinary thinking. 8. In a word the aim is,
truth all in all, so far as it is the possible pos-
session of man in this world. All human
opinions and testimonies in the high pursuit after
truth are discarded, and viewed rather as an
impediment, than help to find the great object.
Nothing is to be taken for granted ; nothing to be
refused without a sufficient reason. Every step
in advance must be scrutinized ; every thing must
be accompanied with a reason and a cause. The
metaphysician, from the necessity of his high aim
and aspiration, and the way in which these are to
reach their objects, will be controversial ; he accepts
truth directly at the hand of no one ; it must pass
through the crucible of hard thought and reason-
ing before he can accept of it. On this account,
106 PART III.
lie is often in danger of being considered by tlie
superficial, the feeble polite, and all the credulous
ones, as unpleasant, and to be avoided rather
than courted. Yet he is the true friend of
society ; he aims at truth more than pleasing
others, and self-gratification ; he is severe with
the views of others, because he is earnest in his
pursuit, and a master over himself.
Metaphysics are often suspected and charged of
being adverse to religious spirit and advancement,
in their character and results. It is as hard to
define what many people mean by religion, as it
is to explain their conception of metaphysics. It
happens often that the things which are most
common to men are worst understood, and spoken
of most loosely and unmeaningly. Familiar and
common things are not examined and tested so
severely as the novel and the uncommon; their
age and familiarity give them an easy reception
and a willing place in the mind without doubt or
suspicion. All take for granted they understand
all about them ; but when it comes to a close test,
their thoughts and expressions are alike loose,
meaningless, and undefined. The fact of the uni-
versality of religion, makes it necessarily, in some
degree a loose object of thought and refiection.
All claim its blessings, all talk about it; but will
not, and, perhaps, cannot, think calmly and intel-
METAPHYSICS. 107
ligently about it, so as to give them power to
define and express it rationally and intelligently.
IMen generally accept of religion from the reli-
gious tendency of their couviction^ thinking it
either too great a task, or a needless work, or a
presumption, to examine its claims and require-
ments. All feel its need and reason in some way
or other; only few accept of it on the ground
of light, and can present it as a reasonable
thing.
Religion is an infinite mystery in its source,
object, influences, processes, and blessings; which
may be another reason why it is a thing so vague
and undefined in the minds of men. Though pre-
sented to human reason for test and acceptance,
yet in all points it leads to the infinite and the
mysterious. It is a circle which is touched in all
points by awful mystery: but it is a mystery
which never contradicts the true and the real
in the finite. We test the infinite, not by
the infinite, that we have no means and power
of doing ; we test it by the laws and means
of the finite ; and if we use and read these
aright, our conclusion is always right, because the
infinite, and the finite always agree. Men should
be able to examine and read rightly themselves
and their condition and relations : this is what is
required and demanded at their hands ; this done
108 I'ART III.
rightly will land them safely and happily into full
harmony with the thoughts and laws of God.
Some view religion as a chain of infallible
dogmas, holding its empire chiefly over passive
human belief; others look at it as a matter of
feeling more than belief, holding its power over
the sentimental nature of man ; others consider it
as a formal law governing, directing, and polish-
ing the actions and relations of men's outward
life. There is something true in all these views ;
their great wrong is in their exclusiveness and the
extreme into which they are carried.
The dogmatist is opposed to calm inquiry and
advancement ; the sentimentalist has an avei'sion
to intellectual analysis and searching logic; and
the formal is an antagonist to any elasticity and
the least deviation from conventional custom and
rule. Hence metaphysical science is often con-
sidered as an enemy to religion. If the views of
parties, conventional life and habits of men, and
customs of times and places, are taken for religion,
doubtless the tendencies and the results of meta-
physics will be found to be against them. But the
religion of truth, of harmony with right order,
and of God, is a different, and incomparably loftier
and happier thing, to that of parties and opinions ;
and it is possible that metaphysics harmonize witli
that. Men take party views, sectarian narrow-
METAPHYSICS. 109
ness, and conventional customs for religion ; and
make every body and means impious and infidel
that oppose them ; and all the while religion is
neither opposed nor defended, but human opinions
and groundless hypotheses. No wonder that the
narrow, the partisan, and the sectarian cry down
metaphysics as dangerous, because their theories
are sandy and human in their foundation, and
they are brought to a test, their nakedness re-
vealed, and their principles examined, found
wanting, and condemned.
But what has this to do with religion? and in
what way is the science of causes, of forces, and
of mind, in any way prejudicial to religion,
that is based in truth and reason? How the
science which aims at the investigation of truth,
and throws aside prejudice, human opinion, and
all superficial and fallible guides in its search, can
oppose the religion that is rooted in truth, is hard
to say. Philosophy opposes nothing without suffi-
cient reason ; it accepts of nothing without evi-
dence. If religion is based on reason, and sup-
ported by sufficient evidence, it cannot be injured
by metaphysics. To deny religion, is neither the
work nor the condition of metaphysics; it is
neither its starting point, nor its culminating
task ; the business of philosophy is to trace things
to their final causes, test and examine them on the
110 PART III.
ground of tlic clearest and most impartial evi-
dence, and things are refused or accepted accord-
ing as they are found on these high grounds of
test. There are questions so deep and subtle, at
the root and in the surroundings of religion, that
no one but the keen metaphysician can feel and
unravel. Hence the greatest metaphysicians in
every age and country, have been its greatest
expounders and defenders. Metaphysics have
been the friend of religion, and metaphysicians
her defenders. Her rich and lasting literature is
that of theological metaphysicians ; and it would
have gone badly with h«ir often, but for meta-
physics. Her chief battles will be of necessity on
metaphysical ground ; and if her friends cannot
handle their tools rigliLly, it will suffer for want
of skill and power in her professed friends. It
will be found in times of darkness and distress,
that out of the Galilee of metaphysics, light,
support, and deliverance will come.
Metaphysical pursuits are viewed by some as
adverse to truth. The name of truth is very
convenient, and much abused ; it is often substi-
tuted for false dogmas, party and one-sided views,
and superficial fanciful opinions. It is the com-
mon motto on all party banners ; in the hand of
jiarties it is often a sign which leads to delusion,
ends in darkness and error, and settles down
METAPHYSICS. 1 ] 1
in blindness and hopeless hardness. Truth is
broader than human dogmas, loftier than party
motives, purer than human designs, freer than
human custom, and more catholic than the creeds
and sectarianism of men. He who uses the best
means within his reach, in seeking the truest
views and convictions^ and faithfully carries them
out, is true both to himself and all higher
demands. To be true, are required the harmony
and unity of various elements in the conscious
conviction of the soul; hence it is possible that
he who is less correct in judgment concerning
objects, may be incomparably more true than his
more infallible brother. To be true is not to be
infallible; it is not one dull monotonous uni-
formity. Nonconformity with human views and
customs is generally truth in consciousness and
practice ; and what men often call heretical and
heterodox, in the sight of a higher tribunal are true
and orthodox. Truth is harmony with the laws
and conditions of being ; and he Avho fulfils these
most genuinely and universally, is most true.
Truth in its real character is very diflferent from
what it is in human opinions; it is quite another
thing in the presence of a higher light and juster
balance tlian it appears to be to human fancy and
custom. Truth is a thing which concerns the
judgment, the feelings, the motives, the consist-
112 PART III.
ence, and the outward expressions of human life.
It is the highest development and exercise of these
individually and unitedly.
If truth be viewed in itself, and in its true
relations, apart from human opinion and custom,
it is difficult to make out a case, how metaphysical
study is adverse to its apprehension and progress.
The chief business of metaphysic in its final aim
and results is the possession of truth. It discards
human creeds and opinions, human customs and
habits, unsupported by indubitable evidence ; and
if these are meant instead of truth, then most
assuredly in this sense it is an adverse power;
but in most cases these contain more falsehood
than truth. But it refuses not even human
opinion, only so far as it cannot be substantiated
by clear and substantial evidence. Its aim and
effort is, to separate the real from the conventional,
the fanciful from the solid, the right from the
wrong, the primordial from the customary. There
is a distinction to be kept in view, which must not
be forgotten, — the metaphysical power in its true
aim and end, and metaphysical theories. There
are sects and parties among metaphysicians as
well as in Christianity ; there are false and narrow
theories in her ranks, as well as in religion.
Christianity is not blamed and refused on account
of sects and parties ; neither is religion considered
METAPHYSICS. 113
worthless and dangerous, because of false theories,
by theologians and her disciples; why, then,
should metaphysics be blamed and refused on this
ground? It is impossible to conceive an intelli-
gent ground to condemn and exclude it. Meta-
physics in itself has no human theory to propound,
no party to support, no personal and selfish aim
to seek. It is based upon no fallible maxim, it is
governed by no customary prejudice. It aims to
please and satisfy no party nor earthly power. In
itself it is a power, given and cultivated ; and no one
of her disciples cultivates such a power to oppose
truth, but rather to seek and support it ; and no
one can do it effectually but the metaphysician.
Metaphysics is conceived by many as being
inimical to the ordinary duties of life. This is
an old charge, which, in its turn, has been used
against religion, education, avt, and science in
general. The metaphysician enjoys the innocent
pleasure, and can perform the relative duties of
life as other men, when he pleases to throw aside
his metaphysical cap ; and he is all the more
accomplished by his deeper and larger power and
knowledge.
The business of life will take care of itself;
it fits the ordinary capacities of men; it brings
its immediate and palpable results ; men are
driven to it both by want, pleasure, and interest.
I
114 PART III.
There is never a reason to fear that the vast
majority will become so metaphysical as to neg-
lect the common relations of life. "What for want
of aptitude, and the sacrifice demanded, most men
will always be prevented from becoming profound
metaphysicians.
Directly, metaphysics has nothing to do with
the ordinary duties, transactions, and pleasures of
common life. The metaphysician is oiten both blind
and indifferent to the small things of common
life, because absorbed in higher and more im-
portant things; things of vaster interest and
claim, in the higher relations of men. But let any
important crisis or question arise, and the man
who is careless to the small things of life, can
grapple with, solve, conquer, and settle. And
when needful, he can act his part, or give courisel
in the common things of life, and that in a way
that no one but a superior spirit can. It is easy to
descend at pleasure, but not so easy to ascend at
will. The difficult being conquered, the easy can
be done without doubt and uneasiness.
Rather than interfering with the duties of com-
mon life, it tends to facilitate them, and arrest
their foibles and follies, by correcting, directing, and
strengthening the thoughts of men, and pointing
out common errors and dangers. It aims to make
life safe, by pointing out its errors; make it
METAPHYSICS. 115
easy, by removing all obstructions from the Avay
of its advancement ; make it strong and complete,
by strengthening its powers; make it noble and
true, by purifying and restoring it ; and make it
happy and harmonious, by destroying its evils:
it restores the good, and unites human affections,
thoughts, motives, conscience, and life, with God
and the universe.
It is not possible that a science whose aim and
business is to purify, strengthen, and rightly
guide the human mind, and find out the laws and
right relations of beings and things, should be
without results, indulge in foolish theories, be
irreligious in tendency, adverse to truth, and
inimical to common life. If it were, either these
were Avrong, or our conceptions and convictions
of metaphysics are incorrect. It wields an unseen
power, inasmuch as it has to do directly with the
main spring of action. Its influence is universal,
though unacknowledged; and destined to be
greater and mightier still, and to be acknowledged
as a friend, and not a foe.
I 2
IIG
CHAPTER II.
THE ADYAKTxVGES OF METAPHYSICAL STUDY.
It is not correct to say that every thing has
some advantages; neither is it true that every
thing has disadvantages. If it can be proved that
there is an absohite wrong, there can be no real
good in that. It is possible that in the govern-
ment of Infinite Goodness^ there is nothing so
bad as to have no trace of truth and goodness in
it at all, and nothing — in this world, at least — so
good as to have nothing bad in it. Hence, in
that sense, there is nothing without its advantages
and disadvantages. But if we can conceive of
perfect goodness, and also of perfect evil, there
can be no disadvantasje in the one, nor advantage
in the other.
Advantage and disadvantage are terms loosely
used, and variout-ly applied. They are not used
on the high ground of truth and real goodness ;
but in their application to the conventional and
selfish views and feelings of those who use them.
In the loose sense the words are used, the best
things have their disadvantage, and the worst
METAPHYSICS. 117
their advantages. Right is a disadvantage to wrong,
trnth is an impediment in the way of false-
hood, and may prevent the false from advancing.
In this sense it may be a disadvantage, according
to the selfish and earthy opinion and feeling of
men. It may occur circumstantially under certain
conditions that the unjust may enrich himself,
and the false advance the superficial interest of
men in this world. But the thing advanced by
injustice, and defended by the false, is not a solid
and a real advantage; neither is any impediment
or result of truth a real disadvantage. The super-
ficial and the transient are not advantageous;
such are the results of the wrong and the false.
The solid, the lasting, the safe, and the happy,
are no disadvantage ; these are followers of the
just and the true. In this superficial state of
partial knowledge and justice, truth is at a dis-
count, and the untrue at a premium. But there
is no real advantage in the premium of one, nor
disadvantage in the discount of the other.
The same thing often is considered an advantage
to one, but a disadvantage to the other ; and fre-
quently things ara thus viewed, in the life of the
same person, under different conditions and periods
of life. In the relation of things to the super-
ficial things of this world, they are tested and
solved from different stand-points, as they agree
118 PART III.
with different sympathies, and involve their inter-
ests. So long as men will be governed by different
motives, influenced by different powers, and view
their interests as adverse to one another, such will
be the case.
If the order of God is based in equity, truth
and right can be of no disadvantage to any thing
in His order. If goodness is the end of His
order, evil and wrong can be of no real advantage
to any one. The statement that the wrong, either
in itself or in experience, is advantageous, leads to
a monstrous pantheism, destroys the distinction be-
tween the nature and end of things, or implies that
the great sovereign Mind has failed in His design
and government. Either of these conclusions
would be dishonourable to God, perplexing to
reason, and destructive of religion. Such a con-
clusion would be adverse both to reason and
revelation ; for both declare the disadvantage of
the wrong, and the advantage of the right; both
recommend and reward the seeker after the good
and the avoider of the wrong.
The tests by which people weigh and conclude
the advantage and disadvantage of things, are both
l)artial and imperfect ; the elemental premises being
incorrect, and it is but natural the final findings
s^hould be wrong.
1. One wrong test, is, to estimate things intel-
METAPHYSICS. 119
lectual and religious, according to the degree of
earthly and individual selfish advantage or dis-
advantage, they confer upon their possessors.
The views and feelings of men are so low and
contradictory, relative to material advantages and
disadvantages, that this ground is unequal as a
faithful test, and the law of equity demands that
all should he tried by equals.
2. The advantage and disadvantage of things
are often tested by the partiality and prejudice of
human view and desire ; so often the really useful
is refused, and the useless accepted and applauded.
3. The tests are often as numerous as the
opinions and tastes of people ; hence there is no
higher ground of judgment relative to the advantage
or disadvantage of many things, than human dog-
mas and opinions. In such conditions the test is as
varied as parties and one-sided interests ; as change-
able as accidental circumstances. In fact, according
to this, there is no real true test at all. If things
have a reality in themselves and relations, there
must be somewhere a test of their truth and utility
apart from human opinion, prejudice, and selfishness.
4. In the present state of things, matters are
brought to an imperfect court to be judged, and
the verdict often goes against the true and advan-
tageous, and in favour of the wrong and the
disadvantageous.
120 PART 111.
It is tlie fate of all things alike, to be judged
according to these imperfect tests ; and always
will be more or less, in this state of being at least.
For the reason of the shortcomings of the human
judgment, things are never all in all correctly-
judged and estimated according to their real
intrinsic and relative value. And metaphysics
come for a full share in this erroneous judgment
of mankind ; and all the more, because the ob-
jects either transcend the comraon walk of men,
or tlie mode of procedure demands a toil and
attention that all are not willing to give ; perhaps,
under ordinary conditions of life, all are not able
to give.
To judge of the advantages of metaphysics, we
must raise the ground of test above the common
opinion of mankind. If this cannot be done fully
and perfectly, there must be an honest aim and
strife to accomplish it. In order to accomplish it
justly, all human predilections and opinions must
be viewed as insufficient for final decision : human
consciousness must be attentively and patiently
read. Evidence must be carefully sifted and
examined ; nothing must be refused or accepted
but on the ground of clear and convincing evi-
dence. It is not proposed to do all this in this
place, only within a narrow limit ; more time and
space are demanded^ than can be here spared.
METAPHYSICS. 121
There are two reasons which hide the advan-
tages of metaphysical study from the view of ordi-
nary thinkers. 1. As an intellectual science, its
influence directly is upon the mind ; hence, its
advantages are indirect, and not seen and felt at
once. This is the case also with religion and edu-
cation in general, yet many of those who believe
and appreciate the advantages of religion and edu-
cation, deny those of metaphysics ; while the same
reason in this respect may be used against them
alike. 2. The advantages in themselves are not
seen; they are like seed in the depths of the
mind, giving fruit in the lives of men, of various
kinds and of diflFerent degrees. Though unseen
and indirect, yet, like the seed in the ground,
there would have been no such happy and abun-
dant harvest without them. The work is done
deep in the mind, but the results are in the very
external circles of life, and in the extremity of
human activity,
1. Metaphysical study strengthens and expands
the human mind. All the gifts of God are
capable of being increased and expanded ; they are
given us for high and common service ; the
stronger and more expanded they are, the more
service they are capable of doing. It is a com-
mon and an universal advantage to improve every
thing good ; and all increase in importance in
12.2 PART III.
the ratio they are valuable in themselves^ and
capable of high and great service. It is a
higher matter to cultivate health and strengthen
the body, tlian to increase riches ; but it is of
higher importance still to the individual himself
and to society at large, to cultivate and strengthen
the resources and powers of the liuman mind.
Those who speak of the fruitlessness of meta-
physical study, acknowledge the vigour and
expansion it gives to the mind, and their own
tacit confession is a sufficient answer to their
objection : for whatever renders such service to
the mind, does not exist in vain. It cannot do
otherwise than expand and strengthen, for it leads
the mind to do battle with high and lofty
questions ; it opens before the mind the gate
which leads to the infinite and the unknown.
Men become massive and intellectual giants, not
by dealing and amusing themselves with small and
common thoughts ; but by grappling and wrestling
with the deeper and greater questions of being.
2. The study of metaphysics imparts quickness
and insighting ability to the perceptive powers,
and sharpness to the logical faculty of man. The
saying of Robert Hall, that the chief use of meta-
physics is to make men clever at the art of gia-
diatorship, has made many disciples ; and is taken
as a shelter by many to deride metaphysical study.
METAPHYSICS. 123
Robert Hall was not adverse to metaphysical
study ; there is a vein of metaphysical sympathies
and probings running through the whole of his
works : a friend and admirer of John Foster could
not be otherwise than fond of metaphysics, though
he never studied it as a science from the lips or
works of its great masters. Putting the most
severe construction on Mr. Hall's sally, it bears
out our position that the study gives quickness
and edge to the intellectual powers and the
logical faculty of the mind. Skill in the use of
instruments and elements is an essential neces-
sity for the defence, the development, and the pre-
servation of things. If such skill is abused, it is
neither the fault of the instrument, nor the
acquired skill by which it is so used ; but that of
the agent, and the powers which influence him in
such a conduct. Whatever is bad in the abuse, is
good in the use; whatever is capable of doing
much harm, is also, if it be differently and rightly
used, capable of doing much good.
Metaphysical science brings her students con-
stantly into contact with deep and subtle pro-
blems ; hence their tools must be well edged and
kept bright, and a skill and quickness to use them
above the ordinary walk of life. It is a kind of ana-
tomical science of mind, thought, and existence, in
their laws and mystery ; advancement is made by
124 FART III.
the most careful and minute dissection ; and in
order to do it with pleasure and effect, the instru-
ment must be precise, delicate, and sharp.
It fits the mind to expose and attack the sophis-
tries of religion and coraraoa life, Avhich often
would disturb and baffle ordinary minds. By its
aid the wrong, in thought, creed, and practice, is
brought to light, weighed, and found wanting.
By its assistance often truth and religion have
been defended and exalted, when other powers
were feeble and helpless, and always in extreme
difficulty her aid will be asked, and thankfully
acknowledged,
3. Metaphysical study disturbs the stagnation
of ordinary thinking, and opens before the mind a
new and a loftier region. Common-place men
can never advance society ; in the hands of such
men, in the long run, society would stagnate,
recede into feeble mechanism, and mentally,
morally, and religiously die. Men of talent, of
power, of originality, and genius, are the life and
power of society ; they deliver it from stagnation
and sluggish torpor; they raise the platform of
thought and sympathy, and lead it to new fields
of rich pasture, and aspiring hope.
As men of genius and power disturb the common
torpor, and raise and move society ; metaphysics
disturbs, moves, and advances the science of com-
METAPHYSICS. 125
mon thought and knowledge. Even if it leads occa-
sionally into a doubtful speculation, that carries
with it a kind of compensation; it stimulates
thought, and leads men to examine the root and
principles of their common belief: it awakes them
from their slumber, arouses new powers, and deve-
lopes resources not known befoi*e. Inactive torpor
gives neither hope, usefulness, nor happiness : con-
scious wakefulness and activity, is an attitude of
hope and advancement.
Metaphysics has repeatedly disturbed the com-
mon torpor of society, raised it to a higher region,
and given a new direction to its thought and life.
And if it had done no more, its visit has not been in
vain, and deserves an immortal memento of grati-
tude.
4. Metaphysical study tends to free and liberalize
human thinking, and make it independent of hu-
man custom and opinion. One of the canons of
metaphysics is, not to take any thing for granted.
No human authority must be considered infallible;
no name, nor creed, nor earthly source whatever,
must be accepted without being weighed and mea-
sured by thought and argument. Every thing
must be sifted and tested, before it can be received
into the vocabulary of philosophical belief; hence
its collisions with common opinion, and its oppo-
sition to a test that would be infallible and easy.
126 PART IIT.
No one can advance an inch in philosophy without
a full exercise of his higher powers, and a com-
plete freedom from the custom, the prejudice,
and all human opinions. Things must be looked
at as they are, and followed to their real true
source; the mind is obliged to exercise all its
powers, and use all resources in its possession to
accomplish the task proposed. The philosopher
ever has three things in view and aim. 1. Free-
dom from human opinion and the false. 2. Know-
ledge of the truth. 3. The invigoration and
perfect development of his own powers, and that
by independent thinking and action. In every
step in philosophy there is a necessity which can-
not be evaded, to fall back upon one's own powers,
resources, and consciousness.
Every thinker is obliged to feel his own feet and
use them ; the moment he allows others to carry
him to the end of his journey, he is deprived of
his name, independency, and power. It is both a
dignity and a high pleasure to be able to free our-
selves from human opinions and fancies, and pur-
sue the journey of thought with our independent
resources and guidance. If philosophy did nothing
else, this it promises and fulfils ; and this is more
than a reward for its acceptance and cultivation.
5. INIetaphysical study refines the thoughts and
sympathies of the mind. The mind receives the
AIETAPHYSICS. 127
character of its feelings and moulding, from those
objects it communes with. If the character of
the objects with which the mind communes is
corrupt, mean, or material, the mind in its sym-
pathies, thoughts, and expressions, becomes the
same : on the contrary, if the character of those
objects is pure, lovely, spiritual, and great, the
mind is so moulded accordingly.
The objects presented to the mind in philosophy,
are pure, true, great, and spiritual. In the pursuit
of them, the mind loses its meanneos, and rises
above material tendency, and becomes noble, pure,
strong, true, conscious of some greater end than
the body and matter. In the face of so much
material tendency, and corrupt and mean in-
fluences, it is comforting that there is one science,
at least, whose tendency and education are spiri-
tual, pure, true, and Divine. The thoughts of men
govern and mould their subjects : hence, those who
are students of philosophy, unless they are trea-
cherous to their profession, cannot be mean, ma-
terial, false to themselves, and unfaithful to the
laws of being. It separates men from the dross of
human opinion and party ; it gives them a calmer
and happier region to reside in ; they are beyond
the common world of storms and turmoils. It
communes through self with greater power and
higher things than self: hence the meanness, the
128 PART III.
shallowness, and the dross of common self are lost,
by communion with this nobler counterpart of being.
6. Metaphysical study increases the store of
human knowledge ; and that quality of knowledge
that no other form of study could. It makes the
mind an object of its examination and researches :
and the powers and the laws which govern the
mind are thus explored, and made objects of know-
ledge. The final laws and causes of universal being
are perpetually before her attention ; she defines
the boundaries between the unknown and the
known, the finite and the infinite, the conditioned
and the unconditioned. It teaches the limit of
our powers ; it searches out the particular and the
universal in knowledge. It gives men knowledge
of self, and of the laws which are above and out-
side self. If things are estimated according to the
quality and quantity of their producing power, philo-
sophy should be highly estimated ; for the quality
is first in character, and the quantity real and true,
and that in the degree of its earnestness and aim.
7. The study of metaphysics imparts fortitude
and comfort to the mind. It enables the mind to
take a correct view of things ; it teaches the mind
to accept things as they are, and submit calmly
to tlieir laws and conditions. It teaches
moderation in expectation, and submission in
reverses. The mind is supplied with pure thought,
METAPHYSICS. 139
SO as to become absorbed in its object, and ob-
livious to many of the minor sorrows of earth.
The mind takes a large and comprehensive view
of things ; so as to be able to compare on a large
scale, and reason and conclude more correctly than
others, who have not the same advantages ; and is
calmer and comforted accordingly.
There is a kind of pleasure in all toil ; but spe-
cially so, in pure mental toil, when the mind is
lost to all but to its own consciousness and the
objects of its thought. In philosophy the objects
are always pure and great ; and the soul is lost in
an inconceivable infinitude. The soul is also com-
forted in the consciousness of her lofty aspiration,
and her true aim and motive, though the high end
is not always realized.
As no one but the pure knows the felicity of
purity, and no one but the true knows the comfort
and fortitude of truth, so no one but the philoso-
pher knows the comfort of philosophy.
130
CHAPTER III.
THE NECESSITY OF METAPHYSICS.
The good, the true, the real, the pure, the safe,
the useful, aud the happy, are needful as integral
parts in the constitution of the universal order of
being ; and as counterparts, to meet the wants of
the created dependents of being. It is the most
delightful thought that the opposite of these are
not a necessity in the order of being, — namely,
the bad, the false, the unreal, the corrupt, the
dangerous, the useless, and the miserable. Two
opposites cannot be needful ; indeed, they cannot
consistently exist in one thought and order. If
the infinite nature is absolutely good, the opposite
of all goodness cannot have a necessity : if the
order of being be the government of the absolute
good, and if right in itself, the wrong cannot
have a necessity in it.
If this reasoning is conclusive, it follows, what-
ever is wrong must be outside the thoughts of
God and His order, — an outside needless intruder.
It may be established as an axiom that whatever
is needful is gcod, aud whatever is good is needful.
METAPHYSICS. 131
To prove the first is to establish the second, and
to demonstrate the second is to show reason for
the first.
We estimate things in the degree we need
them, or as we think we need them, because
necessity is a test of value. Bread is more pre-
cious than stones, because more needed ; water
more prized than mercury, because every day's
life is more dependent upon it ; labour is more
needful than idleness, because the wealth and
welfare of society depend upon one and not upon
the other ; hence, it is held in higher esteem.
There are two classes of necessary things ; — things
which are made so by fancy and superficial
thought and feeling, and those which from true
want and relation are made so, and the last of
these is referred to here.
Necessity in itself is a kind of relational condi-
tion, involving the existence of other beings and
things, and apart from these can have no exist-
ence. In its application to finite existence, it
supposes limit and law.
Necessity in its application to common and
universal existence comprehends, 1. Quality of
nature. 2. Mode of being. 3. The condition on
which it exists. 4. The condition of finite beings
involves a relation to time, space, higher cause,
and the laws of life, and reason. 5. Cause and
K 2
182 PART III.
effect; while finite being involves a cause above
himself, the infinite supposes an effect below
himself.
Necessity is either absolute or conditional. In
its relation to the Infinite and the All-perfect One,
it is absolute ; but in its relation to finite beings
and things, it is conditional. It is true that among
finite beings and things, the existence of one
being or condition, necessitates the existence of
another as a matter of result or completeness ; but
viewing things in their relation to their higher
causes, they are only conditional necessity. But
for higher will and power they could not have
existed ; these are essential conditions of their
very being. Whatever is dependent upon another
cannot be an absolute necessity in itself, but a
conditional one; it is conditioned by law,
dependence, and source of being ; a higher will,
power, and law, are conditions of its existence.
Inasmuch as existence has different sides,
necessity has various forms. As material sub-
stance exists, physical necessity is the conse-
quence. There is a necessity for physical laws
and conditions to secure harmony and complete-
ness. It is not the work of philosophy to show
how things might be different in nature and rela-
tions to what they are : her work is to explain
existeuce as it is, and to show true causes, fit laws
METAPHYSICS. 133
and relations. Nature viewed as it is; her phy-
sical forces, agencies, elements, means, and ends,
are a necessity.
Moral necessity is another kind which arises
from the nature and relations of moral creatures.
This necessity is not the necessity of force and
passiveness, as that of the physical ; it is rather the
necessity of rational and moral fitness, supposing
a willing agent, and a rational object and end.
Before man can be happy he must be true and
pure ; this is a moral necessity arising from the
fitness of things ; yet, man is made true by the
sway of his free volition, and the exercise of his
reason and conscience.
In reasoning of moral necessity, we always base
the consequences which follow, upon some ante-
cedent conditions, which involve will and intelli-
gence. It supposes the possibility of things being
otherwise, because it involves will and fitness : it
is a reasoning on the ground of possibility, proba-
bility, volition, and moral fitness.
There is also a religious necessity, which, though
based upon and including the moral, yet has features
different from it. There is a necessity in the rela-
tion of beings of rational and moral nature for
religion : whether we view this relation as existing
between man and himself, his fellow man, universal
law and creation, or between him and his lawgiver
134 PART III.
and God, it is alike needful. Religious necessity
is deep in the nature of creatures with affections,
like those of man. Man's nature demands a fit
counterpart ; without it he would both be miser-
able and incomplete. It is a necessity of Divine
purpose, of fitness, of relation, of need, of nature,
and of destiny.
Metaphysical necessity is deep in the nature
and relations of rational beings. A being like
man surrounded with mystery ; being endued as
he is with power of thought, and that without pre-
vention or limit in its exercise ; having doubts
and fears, as he has in every step and condition,
cannot be prevented from trying to bridge the
mystery of being, and sink into the deep secret
and root of law and existence. It is as easy to
destroy thought, blot out intelligence, or annihi-
late existence, as to extinguish metaphysical ten-
dency in rational nature.
I. There is an objective necessity for the exist-
ence of philosophy. The objects about which
philosophy predicates, are a necessity both in
themselves and in their relations. The compre-
hensive and mysterious objects of metaphysics
are existence in itself, with its various laws and
relations. Existence is a necessary fact ; and to
a finite mind a mystcrv. Universal existence
necessitates the existence of the part ; and the
METAPHYSICS. 135
particular predicates the necessity of the universal.
1. Existence is a necessity as an object of sense, of
reason, of consciousness. 2. It is necessary in its
cause. 3. In its governing and regulating laws.
4. In its relational dependence and service. 5.
In its relation to man. (1.) Man needs the com-
plement of being as a creature. If existence in
its most complete form did not exist, he could
have had no existence as he has in its present
form. (2.) It is needful for man in a higher
sense as he is an intelligent being. Human
intelligence proves an intelligent existence above
and outside man; and that there are counter
objects for that intelligence to spend its
energies of thought, feeling, and action upon.
Existence is the counterpart of rational nature;
and it could never be complete, nor even exist
without it.
It is evident that existence in all its forms is
intended to be an object of human thought and
reason. It excites man's inquisitive curiosity ; it
presents itself to his reason, inviting his examina-
tion; it comes, in some of its multifarious forms,
every moment in contact with his senses. His
intellectual advancement and existence depend
upon the examination and communion with
universal being.
II. There is a subjective necessity in the
136 PART III.
liuman mind for metaphysical science and deve-
lopment. In vain will men speak of the danger
and fruitlessucss of metaphysics, and discourage
and prohibit its pursuit; the sympathy is deep
in the nature of man, and it cannot be destroyed
without impairing his nature. The pursuit of
metaphysical study is nothing but the deep feeling
in human nature, rising to the surface of life, the
invisible coming to prominence, and the root
appearing in the flower and fruit. This exists in
the nature of men in the proportion of their mental
stamina ; hence, it appears in actual thought, pro-
portionately to the intellectual power at the root
of man's nature, and in the degree that it is culti-
vated. Intellectual giants will always, and have
always, by the very powerful sympathies of their
nature, enter into regions that common minds
dare not and cannot go, and try their skill and
strength with the deep and mysterious problems of
being, and that of the infinite.
We can trace the metaphysical necessity to
some of its particular sources known to the com-
mon consciousness of men generally. — 1. The first
to be mentioned is, a love for knowledge, either
for its own sake, or as means to some other end.
2. A desire in men universally to remove or rise
above the evil of life. The human mind carries
with it in every state a dislike for the painful, and
METAPHYSICS. 137
a desire after the easy and the happy ; and those op-
posed to universal feelings stimulate men in search
of the new and the unknown. 3. There is an
unaccountable curiosity in the mind, to pry into
the mysterious and the unknown, and that in itself
and for its own sake. Man dislikes secrecy, from
Eden to the present hour ; he must try to solve or
annihilate it. He fears the secret, and becomes
anxious to search it out ; he has a kind of doubt-
ing hope in the unknown, hence he is anxious to
ascertain it by clear proof, and realize the sub-
stance of it. 4. There is a wish in man to be
beforehand in the knowledge of his future con-
dition. From a desire thus to know and govern
his own destiny man ever sighs after the unknown
and the unknowable. 5. There is a law in the
intellectual sympathy of man which leads him to
inquire into final causes ; there is also a law in
the same nature, which ever seeks after the law of
unity and harmony. These laws are compre-
hensible and powerful, they are the root and impulse
of his philosophical nature and destiny. Man has
not created his philosophical tendency, he can at
best or worst but direct or modify it. If the
philosophical tendency is not rightly cultivated
and developed, it is to the detriment and injury
of human nature. In this, as in other things in
philosophy, what is first and deepest in the order
138 PART III.
of nature, is lowest and last in the order of human
knowledge and practice.
III. IMetaphysical study is a high educational
power^ and as such it is necessary to the advance-
ment of the humau mind and society at large.
The human mind increases in strength and vigour
by exercise ; it is preserved in health and power
by constant vigorous activity. Philosophy is a field
of intellectual gymnastics, which call into skilful
and earnest play all the powers of the mind. If
metaphysics was no longer an object of pursuit,
society would grow tamer, feebler, more ignorant,
and less independent. There is no other form of
study that could supply the lack of this. Its
objects are profound, numerous, and lofty ; yet it
demands such nicety of sifting and analysis, that
it imparts refineness to the mind, while at the
same time it gives breadth, power, and profundity.
It is not an evil, but an advantage to society, to
have abundance of educational means and powers ;
in this way all are revealed ; all parts and
sides are thus touched, developed, and polished.
The means of educational development should
correspond with the objects of knowledge, the
end of life, and the powers and resources of the
mind : these ai'c counterparts in life, and go
together.
Society might dispense with some subsidiary or
METAPHYSICS. 139
circumstantial powers and means without suffering
much loss ; but not so with an essential department
at the root of natural existence, as metaphysics is.
It may be said that society generally neither
study nor care for metaphysics ; and what benefit
can it be ? All are not growers of corn, but
all must have bread ; the majority never plough,
and would dislike it, yet there must be the plough-
ing to keep alive society. Society lives in its
various departments by the skill and toil of the
few : and if those departments which the few
carry on and manage were to stop, all would soon
feel the loss. Only few produce mental food to
society, and lead her on into intellectual advance-
ment and triumph : if they failed, or gave up that
high service, society at large would feel the need,
and could not advance in her useful and happy
progress.
140
CHAPTER IV.
METAPHYSICS AND THE LIBT.E,
The Bible among Christians is made the final
authoritative criterion of every opinion and action.
But there is nothing more common, than to make
the Bible speak a language it never meant, and
to utter dogmas it never contained. jMen are so
blinded by their own opinions and party views,
when they think and express themselves as defended
and supported by the Bible, that it is often nothing
more than the reflection of their own opinions, in
their interpretation. The book which is intended
to rectify human opinions and purify corrupt sen-
timents and motives, is made the greatest support
of false opinions, and scapegoat of groundless
fancies, of any other. The loftiness of the book,
and the greatness of its authority, make it a de-
sirable thing to affect respect for and prize its
testimony.
The Bible is made by some the class-book of
natural and general science, and whatever does not
literally accord with it scientifically, is not in their
METAPHYSICS. 141
opinion correct. This is taking the Bible beyond
its intended and professed boundaries ; it also con-
tracts the path and liberty of science within too
narrow a limit. If the Bible could be made the
class-book of science simply as such, it would
be a great misfortune to its authority ; for it is
clear that it is not, by the clearest (jvidence and
demonstrations. The Bible is a book of great moral
truth, intended to govern the motives, the thoughts,
the feelings, and the actions of men. It is a book of
vital food for the spiritual nature of man, and a
rule to regulate the relations and lives of men.
It is enough for science to know, that the Bible
does not flatly contradict and oppose its discoveries
and detail ; and that the motives of its promoters,
and its results relative to tlie common good and
advancement of truth, are in accordance with its
principles and laws. From the affinity of relation,
the Bible stands in closer relation to some branches
of knowledge than it does to others. It stands in
nearer relation to the science of mind than it can
to that of matter, because it is a moral book in-
tended for man as a moral and intelligent being.
A case cannot be made out that metapliysics is
adverse to the Bible. It is easy to make a loose
statement, that philosophy is contrary to the truth
and spirit of the Bible, and that it undermines or
opposes its authority, and such things; but when
142 PART III.
it is asked when and w here ? it cannot be defi-
nitely and specifically shown and proved. To say
that philosophers have been often against the Bible
is nothing to the question; it may be that they
would have been so, if they had not been philoso-
phers quite as much in sympathy ; only their philo-
sophy gave them more skill and power, hence their
opposition more felt and dangerous. And it often
happens that the views of philosophers, when con-
sidered to be against the Bible, are much more
against the conventional views of men and parties
relative to the Bible, than they are against the
book itself. When human arguments and party
views are opposed, it is enough to raise tbe cry in
many quarters, tbat the Bible is opposed, and
religion is in danger; and without much of impar-
tial examination, whether human opinions or the
Bible is opposed, philosopby wholesale is anathe-
matized as an execrable dangerous thing. Theolo-
gians and commentatoi's often quote Scripture
against Scripture, and that to disprove the assertions
of one another ; and yet all this is in harmony with
the Bible, whilst surely one of two contradictions
is always against the Bible : but any thing under
the name of philosopby daring half so much, would
raise the ire of all the religious party scribblers of
the land against it. Names sway the majority of
mankind much more than principles and truth ;
METAPHYSICS. 143
there is mucli more of fighting for human opinions
and conventions, under the sham of defending re-
ligion and the Bible, than really there is for real
truth and religion, as they are in themselves free
from all party views and prejudice.
Metaphysics existed in its germinal form
before the Bible in its verbal form ; and has
never been studied by any one of its true stu-
dents from malice pi'epense to the Bible. If ever
it appears to oppose the Bible, it is incidental
and not intentional ; it may be an apparent opposi-
tion more than real. If ever metaphysics becomes
opposed to the truth, it is the fault of metaphy-
sicians more than metaphysics ; and if ever it
opposes the Bible, it is an opposition to something
human about the Bible, and not the true and the
Divine in it, or the wrong in the metaphysician
himself, and not in the metaphysics.
There is nothing in the Bible from which it
can be shown, that it opposes metaphysics in
itself, nor yet in its studious cultivation and
use. The Bible speaks more about the use of
things, than of things in themselves ; it lays down
limits and conditions for the right use of all things,
contrary and beyond which they become wrong
and sinful. The Bible approves of beings and
things in certain relations and conditions, whilst
it disapproves of them in others, and the contrary.
144) PART III.
As it is possible to misuse and abuse the best of
God's gifts, so tlie best intellectual instrument and
power may be misapplied, and made the production
of evil rather than good; and in that sense dis-
approved of, whilst in its natural and best sense
it would be approved of. The Apostle (Col. ii. 8)
speaks of philosophy, tptKoa-ofla.;, in a bad sense, as
a thing capable of being abused j and, when so
misapplied, to be avoided by simple and unsus-
picious Christians.
Not only the Bible does not oppose metaphy-
sical science, but the metaphysical element pervades
it, and it cannot fully be understood and inter-
preted without it. 1. Many of the terms used in
the Scriptures are metaphysical, and cannot be
thought of without metaphysical sympathy and
reasoning being produced; and cannot be inter-
preted without metaphysical power. God, spirit,
creator, governor, creation, cause, effect, truth,
thought, conscience, mind, soul, regeneration, in-
fluence, power, eternity, everlasting , time, space,
infi.nite, omnipresent, unchangeable, almighty, ever-
lasting, these, and a large number besides, involve
in their simplest meaning the metaphysical ele-
ment, and caimot be thought of without it, 2.
The objects-matter of the Bible are necessarily
metaphysical in their character, notions, and sur-
roundings. The infinite, the invisible world, reve-
METAPHYSICS. 145
lation, miracles, Divine government, the injluence of
spirit upon spirit, redemption, the existence and
cause of evil, the relation of things and beings, hap-
piness and misery, man's immortality, faith, love,
hope, and heaven : — these involve the metaphysical
element, and cannot be approached without it.
3. Some books and portions of the Bible are tho-
roughly metaphysical in their tendency, sympathy,
and reasoning. Is it possible to read the books of
Job, Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Isaiah, and the
Prophets gerierally ,'withovLtheing convinced of this?
The Gospels are pervaded by the same element ;
the Epistle to the Romans, and all the Epistles of
Paul, especially those to the Ephesians, Philippians,
and the Colossians. Never was a more meta-
physical writer than the Apostle Paul ; take the
eighth chapter of Romans, and the fifteenth
of 1st Corinthians as an example of this; and
the same, more or less, pervades the whole of his
writings. It was in the depth of the man, and it came
out in every thing he said and wrote ; it was wor-
thy his superior grandeur, without it he could not
have been the great Apostle and the powerful writer
he was. 4. The comprehensive principles and end
of metaphysics are everywhere recommended in
the Bible, even on the high grounds of need and
duty. Reflection on the laws and works of God
is recommended everywhere ; the search after
L
146 PART III.
knowledge is constantly urged and encouraged ;
the testing of things, and the seeking of truth, are
applauded and shown as needful everywhere through
the volume. The inquiry into the relations, the
causes, the laws, and the results of beings and
things, are involved indirectly in the truths incul-
cated in the Bible, as well as directly and repeat-
edly recommended verbally.
It would be easy to quote pages from the Bible,
to verify the foregoing remarks ; but this is diflS-
cult from their number, and partially needless to
all the readers that may look into these pages,
for such passages will be known to them. Indeed,
to enter into minute detail, would require both a
longer time and a larger space than I can afford to
it ; the intention of the chapter is suggestive, and
not exhaustive.
147
CHAPTER Y.
THE RELATION OF METAPHYSICS TO OTHER FORMS OF
KNOWLEDGE.
As every atom belongs to and serves the whole
atomic universe ; as every particle of light is a
part, and serves the whole body of light ; as every
member is a part of a body, and helps to complete
the whole, and no body can be complete without
all its members ; so is one branch of knowledge
connected with, and essential to the other. Some
parts, on account of their relative position, or the
variety or importance of the service they render,
are greatly more important then others, hence
more essential and needful.
If the science of mind is at all any part of the
great system of knowledge, it follows that it has
its parts to play, and that the whole would not be
complete without it. The degree of its service
depends upon its comprehension, its position, and
means of usefulness, and the variety and degree of its
service. Every form of knowledge has its own spe-
cial objects-matter, and must be specially adapted
L 2
148 PART III.
for them ; it has also its universal relation as a part
of the whole, which it serves indirectly, in the
degree of its relation, means, and power. Every
form of knowledge has its more particular and
professed business : at the same time, every thing
stands related to the whole, and helps to complete
it.
There are some particular branches of know-
ledge to which the science of mind is specially
connected. The relation between things is mediate
or immediate, near or remote, common or special ;
there is a relation between the most extreme
things, but it is reacted and dependent upon
various mediate links and conditions. While meta-
physics stands related to the whole body of know-
ledge, it stands nearer to some parts than it does
to others.
1. Metaphysics stands in intimate relation to
theology. Theology reaches its systematic aim
either through the objects and laws of nature,
or through the truths and light of revelation ;
hence it is called natural or revealed.
The object- matter of theology is God, in His
nature, and His design, will, and laws, towards
men and the universe. Theology is absolutely a
science of mind, and that in the loftiest and most
sacred sense. It treats of the Divine mind,
relative to human interest and destiny ; hence it
METAniYSICS. 119
comprehends universal intelligence, law, and order.
Mental science opens the door and leads on theo-
logy ; it strengthens the mind for il s successful
pursuit, and feeds and supports its premises and
bulwarks. It is difficult to think, how theology
can exist and be defended, without some know-
ledge of the laws of cause, of being, and of thought.
Philosophy and theology are two sisters, having
their origin in one source, their converse about
common objects, and their aim and results in the
same ultimate conclusions. They are intended to
serve each other in their career, to rectify each other
in their inadvertencies, and to support each other
in their common and truthful conclusions. From
the nature and order of things, theology is more
dependent as a science upon philosophy, than
philosophy is upon theology ; because it is wider
in its range, freer in its action, richer in its means
and resources of illustration and defence. Philo-
sophy existed before systematic theology had any
form ; it is based upon the fact of mind and some
final cause behind its very first premises, and is
defended by its skill and instruments. Theology
and philosophy go a long way together, having
common sympathy and end, — truth, and common
happiness. Theology is more of a statement,
according to certain formula? and supposed re-
vealed truths ; philosophy is more of a search after
150 Part hi.
truth, ^yitllOut any assumption or prescription of
infallible record whatever. Theology is limited
within a wriiten record ; hence dogmatic and
narrow, as interpreted by human system ; philo-
sophy is bounded by no written record, it sinks
into the deep, and ascends to the lofty places of
the universe, searches out mysteries, and traverses
the invisible and the unknown infinitude of mind
and space. The Bible is the test of the theologian,
consciousness that of the philosopher.
Theology is more conservative in its spirit and
tendency than philosophy, because the comple-
ment of its truths is revealed ; hence the philoso-
pher is more liberal in his views, and universal in
his sympathies and researches, than the theolo-
gian. The theologian believes himself as having
found all ; the philosopher believes himself as
having found nothing fully. The theologian is
satisfied with the light and truths he has; the
philosopher ever sighs and searches for more light
and truth. The theologian is ever in danger of
becoming narrow, illiberal, and despotic in thought
and assumption; and the mere acquaintance with
theology, and nothing else, will almost surely lead
to such undesirable results. The metaphysician is
in danger of becoming too speculative, sceptical,
and confident in the power and light of reason.
Theology may be of good service to the meta-
METAPHYSICS. 151
physician to modify his speculation, and show him
that there is something higher than human reason
in the universe : it may preserve from scepticism
and despair. Philosophy may serve the theologian,
by giving him broader and more catholic views
of God, men, and truth; it may preserve from
assumptions infallibility, the pharisaical boast of
orthodoxy, and the loud anathemas against all
views and things, except those of the narrow
dogma or adopted party.
One thing is certain that the Divine voice in
words is not different from that in works ; and if
they be rightly interpreted, the conclusion will be
one. But true philosophy is often a very different
thing from the opinions of philosophers; so is
true theology, from theologians. It is not a
discord between theology and philosophy that
causes collision ; but a want of harmony of thought
and feeling between theologians and philosophers.
There is nothing in the nature, tendency, and
intention of philosophy and theology antagonistic
to each other : both perfectly agree in themselves,
in their special functions, and yet in their common
service and end. The echo of Divine reason must
be the same in consciousness, as it is in true
revelation : rightly read, they will harmoniously
agree.
2. Philosophy stands also nearly related to
153 PART III.
politics. In all walks of knowledge there are
some thiujis common and alike to them all ; which
cannot be acquired without the same qualificatit)ns.
It is a condition in all alike, that the mind must
a quire a certain acuteness and vigour before any
ot them can be pursued with effective results.
These, philosophy imparts to the mind, which is
the one common power in the pursuit and dis-
covery of all knowledge. But every form of
knowledge has something peculiar to itself in it,
which requires special qualification to its right
performance. Politics has a common work and
object ; it has also its special Avork, and the way
of doing it. It views and deals with man as a
rational responsible being ; it is true that it views
man on his material side as well, but always
through his higher nature — the mental. In
enacting and administering laws, man is viewed as
a being of intelligence, will, and conscience.
Before laws of reason and equity, suitable to
man as a being of reason, of limit, of conditions,
and states, can be correctly enacted, and justly
administered, it is needful to know something of
the nature of such a being ; this mental science is
the best instrument to impart.
In order to carry out the work of politics
rightly and faithfully, the politician is under the
necessity to know something of causes and effects ;
METAPHYSICS. 153
of laws and relations; of the human intellect,
passion, conscience, and will ; of mental idio-
syncrasies ; of differences and likenesses ; of
human motives and actions; of the nature of
truth and falsehood ; the cause of happiness and
misery ; and of human ability in certain conditions,
and his inability in others. The want of knowing
the human mind better is one reason that so many
laws are enacted, so unnatural to the nature of
man, and so unreasonable in their requirements
and provision, hence opposed often by revolution,
and repealed by force, or by higher reason. It
will be a happy event for people and countries,
when their legislators will study more, and under-
stand better, the laws of mind ; then better laws
will be enacted, and greater stability established.
Before any man aspires to be a maker of laws for
his fellow men, he ought at least to have this
qualification in a superior degree, — the knowledge
of mental science. If legislators made it their
business to know themselves better, we should
have fewer legislators, but far better in quality;
juster laws ; happier countries ; more satisfied
people ; and more stable institutions. Instead of
the circumstantial and conventional qualifications,
this would be both real, superior, and of universal
advantage,
3. General jurisprudence stands nearly related
154 PABT III.
and greatly indebted to the science of mind. All
things which belong to man, are studied directly
or indirectly in reference to him. They are thus
studied in themselves, or in man himself; for a
knowledge of him is to know the counterparts of
his being.
Jurisprudence has men in view, in certain rela-
tions, and under special conditions ; if those rela-
tions and conditions did not exist, there could be
no such system as jurisprudence. (1.) It views man
as subject of law. (2.) As free and capable of
moral and responsible action. (3.) As a being of
purposes and motives. (4.) As a being of various
relations. (5.) As a being in a condition of
doing wrong, and of being wronged. (6.) As a
being of merit or demerit, according to the nature
of his actions. Not only is mental philosophy an
assistance to jurisprudence, but an essential
necessity to its right understanding and practice.
To study jurisprudence in theories apart from men,
is often nothing better than legal dogmas, without
either fitness, truth, or reason; but when the
higher nature and relations of man are studied,
true and righteous jurisprudence is understood ;
for all are for him, and whatever answers his
wants and relations is fit and true. No one can ad-
vance or practise jurisprudence on an enlightened
ground, without a knowledge of mental science.
METAPHYSICS. 155
4. There is a near relation between the science
of mind, and that department of knowledge which
treats of disease and remedy — the healing art. It
is undeniable that there is a very near union be-
tween the mind and the body, and many of the
diseases of the body proceed from the influence of
the mind over the material organism. It is needful
for the medical student to understand something
of the laws, emotions, and power of the mind, in
order to know more accurately what kinds of dis-
eases are more particularly produced by the power
of the mind over the body, and the way and the
degree they are thus produced. A knowledge of
the laws of mind would often simplify and solve
many perplexed and complicated cases, and be the
means, in many instances, to suggest the true
remedy, and, in all cases, of preventing many and
injurious prescriptions. For the want of this
power, the medical practitioner is deprived of the
skill and power he might and ought to have ; and
not unfrequently he mistakes and fails, where he
might be right and successful. Ignorance of the
laws of mind and their influence upon the body,
misleads the medical practitioner often beyond his
legitimate boundaries, to wander amidst strange
rocks and bewildering paths; and this is all the
more intolerable in a guide who should know
something of the way, and that when life is in
156 PART III.
question. The importance of the function of the
medical practitioner demands at his hands this
knoAvledge, and all others which increase his skill
and power : he has to do with health and affliction,
with life and death. He owes this knowledge to
himself, and to all those who put themselves in his
hands.
By the exclusive study of the bodily organs in
their anatomical and physiological forms, no won-
der that the medical student so often becomes a
materialist. A knowledge of mental philosophy,
would be a kind of equipoise and a preservative
power, from that low and dull materialism so often
complained of as prevalent among medical students.
For the want of this knowledge, it is not unfre-
quent that mental diseases are treated as physical
ones: hence injury is done, and unhappy results
follow. Mental philosophy to the medical student
is a common benefit to society ; it increases his
resources, skill, and power, and makes him more
able to administer his important function to the
good and happiness of all patients.
5. Metaphysics stands related to history; and
that in such a degree, that history cannot be
successfully studied and fully written without it.
If history has to' account for phenomena, actions,
and revolutions, in their causes and results ; and if
mind is involved in these, and is the leading
METAPHYSICS. 157
agent in all, then it is needful, in order to have a
full and faithful record, to study the laws and
phenomena of mind. Much of history is insipidly
and superficially written; and one reason is, the
want of profounder knowledo;e, on the part of the
writers, of mental philosophy. History, if faithful,
is more a history of thought and motives, than of
mechanism and material forms and appearances.
The historian has perpetually to trace things to
their active and motive source ; he has constantly
to analyse thoughts and motives, in order to dis-
tinguish difference and draw right deductions :
before all this can be done effectively, the mind
must have acquired metaphysical training and
power.
The histor-,an constantly is thrown beyond the
boundary of clear and common facts, to the ground
of analogy and abstract reasoning; and if his-
torians were more familiar with the laws of mind,
history would be both more true and complete.
No uuphilosophical mind can write an indepen-
dent, true, and immortal history: there may be a
pretty relation of events and external transactions
written, which are pleasing to superficial readers ;
but if unphilosophically written, it is not deep and
faithful enough to be immortal. The most philo-
sophic histories of the past live and are admired ;
the shallow, the light, and the flippant ones, are
lUO PART III.
neither consulted nor respected. The present
numerous superficial histories will become effete ;
but the few philosophical ones will withstand the
ravage and revolution of time, and Avill go down
with honour and respect to futurity. Philosophy
gives to history breadth, faithfulness, and truthful-
ness, to universal law and being, which are the
same in every age, and the sure qualities of immor-
tality.
6. There is a near relation between metaphysical
science and logic. Logic is the production of me-
taphysics, and dependent upon it for being and
efficiency. Logic being the formal law of thought,
is a natural offshoot of the science which makes
mind the object-maLter of its study, which is
philosophy. Logic again is an essential effective
instrument in the pursuit of metaphysical science,
and cannot be pursued efficiently without it.
There is a partial dependence and service between
the two ; metaphysics depends partially upon logic,
logic depends entirely upon metaphysics. True
metaphysics advances the interest of logic; true
logic protects and guides the interest of meta-
physics. ^Vhen the logic* of people is bad, their
metaphysics cannot be good ; when their meta-
physics is bad, their logic is the same. They go
together ; as one fares, it shares with the other ;
if one is well off, so is the other ; if one badly off, it
METAPHYSICS. 159
is the case with the other. They are twins pos-
sessing one common sympathy, they were born
only a little after each other, they live together,
and if one dies the other will not long survive.
Their source is one— mind ; their end is one— the^
advancement of mind and truth.
7. Though metaphysical and m;fthematical
science differ, yet there is a near alliance and
sympathy existing between the two. These two
great instrumental powers in the advancement of
knowledge, have been perpetually set against each
other. The mathematician has ever frowned philo-
sophy down as vague and indefinite in its demon-
strations and conclusions, and applauded mathe-
matics as the only method of exact and pure
knowledge. The metaphysician, again, has often
denounced mathematics as a material, formal, and
stiff thing, never able to transcend to the higher
and nobler region of thought. Now these two
sciences are needful and compatible with each
other, so that the metaphysician and the mathe-
matician may live on good terms with each other,
and think themselves brothers, and co-workers in
the advancement of the work and happiness of the
universe.
A difference does not necessitate a contra-
diction; there are differences between these
sciences^ but no contradiction. Some of the
I GO TART III.
points of differences are the following. (1.) They
differ in their objects-matter. The objects-matter
of matliematics are form and magnitude; those of
metaphysics are cause, mind, existence, with their
laws and relations. (2.) Mathematics deals with
the tangible, the visible, and the material ; hence
a material science: metaphj-sics deals with pheno-
mena, the unseen, the supernatural ; hence a more
spiritual and a superior science. (3.) ]\Iatberaatics
is mechanical in its operation ; it has but one
path, and all must do precisely as they are bidden,
or they surely will get wrong : metaphysics is
more free and rational; and allows her disciples
greater range and liberty to seek truth and evi-
dence. (1.) The tendency of matliernatics is to
materialize, formulize, and stereotype thought ;
the tendency of metaphysics is to spiritualize,
liberalize, expand, and diversify thought. (5.) The
work of mathematics is more limited ; it is to
settle the material problems of the material uni-
verse ; and, if that is ever done, its work will be
over: but metaphysics deals in the infinite, it
deals with dateless cause and being, and with end-
less existence. Hence, its woi'k will never end,
because its objects are illimitable. (G.) Philosophy
existed before mathematics; and gave existence to
the latter. I\Ien always philosophized, and their
philosophical broodings about the material universe
METAPHYSICS. 161
gave existence to mathematics. Mathematics was
created by philosophy as an instrument to be used
for her service; but the child since has often
raised its heels against its more venerable and
worthy parent.
But there are points of resemblance as well as
of difference. (1.) The mental processes in the
prosecution of both are very much alike ; — the
analytical, and the synthetical. (2.) Both aim at
common ultimate ends, — the education of the
mind and the acquirement of truth and know-
ledge. They reign over different empires, and
have their individual function and business : but
they may dwell and commune with each other in
peace and harmony as mother and child ; and as
the visible and the invisible do in our persons, and
in the universe. (3.) They both require the same
qualification of mind in strength and perfection to
make any proficiency in their knowledge. The
first metaphysician would be also the first mathe-
matician, if he turned fully his attention that way ;
so would the first mathematician in metaphysics :
and no one but the first-class power of mind can
be great and first in either. They are linked
together and cannot be separated. They are the
highest achievements of thought : they are com-
mon servants of the one great universe.
8. Painting and sculpture in their tlieory are
M
162 PART III.
partially dependent and obligated to meta-
physics. The end and aim of these in theoiy
and practice in their relation to man is the perfect
representation and delineation of the form and
expressions of the mind and body natnrally,
spontaneously, and perfectly. Inasmuch as the
expressions and actions of the body are produced
and governed by the thoughts, the volitions, and
feelings of the mind, they never can be under-
stood and delineated faithfully without some know-
ledge of the invisible mind which directs and
governs the whole. No art that is not faithful
to the deeper being and laws of human nature,
can stand the test of severe and true criticism,
and the ravage and the forces of time, because
deficient in truth, naturalness, and compre-
hensiveness.
9. Poetry owes much to metaphysics. The end
of poetry is, to express things in their true nature,
relation, and law, according to the harmony of
sound and pleasing sensibility. It is the inspiring
of true thought, with the fire of feeling, sponta-
neity of expression, harmony of sound, and unity
of design. Mind must always be the chief object-
matter of poetry, as well as the mighty and skilful
power which produces it. There are four things
requisite to constitute real poetry, — true and
comprehensive conception, harmony of sound.
METAPHYSICS. 103
purity of expression, and spontaneous, deep, and
pure feeling.
No one can express the various powers, re-
sources, susceptibilities, processes, and actions of
mind, without some knowledge of its nature, laws,
and conditions. No one can please, nor hold a
long and a mighty influence over the mind of
others, unless he is faithful to its character and
laws. Utility, power, and immutability, are in
truth and faithfulness, and whatever has not these
qualities, must ultimately die, though other things
which possess these, may share the same mournful
fate ; but the true and the faithful have a chance to
live, and they have also truth on their side ; but the
untrue and the unfaithful have law and all against
their existence, which make it impossible for
them to remain always. The order of God is
against the untrue and the unfaithful in knowledge
and art, as well as in life, which make it impossi-
ble for them to remain in immortal acceptance and
reverence. This is proved historically, as well as
deductively on the ground of abstract truth, equality,
and analogy. The great metaphysical poets have
come down to us; at least those which have come
down are most abstruse, and they are read and
admired partially on that ground. Would Homer
have retained his power ; would Virgil be fresh and
virgin; would Dante still impress us with awful
M 2
161 PART III.
grandeur, but for their metaphysical element?
Abstract the metaphysics of Shakespeare, and all
his life, eccentricity, beauty, and power, are for ever
gone. Milton would never have written Paradise
Lost, but for his metaphysical broodings and
sympathy; and take away this element, and it will
be no longer the splendid production of Milton,
neither will it any longer sway universal mind. The
chief power and charm of Wordsworth is in his
philosophical sympathies and touches : so is it the
case in a high degree in Tennyson. Many more,
of somewhat less magnitude and grandeur, might
be mentioned, both ancient and modern, who have
gained and retained their power, because of their
truthfulness and faithfulness to the nature and
laws of mind. So long as man is faithful to him-
self and the nearest and deepest laws of his
nature, it cannot be otherwise ; as he advances in
true knowledge of himself, he must accept what
is faithful to his nature, and refuse and despise
the contrary.
It may appear as a paradox, to say, that true
and great poetry grows in the soil of true philoso-
phy, yet it is true both to the law of things and
history. The superficial in thought can never be
splendid in poetry ; the untrue and narrow in
conception, can never be great and grand in poetry.
Inspire the deep with poetical fire, it will be both
METAPHY?,ICS. 165
lofty and splendid ; give harmony of sound and
beauty of form to the metaphysical sympathies
and thoughts of the mind, there will flow out of it
glorious and immortal poetry.
10. The science of ethics stands in near relation
and dependence to metaphysics. Ethics is a science
of the mind in certain of its relations and sympa-
thies. Ethics is a science of the human will and
motives, in relation wdtli their expressions and
actions. The science of ethics all through refers
to a rational and accountable nature ; yet, its
immediate objects are those powers which imme-
diately produce and govern them. These powers, —
the will, the motives, and the affections, are powers
of the mind under certain conditions and modifica-
tions, and are known through the expressions of the
mind. Ethics can never be possible, but on the
ground of mind ; it cannot be understood and
enforced, but through the philosophy of mind.
Things must be studied and understood through
their laws, their relations, and their dependents :
so must ethical science be understood through meta-
physics, which is the science of mind and universal
being.
11. Mental science is nearly related to religion,
and capable to render to it the greatest service.
E/Cligion is a broader thing than theology : whilst
theology views religion theoretically, and as such
166 PART III.
presented to the human intellect, religion com-
prehends both the reason, the heart, and the life
of its subjects. Religion does not exclude the
theory, but is based upon it ; but it goes beyond
and deeper, and is more real and powerful than a
theory can be.
Both the danger, power, and happiness of
religion, is in the fact, that it unites with, and
roots in human feeling. The chief danger in
religion is, deception and delusion ; and this for
want of higher and correcter knowledge of the
mind, and its laws, and dependents. The dangers
and extremes are of two kinds ; — fanaticism,
depression : one is in aerial delusive region, the
other is in the region of fog and doubt. Both of
these conditions proceed from a want of higher
knowledge of the mind; a more correct knowledge
of the philosophy of the mind, would often cure
both : it would be the means of comfort to the
depressed, and undeceive the fanatist. So long
as mental science is divorced from religion, and
considered antagonistic to it ; so long will religion
itself be a danger and in danger, and men deluded
and depressed, ignorant of their privileges, rela-
tions, and conditions. No one can fully understand
the state of his mind, unless he knows something
of the laws and phenomena of mind.
167
CHAPTER VI.
MET.\PHYSIGAL DANGERS.
To say that there are dangers around meta-
physics, is the same as may be said of every other
good thing. What is there without dangers in
some way or other connected with it in this world
of darkness, of wrong, and of folly ? Every form
of knowledge has some particular forms of dangers,
to which it may be pushed, or lead unto : even reli-
gion itself has its various and great dangers
around all its truths, duties, and blessings ; enough
to testify the goodness and excellency of any-
thing, if it is not inherently dangerous in itself,
and naturally and unavoidably leads to dangers
and ruin.
No one can help many dangers that may sur-
round his path : if the path be true in itself, and
the motives and means used right ones, the path
in itself is right, and no one should discourage the
traveller from walking in it. Many good things are
in danger from the imperfect relations and asso-
ciations of this state of things, and the want of
168 PART III.
proper qualifications in the use of them, or the
tendency to folly and error of the agent.
The path of knowledge in this world is like a
stranger iu a strange country without either map,
finger-posts, or milestones to direct his path, and
guard him on the right track. He is left very
much to himself; he has to consult stars, and all
he meets with ; and, after all his inquiries, he is left
much to himself. Or it may be compared to a
mariner on the sea, in constant danger from
rocks, reefs, shoals, fogs, waves and tempests, and
that without knowledge of the route, latitude, and
charts, and the proper instruments for such a
condition. The traveller and the mariner have to
use all in their power to reach the end of their
journey safely ; and if they succeed under such
conditions, it is a matter of wonder and gratitude.
But if they neglect the few means in their hands,
no one blames the journey and the voyage, but
their neglect, or the condition in which they were
placed. Not only man is in a dangerous condi-
tion, but there is a positive tendency in man in
his career after truth, to neglect the true means,
and go after the vain and the wrong.
In the hand of man, the most innocent thing
becomes dangerous ; and the most needful and
beneficial in itself, the means of misery and of
death. Fire is a good thing in itself; but it may
METAPHYSICS. 169
he made, in the hand of human nature and wick-
edness, a most destructive instrument. Books are
useful and needful things in themselves ; but
often they are the channels of wrong impression
and falsehood. A hundred things may be named
as good and essentially needful in themselves, yet
in the hand of man they become bad and dan-
gerous ; and if philosophy were not capable of the
same abuse, it would be both unaccountable and
incredible. The better anything is, greater is its
danger of being abused by man : because the sym-
pathy and motives of men are often below the
level of a very pure good thing ; and if abused at all,
by the extreme contrast it appears all the greater
evil, and is really so. A wise thing, if abused, is
all the greater foolishness ; and a lofty thing, if it
falls, has a greater fall and crash, than a lower
and a meaner thing. Philosophy, if it is made an
instrument of abuse at all, becomes more danger-
ous because of its superior power ; and appears all
the more visible and extreme, on account of its
inherent excellency and superiority of power.
Philosophy must be viewed in two ways, — as a
thing which influences the minds and lives of
men, and as a thing acted upon and moulded
by men. It is a thing developed and re-
duced into system by human minds. On the
other hand, it is an instrument which developes
170 PART III.
and perfects the human mind in skill and power
in the search after truth. The danger of philo-
sophy may be either to itself, or to others, as
we view and consider it. As an object, it may
be misconceived, maltreated, wrongly formed and
corrupted ; as a power, it may mislead, deform,
and injure those whom it thus moulds and
governs. These are two different inquiries ; yet
they bear an intimate necessary relation to each
other. If philosophy is corrupted as an object, it
cannot but injure as an instrumental power:
again, if its influence upon its subjects is naturally
and necessarily an evil one, the same influence has
a reflex upon itself.
First, What are the dangers philosophy is
exposed to as an object, if any ? In this respect
philosophy does not escape the lot of all things in
this life. All good and innocent things are in
danger from some source, in one way or other. The
happiest prospect may be blighted, the purest
flower may be destroyed, the noblest organism
may be deformed, and the most useful life may be
spoiled and maltreated. For this an object is not
responsible itself, others must answer for the mis-
doing. Perhaps in no department of knowledge
is the famous saying of Pope, that a little learning
is a dangerous thing, more applicable than in that
of philosophy ; for the reasons that its powers are so
METAPHYSICS. 171
great ; the resources required to understand and
appreciate it so various ; and no one can be a com-
petent judge of its truth and value, unless he grasps
the whole, and that from all points in all possible
relations.
There are various ways in which it is possible tl
inflict injury upon the purity and simplicity of all
forms of knowledge, so upon philosophy the same.
1. One way is, by mixing with its truths mere
human opinion, so that in the long run traditional
elements are established, and become more pro-
minent and powerful than the demonstrative and
true. 2. It is possible to make it the end of
human thought and purpose, rather than the
means and condition to advance and cultivate the
human mind : making it a kind of an absolute
idea, rather than the path to the true altar, and
the ladder to the one God and truth. 3. Or
making it the shelter of prejudice or sectarianism ;
for there may be party and dogmatical theories in
philosophy as there are in religion. When party
views and dogmatical theories are grafted on pre-
tended philosophy, and sheltered by its name and
power, they become invulnerable ; and human
advancement an impossibility. Such are a few of
the ways mental science is in danger, viewing it
objectively, and has even thus suffered at the hand
of men repeatedly.
172 PART III.
Secondly, Is pliilosophy in danger as an instru-
mental power? if it is, in what way, and what is
it? Philosoi)hy is a great power wielded by the
human intellect ; intended to advance the interest
of man, but capable of being abused into au
instrument of deformity and injury. In order to
avoid this dan";er and to the right use of this
splendid instrument, it is needful to know the cha-
racter of the danger, and v.here it lies. It is not
an unconditional necessity, but a thing that may
be avoided and cured by knowledge of the wrong
and right; and practise one, and avoid the other.
The danger of philosophy is common to all sub-
lunary things. Money is made to facilitate the com-
fort and advancement of mankind ; but often by the
use which is made of it, the advancement and
happiness of the race are obstructed by it. Light
is good, and intended to serve virtue, and in all
â– ways increase the happiness and advance the inter-
ests of the whole universe ; but in the hand of
man it is made to serve his selfish cupidity, and
corrupt and mean purposes.
1. One of the dangers of philosophy is, of being
made an instrument in the hand of man to spread
and support human creeds and opinions, so that by
its assistance they become more potent and invulne-
rable. Often has philosophy been thus degraded
into a mean instrument to perpetuate darkness
and wrong, instead of carrying out her original
METAPHYSICS. 173
and natural mission, discovering truth, spreading
light, knowledge, and liberty, in her train every-
where among men. The moment philosophy is
thus degraded to support and spread human creeds
and opinions, it is deprived of its liberty, dignity,
and high end and position, and is no longer
worthy of the name.
2. Philosophy may be also in danger of devoting
her energy, or amusing herself on trivial questions
which are in themselves of little or of no import-
ance to mankind ; or spending her energies over
questions which are not within the province of
human knowledge to understand in this v/orld ; and
if known would not promote man^s usefulness or
happiness. The history of philosophy in the
Middle Ages, and of the Alexandrian Schools of
Philosophy, shows without a doubt the possibility
at least of this result.
3. It may be mentioned as another possible
result which philosophy may fall into, the mag-
nifying of human reason above its true level.
Philosophy is a system of reason; it begins and
ends with reason. There is a tendency in the zeal
of men to push opinions and theories to extremes.
The objects of our pleasure and ambition are in
danger of being magnified at the expense of other
things, — such is reason with the philosopher. Some
religious systems depreciate human reason, and
174 PART III.
make it a worse and a feebler thing than it is.
Now, of the two extremes, it is better and more
hopeful for mankind to magnify human reason,
than always to depreciate its power, and discourage
its action. To depreciate human reason is dis-
couraging and enfeebling ; to magnify it is both
encouraging and strengthening. Reason is the
best thing we have ; it should be fed and encou-
raged, directed and cultivated, for the advancement
of the universe, the good of man himself, and the
honour of God.
It is an unwarrantable conclusion to say, that
philosophy, even in her extreme magnifying of
human reason, leads to direct and necessary infi-
delity. The magnifying of reason in man does not
logically lead to the conclusion, that there is no
higher reason; it rather exalts our view of the
infinite reason in the Divine. Unless philosophy
deifies human reason and makes it absolute and
final, it cannot lead to infidelity, but the contrary.
Nothing but unnatural and strained conclusion
can assert, that a system of human reason leads
necessarily to infidelity. It may lead to rationalism,
and rationalism criticize the religious systems of
men, and find them wanting; but the rationalist may
be as devout and sincere in his attachment to truth,
God, and His government, as the most religious
zealot, and that, in his own view, on a higher and
METAPHYSICS. 175
more reasonable ground. It may become a system
of pure reason, hence of pure criticism : it may
criticize the Bible, and even find it, according to
its own standard, wanting : it does not follow even
then that it is really infidel; it may even under
that condition be true in its faith and allegiance
to God, the infinite Source of truth and reason.
There is an infinite tendency in the religious sys-
tems of men of every age and party, to make all
men who dare to criticize the common dogmas of
hereditary beliefs, infidels ; hence philosophers
will be always liable to be thus accused, because
they dare to think independently, and criticize
freely the opinions of men. So long as men will thus
narrowly and uncharitably accuse one another of
infidelity, because they think and reason above
their fellows, it will never go well with human
reason, religion, and society.
But the danger in magnifying human reason too
highly is, to refuse brighter light, which is higher
and beyond the province of reason to discover, which
withal may agree with human reason, as the beast
agrees with man, only different in the scale of degree.
To make human reason the absolute test of belief, is
as unphilosophical as it is incorrect in logic and ex-
perience : we every day in life meet things which we
cannot understand and explain, and philosophy it-
self ends her journey in enlightened ignorance.
176 PART III.
4. From the fact of the sovei'eign superiority of
philosophy, she is iu danger of becomiug too in-
fallible in tone, and absolute in her conclusions.
It is in the nature of all things, as they rise in
power and resources, to exercise, unless checked,
an absolute sway and indisputable right to dictate
and govern. Philosophy requires always to re-
mind herself, that human reason is at best a
fallible thing, and the best conclusions in human
reasoning may be at fault. She will always need to
exercise much patience and pity over the common
dulness of maukiud generally. She must be hum-
ble on one hand, and patient and forbearing on
the other.
Philosophy may become dogmatical as v/cU as
theology ; when that is the case, it forgets its
function, and is no longer philosophy ; and becomes
injurious in its education upon man, instead of
beneficial to his powers, happiness, and usefulness.
The vocation of philosophy is to strengthen, ex-
pand, and correct the human intellect, and that by
exercise in true and lofty subjects, and enlightened
and faithful guidance. AMien philosophy makes
systems synonymous with truth, definitions as in-
fallible axioms, and conclusions as true beyond
doubt and improvement ; it shuts up the path
of progress, makes reasoning useless, and settles
down in ease as if all the work were done. In
METAPHYSICS, 177
such a condition, her influence would be enfeebling
and disastrous, upon all her disciples. Such a
pass is only possible, not probable, to fall upon the
whole to the lot of philosophy ; it is adverse to its
very nature and intention, and there will be al-
ways some splendid spirits, who will break through
human conclusions, and test truth by a higher law
and surer criterion. There will be always some
Minerva in philosophy to test and lead the human
intellect to some olivelike freshness, progress, and
victory.
178
CHAPTER YII.
THE ENCOURAGEMENTS AND DISCOURAGEMENTS WHICH MEET
THE STUDENT OF METAI'HYSICS.
Things viewed indifferent relations and aspects,
affect us variously and differently ; they often
present themselves discouragingly and encourag-
ingly to our view at the same time ; viewing the
spiritual, the heavenly, and the eternal, in the
light of the earthly, the material, and present
pleasures, they appear in a discouraged light and
aspect. Goodness appears discouragingly to the
selfish and bad ; labour is without attraction, and
a trouble, to the idle ; culture and knowledge have
their discouraging aspects to the sensualist, the
materialist, and the slothful ; whilst to others, of
different views and sympathies, they appear
encouraging and attractive.
The true and the right, when viewed through
their true mediums and in their natural relations,
have no discouraging aspects. When the true
appears discouragingly to us, there is something
M'rong in our views, sentiments, or in our ground
METAPHYSICS. 179
and medium of spectation. The true and the
false never correspond ; the Divine and the human
do not always agree ; some things appear en-
couraging to-day, but in their relation with the
future discouraging ; others full of encouragements
in the light of the future, but discouraging in their
present aspects and relations. There are things
which appear full of encouragements in relation to
earth and time, but otherwise in relation to
heaven and eternity ; there are others which
appear attractive and glorious in the light of
heaven and eternity, but not so in time and
the world. As men and relations differ, and as
the wrong in character and relation exists as well
as the right, what is discouraging to some in
certain place and relation is encouraging to others,
in different place and relation.
There is no form of knowledge without its
aspects of discouragement to some, and from cer-
tain conditions and relations in life ; indeed, the
best and brightest thing in the world, is full of
discouragement to some. The discouragements
which the true and right have, is either senti-
mental, or conventional, blind, or selfish, which can-
not stand the test of light, nor bear to be weighed
in an even balance. Things must be tested in
their characters and results, and not according to
the discouragements which they present to many.
N 3
380 fART III.
In this world the good as well as the bad has its
discouragements to many, and even much more.
Discouragement is a test of nothing but of the
different sentiments and views which govern
individuals. When viewed iu reference to meta-
â– physical knowledge, it only shows the different
views and feelings of persons relative to it : its
character and utility must be tested elsewhere.
In order to understand things correctly, the
character and source of the encouragements and
discouragements must be understood. If the
source is good and the motive right, the encourage-
ment is good in nature, and the object of it cannot
be wrong. Truth and reason encourage the same
in character as themselves; the false and the
blind encourage their kind alike. It is an evidence
of goodness that it is encouraged by the good, and
that in the degree of the knowledge and perfection
of the source of encouragement : so with the bad
and the wrong. If the encouragement is rational
and true, the thing thus encouraged cannot be
unreasonable and false ; on the contrary, if the
encouragement be groundless and feint, the thing
thus encouraged cannot be strong and well
grounded.
It is beyond the limit and purpose of this
chapter to speak of discouragements particularly,
and in detail; the object is to point out simply
METAPHYSICS. 181
some of the leading discouragements and en-
couragements, connected with mental science ; and
this more as matter of suggestion than of detail.
Encouragements and discouragements are either
material, intellectual, political, moral, or religious.
All are in the object or in the agent ; or in the
relations and circumstances which are between the
two. In their character they are either absolute
or conditional : in relation they are either personal
or relative. Every form of encouragement or
discouragement, in its intrinsic character is natural
or conventional, circumstantial or real, in the
nature and relation of things as they appear in
themselves, or in the thoughts, habits, prejudices,
and superficial conditions of men. These various
forms of encouragements and discouragements,
though possessing something in common, have
withal their own peculiar features and character,
which cannot here be fully developed into their
legitimate detail.
It is shown in some of the preceding pages, that
mental science is a necessity ; hence all the discou-
ragements which may appear against it are conven-
tional, proceeding from habits and prejudices, which
men have wrongly acquired. If mental science be
a necessity, it also follows, that it must have real
encouragement for its prosecution ; for every thing
true has encouragements both in itself and results.
183 PART III.
Indeed, it is a sufficient encouragement to the
true in conviction and motive, to be convinced of
the truth of a thing, to pursue it with pleasure and
earnestness. His aim is loftier than human pleas-
ing; his conviction is deeper than men's opinion.
He does not pursue things because they are ap-
proved of by the majority, neither does he relin-
quish his perseverance because the multitude
happen to be against him. He perseveres under a
conviction of the need, the truth, and importance
of the thing in view ; and if he relinquishes the task,
it is because he has received more light and dif-
ferent convictions, or his resources and powers have
failed him, hence the object unattained and hopeless.
It may be mentioned as one discouragement in
the view of many, it requires stronger powers and
greater application in its pursuit, than in other
branches of knowledge. The easy is pleasing to
natural feeling, whilst the hard is irksome and
avoided. Men prefer the surface to the depth, the
smooth to the hard, the easily attained to the
arduous and the difficult. In the pursuit of know-
ledge, quality is not considered so much as quantity ;
real value is not desired so much as ease and
pleasure in the pursuit; ultimate results are not
so much a matter of calculation and motive, as
the ease of the means and the sacrifice required in
the acquisition.
METAPHYSICS. 183
The details of life in the small biographies of the
day are read extensively with avidity ; political
and commercial daily occurrences are looked for
and read by the million ; general history, which
never requires high powers of intellect to read, has
its numerous class of readers and students ; the
religious, sentimental, and dogmatical literature of
every age and country, have had a large place in
the minds and hearts of men. Most branches in
material science do not require the highest mental
powers and application to advance, and in some de-
gree at least to succeed in them. Not so in mental
science : in order to succeed in any degree, there
are required high power and long and great appli-
cation. There are required piercing insight, pa-
tient concentration, acute analysis, comprehensive
grasp, independent thought, and high confidence in
the laws of being and human powers. Not so in
material science and other forms of knowledge :
hence they attract more attention and admirers
than this their superior sister. Mental science
requires earnest thinking, whilst other forms of
knowledge are acquired with moderate and leisurely
toiling : hence many give it up in discouragement
and despair, and turn to others more easy and
congenial with their views and feelings.
The result in metaphysical study is not so
visible and immediate as in most other depart-
184 PART III.
inents of la];our : hence a source of discourage-
ment to the faint and timid student. In physical
science, and other paths of literary toil, the re-
sults generally are immediate and visible to all; so
the reward is sure, and something equal to the
effort and sacrifice made. Not so with the student
of mental science : he has to toil without being
recognised as a common benefactor ; he has to
spend his efforts Avithout seeing tangible results
clear and distinct, as in physical science, to his
efforts. The result of metaphysical science ope-
rates directly upon the mind itself, and that is not
seen and acknowledged by men generally, accord-
ing to its real value. Metaphysics labours deeper
and anterior to other forms of knowledge, so
science in general is more indebted to it than it
will acknowledge ; for men generally concern them-
selves about tangible results, and are careless and
blind to the invisible operative causes behind the
scenes. In this world the material and the tangible
are ever appreciated above the mental and the in-
visible ; so religion and mental science are estimated
lower than those things which directly concern the
material of life.
The end and value of metaphysics are in the
fact that they are indirect and slow in their
result ; thus their real usefulness is accom-
plished : but this demands at the hand of
METAPHYSICS. 185
the student greater patience, fortitude^ and per-
severance.
There is another discouraging aspect in the path
of the metaphysical student ; he has to pursue his
work in greater isolation than most other stu-
dents. Men generally like to work and travel in
company, and that specially when the toil is hard
and discouraging, and the journey far and dilGfi-
cult. Men require in all the hard and needful
toil of life, mutual encouragement and support ;
which they are able to give one to another. When
toiling and travelling together, they possess the
same aim and aspiration, and are conscious of the
same doubts and difficulties ; whilst the lonesome
traveller and worker are deprived of them. The
paths to other sciences are not so difficult, and the
work not so hard ; the devotees are found in
larger companies ; hence, have more mutual
intercourse and encouragement. The metaphy-
sical student has to travel often an unknown path
alone ; and pursue a hard work single-handed :
he has not many companions to encourage, no
multitude of admirers to cheer him on. To pur-
sue his work with diligence and success, he
requires no ordinary measure of self-posses-
sion, determination, earnestness, and devoted
perseverance.
Not only has the student of metaphysics to
186
PART III.
travel much alone, but he has perpetually to
meet the suspicion and the stream of opposite
sympathy. The vulgar generally have neither
conception of the end and meaning of the science,
nor any sympathy and attachment for it ; the
leading devotees of material science, and other
branches of learning generally, have a kind of sus-
picion and aversion to it which they do not fail to
show when occasion serves. No one needs such
independence of conviction, indomitable courage,
and single and lofty aim, as the student of meta-
physics. The science has fewer patrons and more
opposition, because less understood and more
neglected than others : for these and other reasons,
there are higher qualifications necessary to pursue
it successfully.
The science of mind has peculiar encourage-
ments to offer, as well as her discouragements to
all her sincere and faithful students. All true
objects of pursuit have attractions and encourage-
ments in common ; but there are peculiar attrac-
tions and inducements offered by some, either in
magnitude, quality, or some peculiar advantages
and usefulness, which encourage and support the
toil of study. Men view different objects from
their own standpoint of spectation, and through
the medium of their own sympathies and senti-
ments, so that often what is peculiarly encouraging
METAPHYSICS. 187
and attractive to one is the reverse to the other.
So long as men differ in powers, positions,
interests, and feelings, and the influences which
mould and govern their lives are so widely differ-
ent, the views and conclusions of men will be
widely at variance, relative to certain objects of
ambition and pursuit.
As the advantages of metaphysics have been
already partly shown in a chapter of this volume,
it is all the less needful here to dwell at great
length on the encouragements of the study. But
it is not intended here, more than just to intimate in
a few sentences the encouragements of the sub-
ject, more as a matter of consistency and harmony
of plan, than of absolute necessity and exhaustive
reasoning.
The science of metaphysics has attraction to a
class of minds, because it deals with the highest
and most difficult objects and laws of thought;
which is in the inverse to the discouragements it
presents to most minds. There is a class of minds
everywhere, that is impatient of the ordinary
routine of life ; they live in different regions ;
they seek new paths, and travel in a way peculiar
to themselves ; and are never satisfied but among
the difficult, the lofty, and the unknown ; like spi-
rited boys, more venturesome than their comrades,
climbing to dizzy places, or carrying their sports
188
PART III.
beyond their sympathies and capabilities : or like
enterprising men in different departments of the
business of life, who extend their lines of opera-
tions beyond the daring and even the thought of
common-place men. So are certain miuds ; they
rise to dizzy altitudes; they diverge from the
ordinary path ; they sink deeper than ordinary
thinkers ; they want to know something that has
not been found out and known before. The force of
their genius and the majesty of their power push
them forward : their restless energy, their daunt-
less spirit, their indomitable courage, their bound-
less resources, their lofty aim, piercing thought,
and great power, make them unfit companions for
the majority in life, and of necessity, because of
their great superiority, they are obliged to walk
the path of science alone. In vain you tell them
it is dangerous, useless, prohibited by mandates
and decrees, and waste of strength and resources.
You cannot prevent them by all threatening or
persuasion; they consult no plan of prudential
etiquette ; they adhere to no circumstantial influ-
ences ; they break through all prohibition and
associational difficulties. They follow the deep
law of their nature ; they submit to their own
inward mighty power; the current stream of their
thoughts breaks over all artificial boundaries.
METAPHYSICS. 189
The inexhaustible character of the study is suit-
able and an inducement to an immortal aspiration
to pursue it. Many other forms of knowledge,
either on account of their limit, or because of
their character, may be superseded and left behind,
as unfit any longer for thought and pursuit : but
the science of mind, of cause, of being, and of
the infinite, will never be superseded. It is
boundless in its object-matter ; inherent in the
human mind ; and the spirituality of its character
makes it fit for the higher nature, and the endless
condition and relations of man. In this study,
man always carries with him a consciousness of the
inexhaustible, of the boundless, of the absolute,
and of the infinite ; which are befitting conditions
as counterparts of his need and nature.
The study in its results gives peculiar advantage
to the mind of its students. It teaches the limits of
human thought ; hence it preserves from presump-
tion, checks pride, and teaches humility. As it has
already been intimated in a former page ; it
expands and strengthens the powers of the mind,
by communion with pure and lofty thoughts,
vigorous activity, and reflex influence. On this
ground as well as on others, it oflers peculiar
attractions to all who aspire after the development
of their highest nature.
It is a natural study suitable to the rational
190 PART 111.
nature of man. There can be nothing more
congenial and natural than the study of ourselves,
the laws, the relations, and cause of our being ;
and the laws and causes of universal phenomena
of mind. The study does not depend upon the
superficial conditions of life ; it can be pursued
under all the conditions of life, for all carry with
them always their consciousness ; they have ever
around them the phenomena of mind.
Piually, in this study there are peculiar charms
and interests, and that within the reach of all
devoted students. It produces a deep impression
of the individual identity of the mind ; of the
superiority of our spiritual nature ; of the
high purpose of our being ; and of the power
and resources of our nature. It brings the mind
into constant communion with the spiritual and
the higher condition of being; it impresses the
mind with the existence, the wisdom, the goodness,
and the designs of the Infinite. It raises the
mind to a world above the present ; and to a
sublimer and a happier condition of being. The
transient is lost in the constant ; the material for-
gotten in the spiritual ; the soul forgets the mean
and small things of common value, in her reflec-
tion upon and communion with the glorious, the
infinite, and the endless. Who then can depreciate
a study so natural, beneficial, lofty, and happy?
METAPHYSICS. 191
Let its records be read correctly, its objects and
aim be considered impartially, and its teaching
be applied rightly ; and it will advance man in
virtue, knowledge, power, truth, usefulness, and
happiness.
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